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Introduction
In 1928 von Neumann proved, with the so called minimax theorem, the existence of an
optimal strategy in two-person zero-sum games (see [40]). Later in 1944 he published
together with Morgenstern the book \Theory of Games and Economic Behavior", which
can be seen as cornerstone of the analysis of games in strategic form. Some years later in
1951 Nash proved, that all nite1 non-cooperative games have an equilibrium point. We
call a Nash-equilibrium a prole of strategies for each player, where one player cannot prot
from changing its strategy unilaterally. Since Nash's result is known, a lot of researchers
have sought for algorithms, which nd Nash-equilibria in nite games. There are various
publications about the computation of them. A good overview about the existing basic
algorithms and their common ground is given in [19]. For the two-player case the so-called
Lemke-Howson algorithm and the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm and for the N -player
case the Herings-van den Elzen algorithm and the Herings-Peeters algorithm are the most
famous ones. Those algorithms are implemented, for example, in Gambit a library of game
theory software (cf. [24]), which is the standard software for the analysis of nite games.
Leaving nite games { here games where the set of pure strategies for the players are nite
{ and turning to undiscounted stochastic games, we realize that the question whether all
undiscounted stochastic games have a Nash- or "-equilibrium for all " > 0 is still open,
even if the undiscounted stochastic game is \simple"2. Such a \simple" undiscounted non-
cooperative stochastic game, the so called quitting game, is the center of this thesis. The
game of our interest has nitely many players, where each player has only two possible
actions, namely continuing the game or quitting the game. All players make their decision
simultaneously and independently of each other. If at least one player decides to quit the
game, the game ends for all players and they receive a payo, that only depends on the
set of players, who did chose to quit the game. If nobody quits, the game continues to the
next round. If the game never ends, the payo to each player is zero. In 2001 the quitting
game was dened in general by Solan and Vieille (see [36]).
The question whether quitting games or undiscounted stochastic games in general always
have so called approximate equilibria is still open and there is no existing software for the
analysis of such games, or even stochastic games with more than two players, known. This
is the starting point of our work.
1Finite means here that the set of pure strategies for the players are nite.
2Stochastic games were considered rst by Shapley in 1953 (cf. [30]). For an overview on recent results
on stochastic games in general see e.g. [43].
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Introduction
The thesis consists of two main parts. The rst one is dedicated to questions concern-
ing the existence of equilibria in quitting games and the second one concentrates on the
computational analysis of quitting games.
We start in Chapter 1 with a review of existing results and literature, followed by the
denition of quitting games in general. Beside the usual denitions we state the underlaying
probability space and the random variables that are used to describe the game, which are
often missing in the existing literature. In Section 1.2, we consider the one-step game
corresponding to the quitting game, where we focus on perfect strategies, which play a
major role in the proofs of Chapter 2 and are here also used for example to prove the
existence of a Nash-equilibrium in one-step games. If one repeats the one-step game nitely
often we come to the nite quitting game, which is treated in Section 1.3. Vital results for
the computational analysis of quitting games are treated in Section 1.4, where we work out
the relations between the structure of the strategy prole of the players and the expected
payo the players achieve in the quitting game.
Chapter 2 gives an overview about results on the existence of "-equilibria in quitting
games, where we mainly focus on the results by Solan and Vieille (cf. [36]). Starting with
symmetric quitting games and those that have dominant strategies, we consider quitting
games in general. A main result of the thesis is contained in Section 2.3. It generalizes a
result of Solan and Vieille. They showed that for all quitting games, where the players get
a payo equal to one if they play quit alone, and a payo lower or equal to one if they play
quit together with someone else, have an "-equilibrium for all " > 0. We extend this to
games where it is allowed that the players receive zero if they play quit alone and a payo
lower or equal to zero if they play quit together with someone else. For the proof we need
three propositions. The last one can be used to evaluate the results of an algorithm that
detects cyclic "-equilibria in quitting games (see Section 3.6). We give a detailed proof
based on the corresponding result by Solan and Vieille, which also improves the resulting
approximations on the quality of the equilibrium in that way, that it is now independent
of the number of players.
Since there is no software for the analysis of quitting games, or stochastic games with
more than two players, we want to make a step forward to close this gap. In Chapter
3 we provide algorithms and explain the implemented programs for symmetric quitting
games, for a reduction by dominance and for the detection of a pure, instant or stationary
"-equilibrium. Furthermore we discuss questions that are related to an implementation of
an algorithm for the detection of a cyclic "-equilibrium.
While the focus in Chapter 3 is on the detection of one sample "-equilibrium we consider
in Chapter 4 the search for all or as many as possible equilibria. In the rst part of
Chapter 4, we discuss two parallelized algorithms for a search of instant and stationary
"-equilibria in quitting games and treat two software packages, i.e. Gambit and PHCpack,
which are also helpful for the analysis of quitting games, since one can use them to analyze
the corresponding one-step games or to compute stationary Nash-equilibria in quitting
games.
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Some general conventions
Whenever we introduce a new notation we write `:='.
With N := f1; 2; : : :g we denote the positive integers starting with 1. Furthermore R
denotes the real numbers and R+ := [0;1[.
A vector y 2 RN , (N 2 N), is a column vector. For the transposed vector we use T .
Usually we denote by yn the n-th component of the vector y , n = 1; : : : ;N . Furthermore
we denote with k  k the maximum norm, i.e.
kyk := max
i2N
jy i j for all y = (y1; : : : ; yN )T 2 RN :
We set inf ? :=1 and Q
?
:= 1.
All the other notation, which are used in this thesis is listed at the end in the Index of
notation.
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Chapter 1.
Quitting games
Quitting games are undiscounted sequential stochastic games with nitely many players.
At any stage each player has only two possible actions, continue and quit. The game ends
as soon as at least one player chooses to quit. The players then receive a payo, which
depends on the set of players that did choose to quit. If the game never ends, the payo
to each player is zero.
One eld of application for quitting games could be for example in economics, where several
rms, which produce the same kind of product, plan to enter a new market. They have
only two possible actions. Either they choose to enter the market (represented by the
action quit { quit the thoughts about doing it) or not to do it (represented by the action
continue { continuing the thoughts about it). Every day each company (players) decides
independently of each other to enter the market or not. If no one decides to oer their
product on the new market, they have to decide the next day (or hour) again. The market
entry has to be chosen carefully. If a lot of other rms enter the market, the price for the
oered product is lower than the price of the product, if only a few rms enter the market.
So the payo depends on the set of players that did choose to enter.
Quitting games belong to the class of non-cooperative non-zero-sum multi-player recursive
repeated games with absorbing states. A game is said to be non-cooperative (see e.g. [18]),
if commitments like promises or agreements have no binding force. A state is absorbing,
if the probability of leaving that state is zero for all possible pairs of actions and a game
is called recursive, if all payos in the non-absorbing states are equal to zero (see e.g.
[14]). Kohlberg 1974 proved in [20] that every two-player zero-sum absorbing game has an
equilibrium payo. Afterwards Vrieze and Thuijsman 1989 showed in [38] that every two-
player non-zero-sum absorbing game has an equilibrium payo. In 1997 Flesch, Thuijsman
and Vrieze examined in [14] a three-player game with absorbing states and pointed out that
the analysis of N -player (N  3) games is dierent from any analysis used for two-player
games.
Solan proved 1999 in [34] that all three-player absorbing games have approximate equilibria.
In the paper Quitting Games, Solan and Vieille 2001 ([36]) dened the quitting games in
generality rst and proved the existence of subgame-perfect approximate equilibria under
1
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some restrictions to the payo function. Furthermore Solan and Vieille 2003 studied in [37]
an example of a four-player quitting game, in which the simplest equilibrium strategy is
periodic with period two. In The structure of non-zero-sum stochastic games 2007 ([31]),
Simon showed under which properties quitting games have approximate equilibria among
other things by generalization of the solution idea from Solan and Vieille. Furthermore
he proved by using algebraic topology that a special class of quitting games, the so called
escape games, have approximate equilibria. In 2012 Simon considered in [32] quitting
games with only so called normal players using topological dynamics. Finally it is still not
clear whether all quitting games have approximate equilibria or not, even for four players
the question is still open.
The outline of this chapter is as follows. First we introduce the quitting game in general.
We dene the strategy prole for the players and construct the underlying probability
space and random variables referring to a given strategy prole in order to describe mathe-
matically, how the game is played. The expected payo for the players plays a central role
in game theory, because all players are assumed to behave rational, they try to maximize
their own expected payo. This motivates the denition of an equilibrium in the sense of
Nash (see [27]), where an unilateral deviation from the strategy of one player gives her no
additional prot (or not more than "). We distinguish between several types of equilibria
with respect to the structure of the strategy prole. In Section 1.2. the base game, the
so-called one-step game, of the quitting game is considered. Here the concept of a perfect
strategy prole is central. With the help of this, we show, for example, that all one-step
games have at least one Nash-equilibrium. In Section 1.3., we introduce the nite quitting
game. It has the same payo-structure as the corresponding quitting game but is played
only a nite number of steps and will be later used in Chapter 2 to prove that a certain
kind of quitting games has an "-equilibrium (see Section 2.3). Using one-step games and
nite quitting games corresponding to a given quitting game, we show which relations exist
between the structure of a given strategy prole and the value of the expected payo, and
how to construct new "-equilibria out of given ones. This will be helpful for programming
purposes (see e.g. Section 3.3).
1.1. Quitting games
As mentioned before, a quitting game is a sequential N -player (N 2 N) game and played
as follows. In every step, each player has only two possible actions, continue and quit.
The players make their decisions simultaneously, that means in particular independently
from each other. The game continues as long as all players choose to play continue. If at
least one player plays the action quit, the game terminates for all players. In that case, the
players receive a payo, which depends on the set of players that did choose to play the
action quit. If the game never ends, the payo to each player is zero. This leads us to the
following denition.
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Denition 1.1.1 (Quitting Game). A quitting game is a tuple
G = (N ; (rS )?SN ) (1.1)
where
 N = f1; : : : ;N g  N is a nite set of players, N 2 N,
 S 2 P(N ) denotes the quitting coalition and
 (rS )S2P(N ) is a sequence of payo-vectors rS = (r 1S ; : : : ; rNS )T 2 RN to the players
under the quitting coalition S with r? := (0; : : : ; 0)
T := 0.
Observe that in game theory usually the number of players is written as a superscript, i.e.
rnS denotes the payo of player n under the quitting coalition S .
Remark 1.1.2. To compare this denition of a (stochastic) game for example with [33]
or [29], we have the following setting:
1. The state space is given by Z := P(N ).
2. The action space is given by A := f0; 1gN , where 0 stands for continue and 1 for
quit. That means all players have the same available actions and the actions which
can be chosen are independent from the state of the game.
3. The transition law ~t : P(N ) P(N ) A! [0; 1] is given by
(z ; S ; a) 7! ~t(z jS ; a) :=
8><>:
1 for S = ? and z = fn 2 N : an = 1g
1 for S 6= ? and z = S
0 otherwise
where z ; S 2 P(N ) and a = (a1; : : : ; aN ) 2 A. That means if the game is not
terminated, the given state is S = ?. In this case the given action a = (a1; : : : ; aN )
determines the next state, where the transition law has the value one only if z =
fn 2 Nj an = 1g. If the game is already terminated, the current state is represented
by the quitting coalition S 6= ?. In that case the next stage can only be z = S
independent of what the players play.
Observe that the transition law is even deterministic and independent of the last
state of the game and the last chosen action.
4. The payo function is given by r : A! RN , where
a = (a1; : : : ; aN )T 7! r(a) := rfn2N j an=1g;
and is state-independent.
5. There is no discounting in this model.
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Example 1. A typical way to describe two- or three-player quitting games is via a matrix.
Consider the following two player game, where Player one is the so called row player and
player two the column player.
Player 2
continue quit
Player 1
continue
quit
	
( 5 ; 0 )
( 0 ; 5 )
( 10 ; 10 )
Where 	 means, that the players does not receive any payo and the game continues to
the next round.
In this case the quitting game is given by
G =

f1; 2g;

r? = 0; rf1g =
  5
0

; rf2g =

0
 5

; rN =
  10
 10

:
Now the players choose their action not with certainty, but according to a certain proba-
bility.
Denition 1.1.3 (strategy, prole). Let G = (N ; (rS )S2P(N )) be a given quitting game.
Then
 pni 2 [0; 1] is the probability that player n 2 N will play the action quit at stage
i 2 N,
 the sequence n := (pni )i2N is the strategy for player n and n the set of all strategies
for the player n, n 2 N ,
 the vector  := (1; : : : ; N )T of strategies, respectively the sequence of vectors
 = (pi)i2N, pi := (p1i ; : : : ; p
N
i ), is called (strategy) prole in the quitting game G
and  := 1 : : :N denotes the set of all (strategy) proles for the given quitting
game,
 ( n ; ~n) := (1; : : : ; n 1; ~n ; n+1; : : : ; N )T is the alternative strategy prole for
player n 2 N , where all the players m 2 N n fng play their strategy m , whereas
player n changes her strategy and plays according to the strategy ~n .
Remark 1.1.4. The here dened strategy for a player is a so called \randomized Markovian
strategy" (see e.g. [29]), because the decision, with which probability an action is played
by the player in a state, is independent from the previous states of the game and chosen
actions.
Denition 1.1.5 (subgame strategy, subgame prole). Let G = (N ; (rS )?SN ) be a
given quitting game and  = (1; : : : ; N )T = (pi)i2N a strategy prole in G . For each
j 2 N, nj := (pni )ij denotes the subgame strategy for player n 2 N induced by n for
the quitting game starting at time j and j = (
1
j ; : : : ; 
N
j )
T denotes the subgame prole
induced by  in the quitting game starting at time j .
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Denition 1.1.6 (pure, totally mixed, cyclic, stationary). Let  = (pi)i2N be a strategy
prole in a quitting game G . A strategy n = (pni )i2N for player n 2 N is
 pure :() 8i 2 N : pni 2 f0; 1g.
 totally mixed :() 8i 2 N : pni 2 (0; 1).
 cyclic :() 9k0 2 N : pnk = pnk+k0 8k 2 N.
 stationary :() 8i 2 N : pni = pn1 .
A strategy prole  is called pure/totally mixed/cyclic/stationay, if all strategies n are
pure/totally mixed/cyclic/stationary, n 2 N .
We end up this section by introducing the following notation:
Notation 1.1.7. The function % : [0; 1]N P(N )! [0; 1],
(p; S ) 7! %(p; S ) :=
Y
n2S
p n
Y
m2NnS
(1  p m);
with p = (p 1; : : : ; p N )T , denotes the probability that a quitting coalition S or { equivalent
to that { an action a = (a1; : : : ; aN ) 2 A with S = fn 2 N j an = 1g is chosen under the
vector p.
Proposition 1.1.8. For all p = (p1; : : : ; pN ) 2 [0; 1]N , all S 2 P(N ) and all i 2 N
%(p; S ) = pi  % (p i ; 1); S+ (1  pi)  % (p i ; 0); S
holds, where (p i ; b) := (p1; : : : ; pi 1; b; pi+1; : : : ; pN ), b 2 f0; 1g.
Remark 1.1.9 (Interpretation). Let p 2 [0; 1]N be given. Consider the probability space P(N );P(P(N ));P, where P(fSg) := Pp(fSg) := %(p; S ), S 2 P(N ), is the probability
that the quitting coalition S is played. Fix a player i 2 N and dene a random variable
X : P(N )! f0; 1g with
X (S ) :=
(
1 for i 2 S
0 for i 2 N n S ; S 2 P(N ):
Then the formula from Proposition 1.1.8 represents the law of the total probability. That
means
P(S ) = P(S jX = 1)  P(X = 1) + P(S jX = 0)  P(X = 0):
Furthermore we want to give an analytical proof of Proposition 1.1.8:
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Proof. Case 1: Assume that player i is in the quitting coalition, i.e. i 2 S . Because
%(p; S ) =
Y
n2S
pn
Y
n2NnS
(1  pn) = pi  1 
Y
n2Snfig
pn
Y
n2NnS
(1  pn);
with (p i ; 1)i = 1 and pn = (p i ; 1)n for all n 2 N n fig
%(p; S ) = pi  (p i ; 1)i 
Y
n2Snfig
(p i ; 1)n
Y
n2NnS
 
1  (p i ; 1)n
= pi 
Y
n2S
(p i ; 1)n
Y
n2NnS
 
1  (p i ; 1)n
= pi  % (p i ; 1); S
follows.
Case 2: Now player i is not in the quitting coalition, that means i 2 N n S . With
(p i ; 0)i = 0 and pn = (p i ; 0)n for all n 2 N n fig we obtain similarly to Case 1 that
%(p; S ) = (1  pi) 
Y
n2S
pn
Y
n2Nn(S[fig)
(1  pn)
= (1  pi)   1  (p i ; 0)i Y
n2S
(p i ; 0)n
Y
n2Nn(S[fig)
 
1  (p i ; 0)n
= (1  pi) 
Y
n2S
(p i ; 0)n
Y
n2NnS
 
1  (p i ; 0)n
= (1  pi)  % (p i ; 0); S:
Due to the fact that %
 
(p i ; 1); S

= 0 for i 2 N n S and % (p i ; 0); S = 0 for i 2 S , Case
1 and 2 imply the proposition.
Probability space and equilibria
Let G =
 N ; (rS )S2P(N ) be the given quitting game, Z = P(N ) the corresponding state
space and A = f0; 1gN the corresponding action space. Furthermore and without loss of
generality let z = ? be the initial state. If a strategy prole  = (pi)i2N 2  is given,
the probability space (
;A;P) and a stochastic process (Xk ;Yk)k2N on (
;A;P) with
values in (Z  A) are dened by1
 
 := (Z  A)N
 A := P(Z )
P(A)
 P(Z )
 P(A)
 : : :
1This denition is standard, cf. [29]
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 Xk(!) = Xk
 
(z1; a1; z2; a2; : : :)

:= zk
(Xk denotes the random state of the system at time k , k 2 N, ! 2 
),
 Yk(!) = Yk
 
(z1; a1; z2; a2; : : :)

:= ak
(Yk denotes the random action taken at time k , k 2 N, ! 2 
),
 Hk := (X1;Y1; : : : ;Xk),
that means Hk(!) = Hk
 
(z1; a1; z2; a2; : : :)

= (z1; a1; z2; a2; : : : ; zk)
(Hk describes the random history up to time k , k 2 N, ! 2 
)
 P(X1 = ?) := 1 and
P(Hk = (z1; a1; z2; a2; : : : ; zk))
:= P(X1 = z1)
k 1Q
i=1
~t(zi+1jzi ; ai) 
  Q
fn2N j ani =1g
pni
Q
fm2N j ami =0g
(1  pmi )

= P(X1 = z1)
k 1Q
i=1
~t(zi+1jzi ; ai)  %
 
pi ; fn 2 N j ani = 1g

where zi 2 Z for all i = 1; : : : ; k and ai 2 A for all i = 1; : : : ; k   1.
Notation 1.1.10. Let Y nk : 
! f0; 1g denote the random action taken at time k 2 N of
player n 2 N . That means
Y nk (!) = Y
n
k
 
(z1; a1; z2; a2; : : :)

:= ank ;
where ai = (a
1
i ; : : : ; a
N
i )
T 2 A for all i 2 N.
With Notation 1.1.7 we have
P(Yk = ak) = %
 
pk ; fn 2 N j ank = 1g

for all k 2 N and ak 2 A. That means %(pk ; ) can be interpreted as density (with respect
to a counting measure) from Yk .
Let the quitting game G = (N ; (rS )S2P(N )) and the strategy prole  2  be given.
Then a stopping time  : 
 ! N [ f+1g concerning the ltration (Ak)k2N , with
Ak := fYi : 1  i  kg, is dened by
(!) := inf

k 2 N : Yk(!) 2 A n f(0; : : : ; 0)Tg
	
: (1.2)
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Denition 1.1.11 (terminating). Let G be a given quitting game and  = (pi)i2N a
strategy prole in G . The quitting game is called terminating under  ifY
i2N
%(pi ;?) = 0
holds.
Remark 1.1.12. Observe, that terminating does not mean that a k 2 N has to exist such
that %(pk ;?) = 0, respectively that a player plays quit with certainty in one stage of the
game. It only means, in other words,
MX
i=1
ln %(pi ;?)  !  1 for M !1:
For example the quitting game with the strategy prole  = (p1; p2; : : :), where
pnk = 1 
N
p
e 0:5k ; k 2 N; 8n 2 N ;
does not terminate, although the quitting probability is strictly positive in each stage.
Denition 1.1.13 (expected payo). Let G = (N ; (rS )S2P(N )) be a quitting game. Dene
the function  : ! RN by
 7! () = (1(); : : : ; N ())T := E(r(Y )1f<1g);
with r from Remark 1.1.2, where E is the expected value with respect to the probability
measure P. Then () is called the expected payo to the players in the quitting game
G under the strategy prole . n() denotes the expected payo to player n 2 N under
the prole .
Using the denition of P and r(0) = r? = 0, one obtains
() =
X
k2N
X
ak2A
P( = k ;Yk = ak)  r(ak)
=
X
k2N
 X
ak2A
P
 
Hk 1 = (?; 0;?; 0; : : : ;?);Yk = ak
  r(ak)
=
X
k2N
 k 1Y
i=1
Y
n2N
(1  pni ) 
X
S2P(N )
rS 
Y
n2S
pnk
Y
m2NnS
(1  pmk )

=
X
k2N
 k 1Y
i=1
%(pi ;?) 
X
S2P(N )
rS  %(pk ; S )

: (1.3)
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Remark 1.1.14. Another way to obtain the formula for the calculation of the expected
payo for a given prole  is the following:
() =
X
k2N
P( = k)  E(r(Yk)j = k)
=
X
k2N
P( > k   1)  E(r(Yk))
=
X
k2N
 k 1Y
i=1
%(pi ;?) 
X
S2P(N )
rS  %(pk ; S )

Denition 1.1.15 ("-equilibrium, Nash-equilibrium, approximate equilibria). Let G =
(N ; (rS )S2P(N )) be a quitting game.
 The strategy prole  = (pi)i2N is an "-equilibrium ("  0) in G
:() 8n 2 N ^ 8~n 2 n : n()  n(( n ; ~n))  ".
 G has got approximate equilibria
:() 8" > 0 : 9 "-equilibrium in G .
 The strategy prole  = (pi)i2N is a Nash-equilibrium (or short: equilibrium) in G
:()  is an "-equilibrium in G with " = 0.
To be an "-equilibrium means, that a player, who is changing her strategy alone, can only
expect a prot lower or equal to " compared to the expected payo before the change,
i.e.
n()  max
~n2n
n
 
( n ; ~n)
  " 8n 2 N :
Furthermore, a Nash-equilibrium is an adopted maximal expected payo, and of course
having a Nash-equilibrium implies that the game has approximate equilibria.
Remark 1.1.16 (uniform "-equilibrium). In literature one often nds another important
equilibrium concept, namely the uniform "-equilibrium, which is mentioned for complete-
ness sake. Therefore we dene for all i 2 N the function ~i :  ! RN as follows (see [36]
p. 280):
 7! ~i() = E

1figr(Y )  i   
i

:
A strategy prole  is now called a uniform "-equilibrium in G if:
9i0 2 N : 8i  i0 8n 2 N 8~n 2 n : ~ni ()  ~ni
 
( n ; ~n)
  "
Solan and Vieille proved in [36] that an "-equilibrium  in a quitting game G is also a
uniform ~"-equilibrium, with ~" > ".
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Denition 1.1.17 (cyclic / stationary / instant / subgame "-equilibrium). Let G be a
quitting game and "  0. An "-equilibrium  = (pi)i2N in G is called
 cyclic :()  is cyclic,
 stationary :()  is stationary,
 instant :() 9n 2 N : pn1 = 1 and
 subgame "-equilibrium :() 8j 2 N : j is an "-equilibrium in G .
An established procedure to analyze quitting games respectively repeated games is to
dissect it into fragments. The smallest fragment is of course the one-step (quitting) game,
where one considers only one stage of the game. This one-step game should be examined
in the next section.
1.2. One-step games corresponding to a quitting game
In this section we introduce the base game of the quitting game. We will call it the one-step
quitting game or shortly one-step game2. The base game is played once by N players. The
players have again only the choice between two possible actions, continue and quit. They
make there decisions simultaneously. If at least one player decides to play quit the players
receive the same payo like in the corresponding quitting game in dependence on the set
of players that did choose to quit. If no player decides to play the action quit, the players
receive a payo v 2 RN .
Denition 1.2.1 (One-step game). A one-step (quitting) game corresponding to a quitting
game G is a tuple
 v :=
 
G ; v

=
 N ; (rS )S2P(N ); v; (1.4)
where
 G is the corresponding quitting game with the nite set of players N = f1; : : : ;N g,
the quitting coalition S 2 P(N ) and the family of payo vectors (rS )S2P(N )
 v = (v 1; : : : ; vN ) 2 RN is the payo to the players, if all of them choose to play the
action continue otherwise they receive rS , S 2 P(N ) n f?g.
Remark 1.2.2. The state space, action space and the transition law from the one-step
game are of course the same like in the corresponding quitting game (see therefore Remark
1.1.2). The payo function has to be modied to ~rv : A! RN , where
a = (a1; : : : ; aN )T 7! ~rv(a) :=
(
rfn2N j an=1g for a 6= 0
v otherwise
As we see later the vector v 2 RN will mainly be used for technical reasons.
2These games are also known as one-stage games ([31], p. 15) or as one-shot games ([36], p. 269).
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Example 2 (Continuation of Example 1 { Prisoner's dilemma). Back to our Example 1.
The corresponding one-step quitting games are given by
Player 2
continue quit
Player 1
continue
quit
(v 1 ; v 2 )
( 5 ; 0 )
( 0 ; 5 )
( 10 ; 10 )
respectively
 v =

f1; 2g;

r? = 0; rf1g =
  5
0

; rf2g =

0
 5

; rN =
  10
 10

; v

:
Replacing (v 1; v 2) by ( 1; 1) leads to one of the most famous one-step games the so called
Prisoner's dilemma. The payo to the players is the time they have to stay in jail. The
action continue means that the prisoner stays silent, the action quit means the prisoner
confesses. The corresponding quitting game could then be interpreted in the following
way: If both prisoners stay silent the examination goes on in another round. If at least
one of the prisoners confesses they receive a prison sentence, depending on who of them
confessed. If both of them never confess, they get no prison sentence. In praxis that means
they stay in investigative custody.
Denition 1.2.3 (strategy, prole and alternative prole in the one-step game).
Let  v be a given one-step game. Then
 pn 2 [0; 1] is the strategy for player n, n 2 N , in the one-step game  v .
 the vector p := (p1; : : : ; pN )T 2 [0; 1]N is the (strategy) prole for the one-step game
 v .
 (p n ; ~pn) := (p1; : : : ; pn 1; ~pn ; pn+1; : : : ; pN )T is the alternative (strategy) prole for
the one-step game  v , where p 2 [0; 1]N , ~pn 2 [0; 1].
Denition 1.2.4 (pure, totally mixed). Let  v be a given one-step game and p 2 [0; 1]N
a strategy prole in  v . Then p is called
 pure :() p 2 f0; 1gN
 totally mixed :() p 2 (0; 1)N .
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Probability space and equilibria
Let  v =
 N ; (rS )S2P(N ); v) and p 2 [0; 1]N be given. The corresponding probability space
(
; A;Pp) and the stochastic process ( X1; Y ; X2) are dened analogously to that from the
quitting game, as one can see in the following table.
One-step game Quitting game

 := Z  A Z 
 := (Z  A)N
A := P(Z )
 P(A)
P(Z ) A := N
i2N
 P(Z )
 P(A)
Xi(!) = Xi((z1; a; z2)) Xk(!) = Xk
 
(z1; a1; z2; a2; : : :)

:= zi := zk
Y (!) =
 
Y 1(!); : : : ; Y N (!)
T
Yk(!) =
 
Y 1k (!); : : : ;Y
N
k (!)
T
= Y ((z1; a; z2)) = Yk
 
(z1; a1; z2; a2; : : :)

:= a := ak
Pp( X1 = ?) := 1 P(X1 = ?) := 1
Pp(f!g) = Pp((z1; a; z2)) P(f!g) = P
 f(z1; a1; z2; a2; : : :)g;
:= Pp( X1 = z1)  ~t(z2jz1; a) = P(X1 = z1)
k 1Q
i=1

~t(zi+1jzi ; ai)
%(p; fn 2 N j an = 1g); %(pi ; fn 2 N j ani = 1g)

;
where i = 1; 2, zi 2 Z , ! 2 
 and where k 2 N, zk 2 Z , ! 2 
 and
a = (a1; : : : ; aN ) 2 A ak = (a1k ; : : : ; aNk ) 2 A
Furthermore dene v : [0; 1]
N ! RN by
p 7! v(p) = (1v (p); : : : ; Nv (p))T := Ep
 
~rv( Y )

=
X
a2A
Pp( Y = a)  ~rv(a);
where Ep is the expected value with respect to the probability measure Pp and ~rv from
Remark 1.1.2. Then v(p) is the expected payo for the players in the one-step game  v
under the strategy prole p and nv (p) denotes the expected payo for player n 2 N in
the one-step game  v under the strategy prole p. With Notation 1.1.7 we obtain for the
expected payo v(p) the formula
v(p) =
X
S2P(N )
%(p; S )  rS + %(p;?)  v :
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Denition 1.2.5 ("-equilibrium, Nash-equilibrium of the one-step game). Let  v be a
one-step quitting game.
 The strategy prole p 2 [0; 1] is an "-equilibrium for "  0 in  v
:() 8n 2 N 8~pn 2 [0; 1] : nv (p)  nv
 
(p n ; ~pn)
  ".
 The strategy prole p is a Nash-equilibrium (or short: equilibrium) in  v
:()  is an "-equilibrium in  v with " = 0.
It is already known, that all one-step games have got a Nash-equilibrium. A proof is given
at the end of the next section using the so-called "-perfect strategy prole.
We end up this section by proving some technical facts. First we show, how the one-step
games are embedded into the quitting game referring to the calculation of the expected
payo. Recall for the expected payo in the quitting game G under a strategy prole
 = (p1; p2; : : :)
() =
X
k2N
 k 1Y
i=1
%(pi ;?) 
X
S2P(N )
rS  %(pk ; S )

=
X
S2P(N )
rS  %(p1; S ) + %(p1;?) 
X
k2N
 X
S2P(N )
k 1Y
i=1
%(pi+1;?)  rS  %(pk+1; S )

| {z }
= (2)
holds.
With the Denition 1.1.5 of the subgame prole,
() =
X
S2P(N )
rS  %(p1; S ) + %(p1;?)  (2) = (2)(p1) (1.5)
follows.
So if we have some results in one-step games, it might be possible to assign them to the
corresponding quitting game.
Remark 1.2.6. Let  v be a given one-step game and p 2 [0; 1]N a strategy prole in  v .
Because of
jnv (p)j  %(p;?)  jvn j+
X
S2P(N )nf?g
%(p; S )  jrnS j
 maxjvn j; max
SN
jrnS j
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for all n 2 N , the expected payo v(p) is bounded, i.e.
v(p) 2 [ v ; v ]N ;
where
v := max

max
n2N
jvn j; max
n2N ;SN
jrnS j
	
: (1.6)
The following proposition shows that the expected payo v(p) of a one-step game  v is
linear in the strategy pn of a player n.
Proposition 1.2.7. Let  v be a given one-step game. Then for all p 2 [0; 1]N and all
n 2 N
v(p) = v((p
 n ; 0)) + pn   v((p n ; 1))  v((p n ; 0))
holds.
Proof. With Proposition 1.1.8 and %
 
(p n ; 1);?

= 0, one obtains for all n 2 N
v(p) = %(p;?)  v +
X
S2P(N )
%(p; S )  rS
=

pn  % (p n ; 1);?+ (1  pn)  % (p n ; 0);?  v
+
X
S2P(N )

pn  % (p n ; 1); S+ (1  pn)  % (p n ; 0); S  rS
= (1  pn)  % (p n ; 0);?  v + (1  pn) X
S2P(N )
%
 
(p n ; 0); S
  rS
+ pn
X
S2P(N )
%
 
(p n ; 1); S
  rS
= (1  pn)

%
 
(p n ; 0);?
  v + X
S2P(N )
%
 
(p n ; 0); S
  rS| {z }
= v((p
 n ; 0))

+ pn
X
S2P(N )
%
 
(p n ; 1); S
  rS| {z }
= v((p
 n ; 1))
:
Remark 1.2.8. Because of the linearity of the expected payo v(p) in the strategies p
n
(n 2 N ), it is sucient to consider the expected payo only for pure strategies in order
to determine, whether a given strategy prole in a one-step game is an equilibrium or not,
since the extreme values of v(p) is for each single player attained in a boundary point.
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Corollary 1.2.9. Let p 2 [0; 1]N be a strategy prole in the one-step game  v . The
following formulae hold:
1. v((p
 n ; 1)) = piv
  
(p n ; 1) i ; 1

+ (1  pi)v
  
(p n ; 1) i ; 0

2. v((p
 n ; 0)) = piv
  
(p n ; 0) i ; 1

+ (1  pi)v
  
(p n ; 0) i ; 0

for all i ; n 2 N , i 6= n.
Perfect strategy proles
We now introduce the concept of a perfect strategy prole. It is motivated by the linearity
of the expected payo v in the strategies of the players. The dierence between the
expected payos for a player n, if he plays quit or alternatively continue with certainty, is
in the interest of this concept.
Denition 1.2.10 ("-perfect). Let  v be a given one-step game and "  0. A strategy
prole p 2 [0; 1]N in  v is called "-perfect, if
8n 2 N :
8><>:
nv ((p
 n ; 1))  nv ((p n ; 0))  " for pn = 0
nv ((p
 n ; 1))  nv ((p n ; 0)) 2 [ "; "] for pn 2 (0; 1)
nv ((p
 n ; 1))  nv ((p n ; 0))   " for pn = 1
:
Remark 1.2.11. An alternative denition of an "-perfect strategy prole in a one-step
game can be found in [36]. The denition there uses the concept of the so-called best reply.
The question, which relations between ("-)equilibria and ("-)perfect strategy proles exist,
is answered by the following theorem.
Theorem 1.2.12. Let  v be a given one-step game and "  0. Then the following propo-
sitions hold:
1. p 2 [0; 1]N is "-perfect for  v =) p is an "-equilibrium in  v ;
2. p 2 [0; 1]N is an "-equilibrium in  v =) p is "p-perfect for  v ,
where
p := max
n2N
np and 
n
p :=
(
max( 1
pn
; 1
1 pn ) for p
n 2 (0; 1)
1 for pn 2 f0; 1g :
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Proof. 1.: Let p 2 [0; 1]N be "-perfect for  v . It is to show that p is also an "-equilibrium
in  v , i.e.
nv (p)  max
~p2[0;1]
nv
 
(p n ; ~p)
  "
for all n 2 N .
Because of the linearity of nv (p) with respect to p
n (cf. Proposition 1.2.7), it is sucient
to show that for all n 2 N
nv (p)  max
~p2f0;1g
nv
 
(p n ; ~p)
  ": (1.7)
Since p is "-perfect in  v , the Inequality (1.7) follows immediately for p
n = 0 and pn = 1.
For pn 2 (0; 1) it holds either
(a) max~p2f0;1g = nv
 
(p n ; 1)
  nv (p)  nv  (p n ; 0) or
(b) max~p2f0;1g = nv
 
(p n ; 0)

> nv (p) > 
n
v
 
(p n ; 1)

.
Case (a): Since p is "-perfect in  v , we get
nv (p)  nv
 
(p n ; 0)
  nv  (p n ; 1)  " = max
~p2f0;1g
nv
 
(p n ; ~p)
  ":
Case (b): Analogously to Case (a), with p "-perfect in  v , we obtain
nv (p) > 
n
v
 
(p n ; 1)
  nv  (p n ; 0)  " = max
~p2f0;1g
nv
 
(p n ; ~p)
  ":
So for both cases we have (1.7).
2.: Let p be an "-equilibrium, that means for all n 2 N and for all ~p 2 [0; 1]
nv (p)  nv
 
(p n ; ~p)
  " (1.8)
holds. If pn = 0, this implies
nv (p)  nv
 
(p n ; 1)
  " (1.9)
and for pn = 1
nv (p)  nv
 
(p n ; 0)
  ": (1.10)
Consider the case pn 2 (0; 1). For all ~p 2 [0; 1], we have
nv (p) = p
n  nv
 
(p n ; 1)

+ (1  pn)  nv
 
(p n ; 0)
  nv  (p n ; ~p)  " (1.11)
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(cf. Proposition 1.2.7). For ~p = 1, (1.11) yields to
(1  pn)  nv
 
(p n ; 0)
  (1  pn)  nv  (p n ; 1)   "
and consequently
nv
 
(p n ; 1)
  nv  (p n ; 0)  "1  pn :
For ~p = 0, we obtain with (1.11) that pn  nv
 
(p n ; 1)
   pn  nv  (p n ; 0)   " and
therefore
nv
 
(p n ; 1)
  nv  (p n ; 0)    "pn :
Both together imply
nv
 
(p n ; 1)
  nv  (p n ; 0) 2   "pn ; "1  pn

2  "np ; "np  ; (1.12)
where np := max

1
1 pn ;
1
pn

.
Let M (p) := fn 2 N j pn 2 (0; 1)g and p :=
8<: maxn2M (p) 
n
p if M (p) 6= ?
1 otherwise
.
With (1.9), (1.10) and (1.12)
8n 2 N :
8><>:
nv ((p
 n ; 1))  nv ((p n ; 0))  " for pn = 0
nv ((p
 n ; 1))  nv ((p n ; 0)) 2 [ "p ; "p ] for pn 2 (0; 1)
nv ((p
 n ; 1))  nv ((p n ; 0))   " for pn = 1
follows. By Denition 1.2.10 and p  1, p is "p-perfect in  v .
Remark 1.2.13. With (1.12) even
8n 2 N :
8>><>>:
nv ((p
 n ; 1))  nv ((p n ; 0))  " for pn = 0
nv ((p
 n ; 1))  nv ((p n ; 0)) 2
h
  "
pn
; "
1 pn
i
for pn 2 (0; 1)
nv ((p
 n ; 1))  nv ((p n ; 0))   " for pn = 1
holds.
Corollary 1.2.14. Let  v be a given one-step game. Then
1. p 2 [0; 1]N is (0-)perfect for  v () p 2 [0; 1]N is a Nash-equilibrium in  v
2. p 2 f0; 1gN is "-perfect for  v () p 2 f0; 1gN is an "-equilibrium in  v
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Existence of a Nash-equilibrium in a one-step game
We now prove, that every one-step game has a Nash-equilibrium. Therefore we use
Brouwer's Fixed-Point Theorem.
Theorem 1.2.15 (Brouwer's Fixed-Point Theorem). 3 Suppose that M is a nonempty,
convex, compact subset of RN , where N  1, and that f : M ! M is a continuous
mapping. Then f has a xed point.
With this we prove the following theorem:
Theorem 1.2.16. 4 Let G be a given quitting game. Every one-step game  v = (G ; v),
v 2 RN , corresponding to the quitting game G has at least one Nash-equilibrium.
Proof. The proof is similar to that from Nash in [27], but given here for the special case
of a one-step game. The set [0; 1]N of all proles of a one-step game is nonempty, convex
and compact. Dene the map  : [0; 1]N ! RN2 with p 7! (p) = (1(p); : : : ;N (p))
and n(p) = (n0 (p);
n
1 (p)) where
nj (p) := max

0; nv
 
(p n ; j )
  nv (p)	; j 2 f0; 1g; n 2 N :
The function  is non-negative and continuous. (p) is a matrix, which has two entries for
each player. The rst one n0 (p) is either the non-negative dierence between the expected
payo to the player n if she plays continue with certainty { the other players play according
to p { and the expected payo to the player under the prole p, or zero. The second one
n1 (p) is analogously either the non-negative dierence between the expected payo to the
player if she plays quit with certainty and the expected payo to the player under the
prole p, or zero. For the case that for example n0 (p) is positive, the player n would get a
higher expected payo, if she plays continue instead of pn . So one next step is to decrease
the quitting probability from player n.
Therefore we dene another function h : R2+ ! [0; 1]
x = (x1; x2) 7! h(x ) = x2
x1 + x2
;
which is a normalization function and the continuous function f : [0; 1]N ! [0; 1]N ,
p 7! f (p) = (f 1(p); : : : ; f N (p)), where
f n(p) := h
 
(1  pn) + n0 (p); pn + n1 (p)

:
3See [47].
4John Nash showed in [27] that every nite game has an equilibrium. This theorem is an application of
his theorem and will be proven in the same way.
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According to Brouwer's Fixed-point Theorem, f has got at least one xed-point p^. It
remains to show that p^ is a Nash-equilibrium in  v .
f (p^) = p^ () n0 (p^) = n1 (p^) = 0 8n 2 N
() nv
 
(p^ n ; 0)
  nv (p^) ^ nv  (p^ n ; 1)  nv (p^) 8n 2 N :
And with the linearity of the expected payo nv (p^) in p^
n
8n 2 N :
8><>:
nv
 
(p^ n ; 1)
  nv  (p^ n ; 0)  0 for p^n = 0
nv
 
(p^ n ; 1)
  nv  (p^ n ; 0) = 0 for p^n 2 (0; 1)
nv
 
(p^ n ; 1)
  nv  (p^ n ; 0)  0 for p^n = 1
follows, which implies that p^ is 0-perfect in  v . With Corollary 1.2.14, p^ is a Nash-
equilibrium in  v .
Inuence of variation in the strategy prole
At this point we want to study the inuence of a variation in one component of the strategy
prole p 2 [0; 1]N for a given quitting game  v . Therefore dene p^ 2 [0; 1]N as follows
p^ := p^m;(p) :=
 
p m ; (1  )pm + ; (1.13)
where p 2 [0; 1]N ,  2 [0; 1] and m 2 N .
That means, p^m is a convex combination of pm and the pure strategy 1, which corresponds
to the action quit. It is obvious, that for  = 0 one obtains p^ = p and for  = 1
p^ = (p m ; 1).
Theorem 1.2.17. Let  v be a given one-step game,  2 [0; 1], p 2 [0; 1]N and m 2 N an
arbitrary but xed chosen player. Then the following hold:
1. %(p^;?) = (1  )%(p;?)
That means, the probability that all players play continue under p^ is for the -fold
smaller of the continue-probability under p.
2. v(p^) = (1  )  v(p) +   v
 
(p m ; 1)

3. kv(p^)  v(p)k    (1  pm)  (rmax + v);
where rmax := maxfjrnS j
 n 2 N ; S 2 P(N )g and v = maxf max
n2N
jvn j; rmaxg
4. If p 2 [0; 1]N is -perfect in  v (  0) and if pm 2 (0; 1] for the given player m 2 N ,
then p^ = p^m; is ~-perfect in  v , with ~ := max(2rmax + (1  ); ).
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Proof. 1.: The denition of p^ (cf. (1.13) ) implies
%(p^;?) =
Y
n2N
(1  p^n) =  1  (1  )pm     Y
n2Nnfmg
(1  pn)
= (1  ) 
Y
n2N
(1  pn)
= (1  )  %(p;?):
2.: With Proposition 1.2.7 and the denition of p^ we have
v(p^) = p^
m  v
 
(p^ m ; 1)

+ (1  p^m)  v
 
(p^ m ; 0)

=
 
(1  )pm +   v (p m ; 1)+ (1  )(1  pm)  v (p m ; 0)
= (1  ) 

pm  v
 
(p m ; 1)

+ (1  pm)  v
 
(p m ; 0)

+   v
 
(p m ; 1)

= (1  )  v(p) +   v
 
(p m ; 1)

: (1.14)
3.: Using (1.14), one obtains
kv(p^)  v(p)k =
(1  )  v(p) +   v (p m ; 1)  v(p)
=
  v (p m ; 1)  v(p)
=   v (p m ; 1)  v(p)
=   v (p m ; 1)   pmv (p m ; 1)  (1  pm)v (p m ; 0)
=   (1  pm) v (p m ; 1)  v (p m ; 0)
=   (1  pm)  v (p m ; 1)  v (p m ; 0):
Because player m plays quit with certainty in the alternative strategy prole (p m ; 1),
nv
 
(p m ; 1)

=
X
S2P(N )
%
 
(p m ; 1); S
  rnS 2 [ rmax ; rmax ]
for all n 2 N holds with rmax = max
n2N ; S2P(N )
jrnS j; which implies
kv(p^)  v(p)k    (1  pm)  (rmax + v);
where v = maxf max
n2N
jvn j; rmaxg.
4.: For  = 0 or pm = 1, p^ = p follows and therefore p^ is -perfect in  v in that cases. For
 2 (0; 1] and pm 2 (0; 1), we have to show, that
8n 2 N :
8><>:
nv ((p^
 n ; 1))  nv ((p^ n ; 0))  ~ for p^ n = 0
nv ((p^
 n ; 1))  nv ((p^ n ; 0)) 2 [ ~; ~] for p^ n 2 (0; 1)
nv ((p^
 n ; 1))  nv ((p^ n ; 0))   ~ for p^ n = 1
(1.15)
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with ~ = max(2rmax + (1  ); ).
Case 1: Consider player m. Since p is -perfect and pm 2 (0; 1) we have
v
 
(p^ m ; 1)
  v (p^ m ; 0) = v (p m ; 1)  v (p m ; 0) 2 [ ; ]
and therefore the second inequality from (1.15) for p^m 2 (0; 1) respectively the last in-
equality of (1.15) for p^ = 1.
Case 2: Consider player n 2 N nfmg. Since p^ refers to player m, (p^ n ; b) = \(p n ; b) holds
for all b 2 [0; 1]. Using equation (1.14), one obtains
nv
 
(p^ n ; b)

= (1  )  nv
 
(p n ; b)

+   nv
  
(p n ; b) m ; 1

:
This implies
nv
 
(p^ n ; 1)
  nv  (p^ n ; 0)
= (1  )  nv
 
(p n ; 1)

+   nv
  
(p n ; 1) m ; 1
  (1  )  nv  (p n ; 0)
    nv
  
(p n ; 0) m ; 1

= (1  ) 

nv
 
(p n ; 1)
  nv  (p n ; 0)
+ 

nv
  
(p n ; 1) m ; 1
  nv   (p n ; 0) m ; 1: (1.16)
We now observe three dierent cases:
(a) pn = 0:
pn = 0 ^ p -perfect =) nv
 
(p n ; 1)
  nv  (p n ; 0)   (1.17)
With the use of (1.16) and (1.17) we get
nv
 
(p^ n ; 1)
  nv  (p^ n ; 0)
 (1  )   +  

nv
  
(p n ; 1) m ; 1
  nv   (p n ; 0) m ; 1
 (1  )   +  
nv   (p n ; 1) m ; 1+ nv   (p n ; 0) m ; 1
 (1  )   +  (rmax + rmax )
= 2rmax + (1  )  :
(b) pn 2 (0; 1):
pn 2 (0; 1) ^ p -perfect =) nv
 
(p n ; 1)
  nv  (p n ; 0) 2 [ ; ] (1.18)
Similar to the previous case, we get
nv
 
(p^ n ; 1)
  nv  (p^ n ; 0)  2rmax + (1  )  :
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Under usage of (1.18) and formula (1.16), one obtains
nv
 
(p^ n ; 1)
  nv  (p^ n ; 0)
  (1  )      
nv   (p n ; 1) m ; 1+ nv   (p n ; 0) m ; 1
  2rmax   (1  )   (1.19)
and therefore
nv
 
(p^ n ; 1)
  nv  (p^ n ; 0) 2 [ (2rmax + (1  )  ); 2rmax + (1  )  ]:
(c) pn = 1:
pn = 1 ^ p -perfect =) nv
 
(p n ; 1)
  nv  (p n ; 0)    (1.20)
Consequently formulae (1.16), (1.19) and (1.20) imply
nv
 
(p^ n ; 1)
  nv  (p^ n ; 0)   (2rmax + (1  )  ):
Remark 1.2.18. (To Theorem 1.2.17 3.)
1. Let  v be a given one-step game with v 2 [ 2rmax ; 2rmax ], p 2 [0; 1]N , where
pm 2 (0; 1) for at least one player m 2 N , a strategy prole in  v and  2 (0; 1).
Solan and Vieille state in [36] the following estimate:
kv(p^)  v(p)k  2rmax ; (1.21)
with p^ and rmax like before.
Counter-example: Consider the following one-step game  v with v =

1
2

.
Player 2
continue quit
Player 1
continue
quit
( 1 ; 2)
( 1 ; 1 )
( 0 ; 1 )
( 1 ; 0:5 )
=) rmax = maxfjrnS j
 n 2 N ; S 2 P(N )g = 1 and max
n2N
jvn j = 2
=) v = 2
Obviously p =

0
0

is one (and the only) equilibrium in  v with the expected payo
v(p) = v .
Let  = 0:1 be given, then %(p;?) = 1 > 1  = 0:9. Furthermore let p^;1 be dened
like before, that means
p^;1 = p^ =

p1 + (1  p1)
p2

=

0 + 0:1 1
0

=

0:1
0

:
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From this
kv(p^)  v(p)k =
 11:7

 

1
2
 = 0:3 = (rmax + v)
> 2rmax = 2 0:1 1 = 0:2
follows. So estimate (1.21) does not hold.
The counter-example shows that the estimate in Theorem 1.2.17 3. is sharp.
2. Interpretation: Let  v be a given one-step game,  2 [0; 1] and p 2 [0; 1]N with
pm 2 (0; 1) for at least one player m 2 N . If the continue probability of one player
m (m 2 N ) is decreased by the -fold, then the expected payo of the players changes
maximal at (rmax + v) for a component.
Remark 1.2.19 (To Theorem 1.2.17 4.). We want to answer the question, why pm = 0 is
not allowed in Theorem 1.2.17 4. Assume that pm = 0, then p^m =  2 (0; 1). In order to
prove that p^ is ~-perfect, we have to show
mv ((p^
 m ; 1))  mv ((p^ m ; 0)) 2 [ ~; ~]:
On the one hand, p -perfect implies
mv
 
(p^ m ; 1)
  mv  (p^ m ; 0) = mv  (p m ; 1)  mv  (p m ; 0)    ~;
but on the other hand, we only have
mv
 
(p^ m ; 1)
  mv  (p^ m ; 0) = mv  (p m ; 1)  mv  (p m ; 0)
   mv  (p m ; 1)  mv  (p m ; 0)
  rmax   v :
However this is true for all p 2 [0; 1]N in  v , where pm = 0. A better a priori estimate is
not possible.
Observe that the proof that
8n 2 N n fmg :
8><>:
nv ((p^
 n ; 1))  nv ((p^ n ; 0))  ~ for p^ n = 0
nv ((p^
 n ; 1))  nv ((p^ n ; 0)) 2 [ ~; ~] for p^ n 2 (0; 1)
nv ((p^
 n ; 1))  nv ((p^ n ; 0))   ~ for p^ n = 1
will remain unaected from this case.
Corollary 1.2.20. With Theorem 1.2.17 4., it follows immediately that, if p 2 [0; 1]N with
pm 2 (0; 1), for at least one m 2 N , is (0 )perfect in  v (and therefore an equilibrium in
 v), p^ is 2rmax -perfect in  v .
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Up to now we only analyzed the inuence of the shift from the quitting probability of a
player m 2 N into direction quit with certainty. For completeness we consider also the
other case, where the quitting probability of player m is shifted into direction continue.
Lemma 1.2.21. Let  v be a given one-step game,  2 [0; 1], p 2 [0; 1]N and m 2 N an
arbitrary but xed chosen player. Dene
p := pm;(p) :=
 
p m ; (1  )pm:
Then the following holds:
1. %(p;?) = %(p;?) + pm%
 
(p m ; 0)

;
2. v(p) = v(p) + p
m
 
v
 
(p m ; 0)
  v (p m ; 1);
3. kv(p)  v(p)k  pm(rmax + v);
4. If p 2 [0; 1]N is -perfect in  v (  0) and pm 2 [0; 1) for the given player m 2 N ,
then p = pm; is ~-perfect in  v with ~ =  + p
m(2v + 2rmax ).
Proof. The proof of this properties is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.2.17.
One application of Theorem 1.2.17 and Lemma 1.2.21 is given in Section 3.4.2, where we
will use them in order to determine an optimal step size for an algorithm, which detects
"-equilibria in one-step games.
Payo vector v
Let a quitting game G be given. We already mentioned that every one-step game  v , with
v 2 RN arbitrary, has at least one "-equilibrium. An interesting question is now, whether
there exists a payo vector v 2 R for every probability vector p 2 [0; 1]N , such that p is
an "-equilibrium in  v .
Theorem 1.2.22. Let G be a given quitting game, "  0. For every vector p 2 [0; 1)N , a
vector v(p; ") 2 RN exists, such that p is an "-equilibrium in  v(p;") = (G ; v(p; ")).
Proof. For p being an "-equilibrium in a one-step game  v , with v 2 RN , p has to satisfy
the equilibrium condition
8n 2 N : nv (p)  max
n
nv
 
(p n ; 0)

; nv
 
(p n ; 1)
o  ": (1.22)
Given a player n, we distinguish the following four cases:
1. All players play continue for sure, i.e. p = 0.
2. Only player n plays quit with a positive probability, i.e pn > 0 and (p n ; 0) = 0.
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3. Player n plays continue with certainty and at least one other player plays quit with
a positive probability, i.e pn = 0 and p 6= 0.
4. Player n and at least one other player play quit with a positive probability, i.e.
pn 2 (0; 1) and (p n ; 0) 6= 0.
1.: For p = 0, the Inequality 1.22 leads immediately to the condition vn(p; ")  rnfng   ".
2.: For pn > 0 and (p n ; 0) = 0,
nv(p;")(p) = r
n
fng  vn(p; ")  " =) vn(p; ")  rnfng   ":
3.: For pn = 0 and p 6= 0,
nv(p;")(p)  nv(p;")
 
(p n ; 1)
  " = n0  (p n ; 1)  "
has to hold. This is equivalent to5
vn(p; ")  %(p;?) +
X
S2P(N )
%(p;?)  rnS  n0
 
(p n ; 1)
  "
() vn(p; ")  %(p;?) + n0 (p)  n0
 
(p n ; 1)
  "
() vn(p; ")  
n
0
 
(p n ; 1)
  n0 (p)
%(p;?)
  "
%(p;?)
:
4.: For pn 2 (0; 1) and (p n ; 0) 6= 0, on the one hand nv(p;")(p)  nvp
 
(p n ; 1)
  " should
be satised. This is the case, if and only if
pnnv(p;")
 
(p n ; 1)

+ (1  pn)nv(p;")
 
(p n ; 0)
  nv(p;") (p n ; 1)  "
() (1  pn)nvp
 
(p n ; 0)
  (1  pn)nvp (p n ; 1)  "
() nvp
 
(p n ; 0)
  nvp (p n ; 1)  "(1  pn) :
With
nv(p;")
 
(p n ; 0)

= vn(p; ")  % (p n ; 0);?+X
? 6=S2P(Nnfng)
%
 
(p n ; 0);?
  rnS
= vn(p; ")  % (p n ; 0);?+ n0  (p n ; 0)
and nv(p;")
 
(p n ; 1)

= n0
 
(p n ; 1)

, one obtains
vn(p; ")  
n
0
 
(p n ; 1)
  n0  (p n ; 0)
%
 
(p n ; 0);?
| {z }
=: vnp
  "
(1  pn)% (p n ; 0);?| {z }
=
"
%(p;?)
: (1.23)
5Observe that r? = 0.
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On the other hand, the following condition has to hold:
nv(p;")(p)  nv(p;")
 
(p n ; 0)
  "
() pnnv(p;")
 
(p n ; 1)

+ (1  pn)nv(p;")
 
(p n ; 0)
  nv(p;") (p n ; 0)  "
()  pnnv(p;")
 
(p n ; 0)
   pnnv(p;") (p n ; 1)  "
() nv(p;")
 
(p n ; 0)
  nv(p;") (p n ; 1)+ "pn
and nally with the same arguments as before,
vn(p; ")  
n
0
 
(p n ; 1)
  n0  (p n ; 0)
%
 
(p n ; 0);?
| {z }
= vnp
+
"
pn%
 
(p n ; 0);?
| {z }
=
"
%(p; fng)
= vnp +
"
%(p; fng) : (1.24)
In summary: vn(p; ") 2

vnp  
"
%(p;?)
; vnp +
"
%(p; fng)

has to hold.
Remark 1.2.23.
1. Let p 2 (0; 1)N be given. For " = 0 { that means in the case of Nash-equilibria { the
continue payo vector v(p; 0) = (v 1(p; 0); : : : ; vN (p; 0)) is uniquely determined by
vn(p; 0) = vnp =
n0
 
(p n ; 1)
  n0  (p n ; 0)
%
 
(p n ; 0);?

= rnfng +
P
? 6=S2P(Nnfng) %
 
(p n ; 0);?
  (rnS[fng   rnS )
%
 
(p n ; 0);?
 :
2. What happens if we expand the interval [0; 1)N to [0; 1]N and allow the players to
play quit with certainty?
Case 1: Suppose there are at least two players, who play quit with certainty. In
that case the probability that all players play the action continue is zero, even if we
exclude one of the players by consideration of the alternative prole of that player.
This implies v(p) = 0(p) or 
n
v
 
(p n ; 0)

= n0
 
(p n ; 0)

, for all v 2 RN , that means
the expected payo in this one-step game under p or, respectively, under (p n ; 0) is
independent from the continue payo vp for all players n. Therefore a given prole
p 2 [0; 1]N , where at least two players play quit with certainty, is an "-equilibrium, if
the payo structure of the corresponding quitting game is, accordingly, irrespective
of v .
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Case 2: Suppose there is only one player n, who plays quit with certainty. For all
players m 2 N , m 6= n, one has the same argument as in the case before: Their
expected payos are independent from the continue payo v(p; "). But for player n,
nv(p;")(p) = 0(p) = 0
 
(p n ; 1)
  nv(p;") (p n ; 0)  "
has to hold, which is equivalent to
vn(p; ")  vnp +
"
%
 
(p n ; 0);?

with vnp from (1.23) for (p
 n ; 0) 6= 0 and vn(p; ")  rnfng + " otherwise.
A similar theorem can be formulated for "-perfect proles p 2 [0; 1]N .
Theorem 1.2.24. Let G be a given quitting game, "  0. For every vector p 2 [0; 1)N , a
vector ~v(p; ") 2 RN exists, such that p is an "-perfect prole in  ~v(p;") = (G ; ~v(p; ")).
Proof. If p should be "-perfect in a one-step game  v , with v 2 RN , p has to satisfy the
condition
8n 2 N :
(
nv
 
(p n ; 1)
  nv  (p n ; 0)  " for pn = 0
nv
 
(p n ; 1)
  nv  (p n ; 0) 2 [ "; "] for pn 2 (0; 1) :
We distinguish between the following four cases:
1. pn = 0 and a) p = 0 or b) p 6= 0;
2. pn 2 (0; 1) and a) (p n ; 0) = 0 or b) (p n ; 0) 6= 0.
1.a): It immediately follows that ~vn(p; ") has to be chosen such that
~vn(p; ")  rnfng   ":
1.b): This case is equivalent to Case 3. from the proof of Theorem 1.2.22, i.e.
~vn(p; ")  vnp  
"
%(p;?)
; with vnp =
n0
 
(p n ; 1)
  n0  (p n ; 0)
%
 
(p n ; 0);?
 :
2.a): Because n~v(p;")
 
(p n ; 1)

= rnfng and 
n
~v(p;")
 
(p n ; 0)

= ~v(p; "), we get
rnfng   ~vn(p; ") 2 [ "; "] () ~vn(p; ") 2

rnfng   "; rnfng + "

:
2.b): For pn 2 (0; 1) additional to
~v(p; ")  vnp  
"
%(p;?)
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from Case 1.b), ~v(p; ") has to be such that n~v(p;")
 
(p n ; 1)
  n~v(p;") (p n ; 0)   ". With
n~v(p;")
 
(p n ; 1)

= n0
 
(p n ; 1)

and
n~v(p;")
 
(p n ; 0)

= ~v(p; ")  % (p n ; 0);?+ n0  (p n ; 0);
we obtain
~vn(p; ")  vnp +
"
%
 
(p n ; 0);?
 :
In summary:
~vn(p; ") 2
"
vnp  
"
%
 
(p n ; 0);?
 ; vnp + "% (p n ; 0);?
#
:
1.3. Finite quitting games
In this section we consider a nite part of a quitting game or, to say it in other words,
we look at a nitely many often, say t times, repeated one-step quitting game, where the
players receive no payo, if all of them decide to play continue during the t stages, but
a payo v 2 RN at the end of the t stages. Benoit and Krishna motivated the study of
nitely repeated games in the following way (see [2]): \The possibility that noncooperative
equilibria of a repeated game may involve choices that do not form equilibria of the un-
derlying one-shot game has been recognized for a long time. In a repeated setting, players
can condition their behavior at any stage of the game on the observed past behavior of
other players. As a result, a player may behave in a way that is not in his or her short run
interests because any attempt to realize short run gains may lead to future losses if other
players retaliate. Some of these equilibria may be more lucrative for all players than any
equilibria of the one-shot game."
Denition 1.3.1 (Finite quitting game). A nite quitting game corresponding to a given
quitting game G is a tuple
GI ;v := (G ; I ; v) =
 N ; (rS )S2P(N ); I ; v
where
 G is the corresponding quitting game with the nite set of players N = f1; : : : ;N g,
the quitting coalition S 2 P(N ) and the family of payo vectors (rS )S2P(N ),
 I = ft1; : : : ; t2g  N is the set of stages, t1; t2 2 N, t1 < t2,
 v = (v 1; : : : ; vN ) 2 RN is the payo to the players, if all of them choose to play the
action continue during all the t stages, otherwise they receive rS .
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Denition 1.3.2 (strategy, prole in the nite quitting game). Let GI ;v :=
 
G ; I ; v

be a
given nite quitting game. Then dene
 pni 2 [0; 1] as probability that player n 2 N will play the action quit at stage i 2 I ,
 the sequence }nI := }n = (pni )i2I as strategy for the player n 2 N ,
 the vector }I := } = (}1; : : : ; }N )T as (strategy) prole for the nite quitting game
and
 (} n ; ~}n) := (}1; : : : ; }n 1; ~}n ; }n+1; : : : ; }N ) as alternative strategy prole for player
n, where all the other players m 2 N n fng play according to their strategy }m ,
whereas player n changes her strategy and plays according to the strategy ~}n 2
[0; 1]NjI j.
Remark 1.3.3. The state space, action space and the transition law from the nite quitting
game are of course the same as in the corresponding quitting game (see Remark 1.1.2).
Probability space and equilibria
Now let a nite quitting game GI ;v = (G ; I ; v) and a strategy prole } in GI ;v be given.
Without loss of generality, we assume that I := f1; : : : ; tg, t 2 N, furthermore let z = ?
be the initial state. A probability space (
I ;AI ;P} := PI ;}) and a stochastic process
( ~Xk ; ~Yk)k2I on (
I ;AI ;P}) with values in (Z  A) are dened by
 
I := (Z  A)jI j
 AI :=
N
k2I
 P(Z )
 P(A)
 ~Xk(!) = ~Xk
 
(z1; a1; : : : ; zt ; at)

:= zk , k 2 I , ! 2 
I ,
 ~Yk(!) = ~Yk
 
(z1; a1; : : : ; zt ; at)

:= ak , k 2 I , ! 2 
I ,
~Yk = ( ~Y
1
k ; : : : ;
~Y Nk )
T
 ~Hk := ( ~X1; ~Y1; : : : ; ~Xk),
that means ~Hk(!) = ~Hk
 
(z1; a1; : : : ; zt ; at)

= (z1; a1; z2; a2; : : : ; zk)
k 2 I , ! 2 
I
 P}( ~X1 = ?) := 1 and
P}( ~Hk = (z1; a1; z2; a2; : : : ; zk))
:= P}( ~X1 = z1)
k 1Q
l=1
~t(zl+1jzl ; al)  %
 
pl ; fn 2 N j anl = 1g

,
where zl 2 Z for all l 2 I and al = (a1l ; : : : ; aNl ) 2 A for all l = 1; : : : ; t   1 with the
transition law ~t from Remark 1.1.2.
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Let the nite quitting game GI ;v =
 
G ; ; I = f1; : : : ; tg; v and the strategy prole } in
GI ;v be given. Then a stopping time I : 
I ! I [f+1g concerning the ltration (~Ak)k2I
with ~Ak := f ~Y : 1    kg, k 2 I is dened by
I (!) := inf

k 2 I : ~Yk(!) 2 f0; 1gN n f0g
	
: (1.25)
The expected payo for the players in a nite quitting game GI ;v :=
 
G ; I = f1; : : : ; tg; v
under the strategy prole } = (p1; : : : ; pt) is given by
g(}) = (g(})1; : : : ; g(})N )T
:= gI ;v(})
:= E}
 
r( ~YI )1fI2Ig + v1fI=+1g

=
tX
k=1
k 1Y
l=1
P}
 
~Yl = 0
 X
ak2Anf0g
P
 
~Yk = ak
  rfn2N : ank =1g + tY
l=1
P}
 
~Yl = 0
  v
=
tX
k=1
k 1Y
l=1
%(pl ;?)
X
S2P(N )nf?g
%(pk ; S )  rS +
tY
l=1
%(pl ;?)  v ;
where E} is the expected value with respect to the probability measure P}.
Similar to the one-step game respectively the quitting game, we dene the "-equilibrium
for the nite quitting game.
Denition 1.3.4 ("-equilibrium in the nite quitting game). Let GI ;v =
 
G ; I ; v

be a
given nite quitting game. A strategy prole } is called "-equilibrium in GI ;v , "  0, if
and only if
8n 2 N ; ~}n 2 [0; 1]jI j : gn(})  gn (} n ; ~}n)  ": (1.26)
Lemma 1.3.5. In a nite quitting game, the requirement (1.26) can be replaced by
8n 2 N ; ~}n 2 f0; 1gjI j : gn(})  gn (} n ; ~}n)  ": (1.27)
Proof. The proof uses mainly the niteness of the game and the linearity property of the
one-step quitting game.
Let the nite quitting game GI ;v =
 
G ; I = f1; : : : ; tg; v be given. In order to show that
} = (p1; : : : ; pt) is an "-equilibrium in the nite quitting game for a given player n 2 N ,
one has to verify that
gn(})  max
~}n2[0;1]jI j
gn
 
(} n ; ~}n)
  " = max
(~pn1 ;:::;~p
n
t )2[0;1]jI j
gn
 
(} n ; (~pn1 ; : : : ; ~p
n
t ))
  ":
(1.28)
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Because of
gn
 
(} n ; ~}n)

=
X
S2P(N )nf?g
%
 
(p n1 ; ~p
n
1 ); S
  rnS + % (p n1 ; ~pn1 );? X
S2P(N )nf?g
%
 
(p n2 ; ~p
n
2 ); S
  rnS
+ %
 
(p n2 ; ~p
n
2 );?

: : :
 X
S2P(N )nf?g
%
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1); S
  rnS
+ %
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1);?
 X
S2P(N )nf?g
%
 
(p nt ; ~p
n
t ); S

rnS + %
 
(p nt ; ~p
n
t );?

vn| {z }
= nv
 
(p nt ; ~p
n
t )


: : :

;
the Inequality (1.28) is equivalent to
gn(})  max
~pn1 2[0;1]
 X
S2P(N )nf?g
%
 
(p n1 ; ~p
n
1 ); S
  rnS
+ %
 
(p n1 ; ~p
n
1 );?
  max
~pn2 2[0;1]
 X
S2P(N )nf?g
%
 
(p n2 ; ~p
n
2 ); S
  rnS
+ %
 
(p n2 ; ~p
n
2 );?
  max
~pn3 2[0;1]

: : :
 X
S2P(N )nf?g
%
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1); S
  rnS
+ %
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1);?
  max
~pnt 2[0;1]
nv
 
(p nt ; ~p
n
t )

: : :

  ":
Since the expected payo nv
 
(p nt ; ~p
n
t )

for the one-step game  v under the strategy prole
(p nt ; ~p
n
t ) is linear in ~p
n
t , the maximum is attained either in ~p
n
t = 0 or in ~p
n
t = 1 (or in
both for the case that nv
 
(p nt ; ~p
n
t )

is constant in ~pnt ). This leads us to the following two
cases:
Case 1: The maximum of nv
 
(p nt ; ~p
n
t )

is attained in ~pnt = 0. Then
max
~pnt 12[0;1]
 X
S2P(N )nf?g
%
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1); S

rnS + %
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1);?
  max
~pnt 2[0;1]
nv
 
(p nt ; ~p
n
t )

= max
~pnt 12[0;1]
 X
S2P(N )nf?g
%
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1); S

rnS + %
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1);?
  nv  (p nt ; 0)
= max
~pnt 12[0;1]
n
v ((p
 n
t ;0))
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1)

= max
~pnt 12f0;1g
n
v ((p
 n
t ;0))
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1)

:
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Case 2: The maximum of nv
 
(p nt ; ~p
n
t )

lies in ~pnt = 1. Then
max
~pnt 12[0;1]
 X
S2P(N )nf?g
%
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1); S

rnS + %
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1);?
  max
~pnt 2[0;1]
nv
 
(p nt ; ~p
n
t )

= max
~pnt 12[0;1]
 X
S2P(N )
%
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1); S

rnS
+ %
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1);?
 X
S2P(N )
%
 
(p nt ; ~p
n
t ); S

rnS

= max
~pnt 12[0;1]
 X
S2P(N )
%
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
j 1); S

rnS + %
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1);?

n~v
 
(p nt ; 1)

= max
~pnt 12[0;1]
n
~v ((p
 n
t ;1))
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1)

= max
~pnt 12f0;1g
n
~v ((p
 n
t ;1))
 
(p nt 1; ~p
n
t 1)

for every ~v 2 Rn .
The same type of arguments is used for the other ~pk , k = 1; : : : ; t   2. So the maximizing
strategies for player n can be found recursively, and there will be always a maximizing
strategy for player n, which is a pure strategy, that means, which is an element of f0; 1gjI j.
Remark 1.3.6. 1. Although there will be always a pure (expected) payo-maximizing
strategy for a player { given the strategies for the other players { in general, an
equilibrium with only pure strategies need not exist.
2. Due to the structure of quitting games respectively nite quitting games, it is clear,
that if ~}n = (~pn1 ; : : : ; ~p
n
t ) 6= (0; : : : 0) is one of the pure maximizing strategies for
player n in the given nite quitting game GI ;v , then all strategies
}^n := (~pn1 ; : : : ; ~p
n
j ; p^
n
j+1; : : : ; p^
n
t ) with ~p1 = : : : = ~pj 1 = 0, ~pj = 1 and p^
n
k 2 [0; 1]
for all k 2 j + 1; : : : ; t are maximizing strategies for player n, as well.
At the end of this section, we show how nite quitting games can be embedded into a given
quitting game with respect to the calculation of the expected payo. Therefore consider the
nite quitting game GI ;v = (G ; I ; v) and a strategy prole } = }I in GI ;v . The expected
payo to the players can be calculated as
gI ;v(}) = E}
 
r( ~YI )1fI2Ig + v1fI=+1g

= E}
 
r( ~YI )1fI2Ig

+ E}
 
v1fI=1g

= E}
 
r( ~YI )1fI2Ig

+ P}(I =1)  v
= E}
 
r( ~YI )1fI2Ig

+
 
1  P}(I 2 I )
  v : (1.29)
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Now let a strategy prole  = (p1; p2; : : :) for G be given. We shift the interval I and
consider the nite quitting game
GI ;v = (G ; I = fi ; : : : ; jg; v);
which starts at the time i and ends at j , i  j . If the continue payo v is equal to the
expected payo from the quitting game starting at time j + 1 under the subgame prole
j+1, that means v = (j+1), then for the expected payo to the players under a strategy
prole } = }fi ;:::;jg in the nite game GI ;v ,
gI ;v(}) = E}
 
r( ~YI )1fI2Ig

+
 
1  P}(I 2 I )

(j+1)
holds.
 = fp1; p2; : : : ; pi 1; pi ; pi+1; : : : ; pj| {z }
=: }fi ;:::;jg
; pj+1; pj+2; : : :| {z }
= j+1
g
Table 1.1.: Partitioning of the prole 
Observe that in general }fi ;:::;jg need not be equal to (pi ; : : : ; pj ), but if this is the case, i.e.
} = }fi ;:::;jg = (pi ; : : : ; pj ), that means } is a part of , then
gI ;v(}) = E}
 
r( ~YI )  1fIkg + (k+1)1fI>kg

(1.30)
for all k 2 I and furthermore
gI ;v(}) = E
 
r(Y )  1fjg + (j+1)1f>jg
  i = (i);
where I is the stopping time corresponding to the nite game and  is the stopping time
of the quitting game.
These technical facts play an important role in the proof of Proposition 2.3.8.
1.4. Relations between the structure of prole  and the
expected payo in quitting games
In this section we consider a quitting game G =
 N ; (rS )S2P(N ) and a strategy prole
 = (p1; p2; : : :) in this game. We study the relations between the structure of  and the
expected payo to the players under the strategy prole . The following questions will
be treated:
33
Chapter 1. Quitting games
1. Assume that at least one stage i 2 N exists, such that all players play continue with
certainty, i.e. pi = 0.
a) How does the value of the expected payo change, if we remove or insert a nite
number of zero-vectors to the given one?
b) If  is an "-equilibrium ("  0), is it possible to construct new "-equilibria out
of  by erasing or adding a nite number of zero vectors to the given one?
2. Assume that one stage i 2 N exists, such that one player plays quit with certainty.
a) How far does this simplify the calculation of the expected payo to the players
under ?
b) If  is an "-equilibrium ("  0), is it possible to construct new "-equilibria out
of ?
3. Let  be a stationary strategy prole. How does this aects the calculation of the
expected payo and the proof that a given prole is an "-equilibrium?
Before concerning the questions in detail, we introduce the following notation:
Notation 1.4.1. Denote
{ c := (0; 0; : : :) the strategy in the quitting game G , where a player chooses to play
the action continue with certainty all the time,
{ q := (1; 1; : : :) the strategy in the quitting game G , where a player chooses to play
the action quit with certainty all the time,
{ qi := (0; : : : ; 0; 1; 0; : : :) the strategy in the quitting game G , where a player plays
the action continue all the time except of stage i 2 N, in which the action quit is
played with certainty,
{ c := 0,
{ q := 1 = (1; : : : ; 1)T 2 [0; 1]N .
1. Removing and inserting zero-vectors
Firstly we show, that the value of the expected payo does not change, if one removes or
inserts nitely many zero-vectors.
Lemma 1.4.2. Let G be a quitting game and  a strategy prole in G. If a set of con-
secutive stages I = fi ; : : : ; jg exists, such that pk = c for all k 2 I , then () = (^) for
all
^ := (p1; : : : ; pi 1; c; : : : ; c| {z }
l times
; pj+1; pj+2; : : :);
l 2 N0.
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Proof. As shown in Table 1.1, we divide the prole  into three parts. The rst one is
}I := (p1; : : : ; pi 1) with I := f1; : : : ; i 1g, the second one is }I = (pi ; : : : ; pj ) = (c; : : : ; c)
and the third j+1. Furthermore we set v := 0, and let l 2 N0 be arbitrary but xed.
() = E
 
r(Y )1f2Ig + r(Y )1f2Ig + r(Y )1fj<<1g

= E
 
r(Y )1f2Ig

+ E
 
r(Y )1f2Ig + r(Y )1fj<<1g

= E}I
 
r( ~Y )1fI2Ig

+ E}I
 
r(Y^I )1fI2Ig + (j+1)1fI=+1g

= gI ;v(}I ) +
i 1Y
k=1
%(pk ;?)gI ;(j+1)(}I )
This, (1.29) and P}I (I 2 I ) = 0 yield
() = gI ;v(}I ) +
i 1Y
k=1
%(pk ;?)(j+1)
= gI ;v(}I ) +
i 1Y
k=1
%(pk ;?)gfi ;:::;i+l 1g;(j+1)
 
(c; : : : ; c| {z }
l times
)

= (^):
Now suppose, that  is an "-equilibrium and that  contains at least one block of zero
vectors. The question how to construct other "-equilibria for the given quitting game out
of the given prole is answered through the next lemma.
Lemma 1.4.3. Let G be a given quitting game, I = fi ; : : : ; jg, i  j , a set of consecutive
stages and  = (p1; p2; : : :) an "-equilibrium in G, where pk = c for all k 2 I , "  0. Then
every prole ^, where
^ := (p1; : : : ; pi 1; c; : : : ; c| {z }
l times
; pj+1; pj+2; : : :); (1.31)
l 2 N0, is an "-equilibrium in G.
Proof. We show that the equilibrium condition
n(^)  max
n2[0;1]N
n
 
(^ n ; n)
  " (1.32)
holds for all players n 2 N and all l 2 N0, with ^ from (1.31).
The previous Lemma 1.4.2 gives us that () = (^) for all ^ like in (1.31). Dene
I := f1; : : : ; i 1g and }I := (p1; : : : ; pi 1), }I := (pi ; : : : ; pj ) = (c; : : : ; c) as decomposition
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of  together with ~}nI := (~p
n
1 ; : : : ; ~p
n
i 1) 2 [0; 1]jI j and ~}nI := (~pni ; : : : ; ~pnj ) 2 [0; 1]jI j as
decomposition of ~n .  being an "-equilibrium implies
n()  max
~n2[0;1]N
n
 
( n ; ~n)
  "
= max
~n2[0;1]N

gnI ;0
 
(} nI ; ~}
n
I )

+
i 1Y
k=1
%
 
(p nk ; ~p
n
k );?
  gnI ;0 (} nI ; ~}nI )
+
jY
k=i
(1  ~pk)n
 
(~ nj+1; ~
n
j+1)
  " (1.33)
for all n 2 N . We distinguish two cases. In the rst case, we show (1.32) for l 2 N and in
the second for l = 0.
Case 1: Let l 2 N be arbitrary but xed. Denote J := fi ; i + 1; : : : ; i + l   1g,
}^J := (p^i ; : : : ; p^i+l 1) = (c; : : : ; c) and }nJ := (p
n
i ; : : : ; p
n
i+l 1) 2 [0; 1]jJ j. Observe that
^ diers from  only in the interval J , which is longer or shorter than the counterpart
I , thus it is sucient to focus on that part referring to the maximization of the expected
payo. For b 2 RN arbitrary but xed we have on the one hand
max
~}I2[0;1]jI j
gnI ;0
 
(} nI ; ~}
n
I )

+
jY
k=i
(1  ~pnk )  b
= max
~}I2[0;1]jI j
rnfng
jX
k=i
k 1Y
d=i
(1  ~pnd )~pnk| {z }
=1 
jQ
k=i
(1 ~pnk )
+
jY
k=i
(1  ~pnk )  b (1.34)
for the strategy  and on the other hand
max
}J2[0;1]jJ j
gnJ ;0
 
(}^ nJ ; }
n
J )

+
i+l 1Y
k=i
(1  pnk )  b
= max
}J2[0;1]jJ j
rnfng
i+l 1X
k=i
k 1Y
d=i
(1  pnd )pnk| {z }
=1 
i+l 1Q
k=i
(1 pnk )
+
i+l 1Y
k=i
(1  pnk )  b (1.35)
for the strategy ^, where we keep in mind, that only player n may quit with a positive
probability, while the other players play continue with certainty.
Because of the structure of (1.34) and (1.35), a strategy }nJ from player n is a maximizing
argument of (1.35) if, and only if ~}nI = (~p
n
i ; : : : ; ~p
n
j ) with ~p
n := 1  Qi+l 1k=i (1   pnk ) and
~pni+1 = : : : = ~p
n
j = 0 is a maximizing argument for (1.34).
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This implies
n(^) = n()  max
~2[0;1]N
n
 
( n ; ~n)
  " = max
n2[0;1]N
n
 
(^ n ; n)
  ":
Case 2: Let l = 0. Then ^ = (p1; : : : ; pi 1; pj+1; : : :). With (1.33),
n(^) = n()
 max
~n2[0;1]N

gnI ;0
 
(} nI ; ~}
n
I )

+
i 1Y
k=1
%
 
(p nk ; ~p
n
k );?
  gnI ;0 (} nI ; ~}nI )
+
jY
k=i
(1  ~pk)n
 
(~ nj+1; ~
n
j+1)
  "
 max
(~pn1 ;:::;~p
n
i 1;0;:::;0;~p
n
j+1;:::)2[0;1]N

gnI ;0
 
(} nI ; ~}
n
I )

+
i 1Y
k=1
%
 
(p nk ; ~p
n
k );?



gnI ;0
 
(} nI ; ~}
n
I )

+
jY
k=i
(1  ~pnk )n
 
(~ nj+1; ~
n
j+1)
  "
holds. Because (} nI ; (0; : : : ; 0)) contains only zeros, g
n
I ;0
 
(} nI ; (0; : : : ; 0))

= 0 and
jQ
k=i
(1  ~pk) = 1, therefore
n(^)  max
(~pn1 ;:::;~p
n
i 1;0;:::;0;~p
n
j+1;:::)2[0;1]N

gnI ;0
 
(} nI ; ~}
n
I )

+
i 1Y
k=1
%
 
(p nk ; ~p
n
k );?

 n (~ nj+1; ~nj+1)  "
= max
n2[0;1]N
n
 
(^ n ; n)
  "
follows. This nishes the proof.
Lemma 1.4.3 pointed out that one may extend, reduce or even eliminate a given block
of zero-vectors without changing the value of the expected payo. Furthermore if  was
an "-equilibrium, the resulting strategy proles are "-equilibria as well. But the converse
implication is not true, in general. This means that it is not possible to insert a nite block
of zero vectors at an arbitrary position in a given "-equilibrium  and get an "-equilibrium
prole again. We illustrate this with a counter example:
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Example 3. Consider the two-player quitting game G given by:
Player 2
continue quit
Player 1
continue
quit
	
( 10 ; 1 )
( 1 ; 1 )
( 5 ; 5 )
The stationary strategy prole  = (p; p; : : :) with p = (1; 1)T is an equilibrium in G
because
n() = 5  max
~n2n
n
 
( n ; ~n)

= max
~pn1 2[0;1]
~p1
n  5 + (1  ~p1n)  1 = 5 n = 1; 2:
Now we insert a zero vector at the rst position of , such that ^ := (p^1; p^2; : : :) =
(c; p; p; : : :). On the one hand, () = (^) (cf. Lemma 1.4.2), but on the other hand,
1() = 5  max
12 1
1
 
(^ 1; 1)

= max
(p11 ;p
1
2)2[0;1]2
p11  10 + (1  p11) 
 
p12  5 + (1  p12)  1

= 10:
2. A player plays quit with certainty
The next lemma refers to the second question (see 2.a) stated at the beginning of this
section.
Lemma 1.4.4. Let G be a given quitting game and  a strategy prole in G. If there exist
a player n 2 N and a stage i 2 N, such that pni = 1, then () = (^) for all
^ := (p1; : : : ; pi ; p^i+1; p^i+1; : : :);
with p^i+k 2 [0; 1]N arbitrary for all k 2 N.
Proof. pni = 1 implies fi < g = ? (cf. 1.2) and thus
() = E
 
r(Y )1fig + r(Y )1fi<<1g

= E
 
r(Y )1fig

= E^
 
r(Y )1fig

= E^
 
r(Y )1fig + r(Y )1fi<<1g

= (^):
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Remark 1.4.5. Lemma 1.4.2 and Lemma 1.4.4 can be formulated and proven analogously
for nite quitting games { observe the change of the length of the interval I and therewith
the change of the length of the nite game in the rst case.
Consider now part b) of the second question from the beginning.
Lemma 1.4.6. Let G be a given quitting game and  = (p1; p2; : : :) an "-equilibrium in G,
where two players n; u 2 N and two stages i ; j 2 N, i  j , exist, such that pni = puj = 1.
Then every prole ^, where
^ := (p1; : : : ; pj ; p^j+1; p^j+2; : : :); p^j+k 2 [0; 1]N ; k 2 N; (1.36)
is an "-equilibrium in G.
Proof. Again we have to show, that for all player m 2 N
m(^)  max
~n2[0;1]N
m
 
(^ n ; ~n)
  "
holds.
First consider all players m 6= n. Denote I := f1; : : : ; ig, }I := (p1; : : : ; pi) and let v 2 RN
be arbitrary. Using the structure of ^, especially that p^ni = p
n
i = 1, and that  is an
"-equilibrium in G , one gets
m(^) = m()  max
~m2[0;1]N
m
 
( m ; ~m)
  "
= max
(~pm1 ;:::;~p
m
i )2[0;1]i
gmI ;v
 
(} mI ; (~p
m
1 ; : : : ; ~p
m
i ))
  "
= max
~m2[0;1]N
m
 
(^ m ; ~m)
  "
The proof for player n is similar to that for the other players, taking into account that
player u plays quit with certainty at stage j , i.e. p^uj = p
u
j = 1, such that one has to choose
I := f1; : : : ; jg.
Corollary 1.4.7. Let G be a given quitting game and  = (p1; p2; : : :) a pure "-equilibrium
in G, "  0, where at least two players play quit with certainty. Denote by i the rst
stage, where the rst player n 2 N plays quit, and by j the rst stage, where the second
player m 2 N n fng plays quit. Then the prole ^ = (pi ; pj ; p^3; p^4; : : :) with p^k 2 f0; 1gN ,
2 < k 2 N, is a pure "-equilibrium in G.
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3. Stationary strategy proles
Let  = (p; p; : : :) with p 2 [0; 1]N be a stationary strategy prole in G . In general the
expected payo for the players under a given prole was calculated by
() =
X
S2P(N )
rS  %(p1; S ) + %(p1;?)  (2):
For a stationary prole () = (k), for all k 2 N,
() =
X
S2P(N )
rS  %(p; S ) + %(p;?)  () = ()(p) (1.37)
respectively
() =
8<:0 if p = c11 %(p;?)  P
S2P(N )
rS  %(p; S ) otherwise : (1.38)
follows.
In the next lemma we want to show, that it is comparatively easy to verify, whether a
given stationary strategy prole is an "-equilibrium or not. We use the fact, that given
that all players except player n play a stationary strategy, there always exists a stationary
strategy for player n, which maximizes her expected payo. This is because the maximizing
problem for player n can be seen as a Markov decision problem and it is well known that
there always exists a stationary strategy which solves it (see e.g. [3] or [18] p.87.).
Lemma 1.4.8. Let G be a given quitting game and  = (p; p; : : :) with p 2 [0; 1]N a
stationary strategy prole in G. Then  is an "-equilibrium ("  0) in G
() 8n 2 N : n()  n ( n ; c)  " ^ n()  n ( n ;q)  ":
Proof. Consider a player n 2 N . Let p 6= (c n ; b) with b 2 [0; 1], otherwise the proof is
trivial. The expected payo for this player is given by
n() =
1
1  %(p;?)
X
S2P(N )
%(p; S )rnS
=
1
1  (1  pn)% (p n ; 0);?  pn  X
S2P(Nnfng)
%
 
(p n ; 1); S [ fngrnS[fng| {z }
=: n
+ (1  pn) 
X
S2P(Nnfng)
%
 
(p n ; 0); S

rnS| {z }
=: n

;
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Observe that p 6= (c n ; b) with b 2 [0; 1] implies %(p;?) < 1.
Dierentiation leads to
@n()
@pn
=
1 
1  (1  pn)% (p n ; 0);?2 
 
n   n
  1  (1  pn)% (p n ; 0);?
   pn  n + (1  pn)  n  % (p n ; 0);?
=
1 
1  (1  pn)% (p n ; 0);?2 

n   n   (1  pn)%
 
(p n ; 0);?

n
+ (1  pn)% (p n ; 0);?n   pn% (p n ; 0);?  n
  (1  pn)% (p n ; 0);?n
=
1 
1  (1  pn)% (p n ; 0);?2 

n   n   %
 
(p n ; 0);?

n

:
The term
n   n   %
 
(p n ; 0);?

n
is independent from p and therefore constant. Furthermore for pn 2 [0; 1] and
%
 
(p n ; 0);?

< 1, 
1  (1  pn)% (p n ; 0);?2 > 0
follows. This implies that the slope of n() is either positive or negative in pn . Therefore
the maximum of the expected payo for a player n 2 N is always reached by a pure
stationary strategy.
Remark 1.4.9. Lemma 1.4.8 implies that in order to verify, whether a stationary strategy
prole  is an ~"-equilibrium in G or not, it is sucient to consider only pure strategies as
alternatives for a player.
Remark 1.4.10. For two-player recursive repeated games with absorbing states, Flesch,
Thuijsman and Vrieze showed in [15] that a stationary "-equilibrium always exists. That
means all two-player quitting games have a stationary "-equilibrium, " > 0. On the other
hand, they found an example of a three-player quitting game, which has no stationary
"-equilibrium (see [14]). The example is the following:
Player 3 c Player 2 Player 3 q Player 2
c q c q
Player 1
c
q
	
(1; 3; 0)
(0; 1; 3)
(1; 0; 1)
Player 1
c
q
(3; 0; 1)
(0; 1; 1)
(1; 1; 0)
(0; 0; 0)
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After answering all three questions stated at the beginning of this section, let us look at
consequences for the search of equilibria: If one searches for "-equilibria it is sucient to
consider proles where either all players play continue all the time, or where at least on
player plays quit with a positive probability at the beginning { blocks with zero-vectors,
i.e. stages where all players play continue with certainty, can be ignored. Concerning
stationary strategy proles: In order to nd a stationary "-equilibrium, it is sucient to
search for vectors p 2 [0; 1]N , such that
8n 2 N : n()  n ( n ; c)  " ^ n()  n ( n ;q)  "
holds.
The next chapter is dedicated to existence theorems for equilibria in quitting games.
42
Chapter 2.
Equilibria in Quitting games
In this chapter, we present important results referring to the existence of ("-)equilibria
in quitting games. The rst one was proved by Solan and Vieille in [36]. They showed
that every symmetric quitting games possesses a Nash-equilibrium (see Section 2.1). In
Section 2.2 we make a short excursion to dominant respectively dominated strategies. After
dening, what this means in the context of quitting games, we show that if at least one
player exists, who has quit as dominant strategy, then the quitting game has a Nash-
equilibrium. Section 2.3 plays a major role in this chapter. We present again a generalized
version of a theorem by Solan and Vieille published in [36]. They showed that for all
quitting games with rnfng = 1 for all n 2 N and rnS  1 for all n 2 N and every S such
that n 2 S , a cyclic subgame "-equilibrium exists. We extend this to rnfng   ~" where ~"
is specied in the theorem. The proof of this is divided into three parts. We mention the
rst two parts and give a short (sketch of the) proof for it, in order to gure out, where
the requirements to the game structure are needed. For the last part we use a version of
the proof by Solan and Vieille, with even better estimates for the resulting equilibrium.
We end this chapter with Section 2.4., where we state some equivalent formulations for the
existence of (cyclic) approximate equilibria by Robert Simon published in [31].
2.1. Symmetric quitting games
Symmetric quitting games are dened as follows:
Denition 2.1.1 (Symmetric quitting game). Let G = (N ; (rS )S2P(N )) be a given quitting
game. Then G is called symmetric, if and only if two families of numbers (k)k2N  R
and (k)k2N  R exist, such that
rnS =
(
jS j for n 2 S
jS j for n =2 S
;
where N := 0.
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That means in a symmetric quitting game, the payo to a player depends only on the size
of S and whether a player belongs to S or not.
Solan and Vieille stated in [36]:
Proposition 2.1.2. Every symmetric quitting game has a pure, stationary (0-)equilibrium.
The proof is also stated in [36]. We only mention how the equilibria are constructed with
respect to the payo families (k)k2N and (k)k2N from a given symmetric quitting game
G . One has to distinguish three cases:
1. 1  0:
The strategy prole  = (1; : : : ; N )T , where n = c for all n 2 N is an equilibrium
in G .
2. 9k 2 f1; : : : ;N   1g : k+1  k ^ k  k 1, where 0 := 0:
The strategy prole  = (1; : : : ; N )T , where 1 = : : : = k = q and k+1 = : : : =
N = c is a stationary equilibrium in G .
3. Neither 1. nor 2. hold:
The strategy prole  = (1; : : : ; N )T , where 1 = : : : = N = q is a stationary
equilibrium in G .
As consequence of the proof, one can construct an easy algorithm which determines an
equilibrium (or all equilibria) for a given symmetric quitting game. Such an algorithm will
be stated later in Chapter 4. For completeness, an algorithm, which checks, whether a
given quitting game is symmetric or not, is also mentioned.
2.2. Quitting games with dominant strategies
In this section, we consider so-called dominant respectively dominated strategies and show,
how they are related to ("-)equilibria in quitting games. But rst the denition:
Denition 2.2.1 ((weakly) dominant/dominated strategy). Let G be a given quitting
game and n 2 n a strategy for player n 2 N . Then n is called
 (weakly) dominant :() 8 2  : n ( n ; n)  n()
 (weakly) dominated :() 8 2  : n ( n ; n)  n()
Consider the quitting game G =
 N ; (rS )S2P(N ). Assume that all players n 2 N own a
(weakly) dominant strategy n , then the strategy prole  := (1; : : : ; N )T is obviously
a Nash-equilibrium in G .
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Proposition 2.2.2. Let G be a given quitting game and m a dominant strategy for player
m, m 2 N . Then either m is pure and stationary, or there exists at least another dominant
strategy ^m for player m, which is pure and stationary.
Proof. Because m is dominant for all  2 ,
n
 
( n ; n)
  n() (2.1)
holds.
Take  = (c; c; : : :). Formula (2.1) implies
n
 
( n ; n)

=
X
k2N
pmk  rmfmg 
k 1Y
i=1
(1  pmi )  maxfrmfmg; 0g: (2.2)
Now choose  = (p1; p2; : : :) such that p1 is pure and that additionally at least one player
n 6= m plays quit with certainty, i.e. p1 = f0; 1gN and pn1 = 1. Because n plays quit with
certainty we could observe the one-step game  0 instead of the quitting game and have for
player m
m
 
( m ; m)

= m0
 
(p m1 ; p
m
1 )

= pm1  rmS[fmg + (1  pm1 )  rmS ;
where S = fk 2 N n fmg j pk1 = 1g, observe that  is pure. This and inequality (2.1) lead
to
pm1  rmS[fmg + (1  pm1 )  rmS  rmS[fmg (2.3)
for pm = 1 or
pm1  rmS[fmg + (1  pm1 )  rmS  rmS (2.4)
for pm = 0.
Finally we obtain with (2.2), (2.3) and (2.4) three cases depending on the value of pm1 :
1. pm1 2 (0; 1) =) rmS[fmg = rmS for all S 2 P(N n fmg) with jS j = 1 and rmfmg  0
2. pm1 = 0 =) rmS[fmg  rmS for all S 2 P(N n fmg)
3. pm1 = 1 =) rmS[fmg  rmS for all S 2 P(N n fmg)
So the value of m gives us statements about the payo structure from m. In the rst case
the payos to player m are independent from her behavior, as long as some other player
plays quit with certainty, otherwise she would prefer to quit alone, especially if rmfmg > 0.
This implies that playing quit with certainty all the time is weakly dominant as well. In
the second case, the structure of the payo family is that way, that player m always gets a
higher (or equal) payo, if she plays continue with certainty, which makes playing always
continue for sure dominant for m. The third case is similar to the second one, with quit
instead of continue.
Observe, that the implications of the three cases are time-independent.
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For completeness, we dene strongly dominant respectively dominated strategies as well,
where we slightly modify this denition by concerning the corresponding one-step game.
Denition 2.2.3 (strongly dominant/dominated strategy). Let G be a given quitting
game and n = (pn ; pn ; : : :) 2 n a strategy for player n 2 N . Then n is called
 strongly dominant :() 8p 2 [0; 1]N ; pn 6= pn : n0
 
(p n ; pn)

> n0 (p)
 strongly dominated :() 8p 2 [0; 1]N ; pn 6= pn : n0
 
(p n ; pn)

< n0 (p)
Remark 2.2.4. 1. The modication is motivated by the fact that, in the case of an
equivalent denition to weakly dominant resp. dominated strategies, only continuing
all the time would be a possible strongly dominant strategy (cf. (2.2)).
2. Let G be a given quitting game and m a dominant strategy for player m, m 2 N .
Then m is pure (and stationary by denition). The proof is similar to the proof
of Proposition 2.2.2, where we have \>" resp. \<" instead of \" resp. \".
Furthermore this implies that, if playing continue all the time is a strongly dominant
strategy for a player, then playing quit all the time is a strongly dominated strategy
for her and vice versa.
3. Assume that  is a Nash-equilibrium in G and m is a strongly dominant strategy
for player m, then m = m . This holds for all Nash-equilibria in G .
Proposition 2.2.5. Let G be a given quitting game and m = (pm1 ; p
m
2 ; : : :) a (weakly)
dominant strategy for player m, where pm1 = 1. Then G has at least one (0-)equilibrium.
Proof. W.l.o.g. we assume that N with pN1 = 1 is a dominant strategy for player N . For
player N , nothing is to prove as long as she is playing according to m in the equilibrium
prole. Consider the players n 6= N . N plays quit with certainty in the rst stage implies
n() = n0 (p1)
or
n
 
( n ; ~n)

= n0
 
(p n1 ; ~p
n
1 )

; ~n = (~pn1 ; ~p
n
2 ; : : :) 2 n ;
respectively, for all  = (p1; p2; : : :), where p
N
i = p
N
i , i 2 N. This means, that the players n
are situated in a one-step game given by  v =
 N^ := f1; : : : ;N   1g; (r^S^ )S^2P(S^); v, where
r^n
S^
:= rn
S^[fNg and v
n := rnfng for n 2 N^ . As mentioned in Theorem 1.2.15, every one-step
game has got an (0-)equilibrium. Let p^ be such an equilibrium in the one-step game  v ,
then all  = (p1; p2; : : :) with p
 N
1 = p^, p
m
1 = 1 and pi 2 [0; 1]N for all i = 2; 3; : : : are
(0-)equilibria in G .
Remark 2.2.6. The resulting equilibrium from Proposition 2.2.5 is an instant equilibrium.
We come back to strictly dominant strategies later in Chapter 3, where we use them { if
at least one player has such a strategy { for a game reduction.
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2.3. Quitting games in general
This section deals with an important theorem by Solan and Vieille stated in [36]. Simon for
example used that theorem to prove existence predications for quitting games in general
(see [31] page 18, Theorem 3).
We quote the theorem from [36]:
Theorem 2.3.1. Let be " > 0. Every quitting game G that satises the following has a
cyclic subgame "-equilibrium:
1. rnfng = 1 for every n 2 N ;
2. rnS  1 for every n 2 N and every S such that n 2 S.
The rst condition in this theorem is achievable by scaling the family of payo vectors,
supposed that rnfng is positive for all players n 2 N . The second condition is the more
restrictive one and implies that the players would prefer to quit alone instead of quitting
together with anyone else. Observe that the payo to the players, if they are not in the
quitting coalition, is not restricted.
Remark 2.3.2. Two-player quitting games, with the structure from Theorem 2.3.3, i.e.
rnfng = 1 and r
1
f1g; r
2
f2g; r
n
f1;2g 2 ( 1; 1] for n = 1; 2, always have an instant Nash-
equilibrium. The argumentation is the following: Consider the two-player quitting game
Player 2
continue quit
Player 1
continue
quit
	
(1 ; a )
( b ; 1 )
( d1 ; d2 )
where a; b 2 R and d1; d2 2 ( 1; 1]. We observe three cases:
1. b  d1 ^ a  d2: Then playing quit all the time is a dominant strategy for player
one and Proposition 2.2.5 is applicable.
2. b > d1: Consider the prole  = (p; p; : : :) with p = (c; q)
T . For player one,
1
 
( 1; ~1)

= ~p11  d1 + (1  ~p11)  b  b = 1(p);
holds for all ~1 = (~p11 ; ~p
1
2 ; : : :) 2 [0; 1]N.  is a stationary prole and for player two,
2
 
( 2; c)

= 0 and 2
 
( 2;q)

= 1 = 2() hold, which imply with Lemma 1.4.8
that  is an instant Nash-equilibrium for G .
3. a > d2 is analogous to 2.
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Here we prove the following theorem, which allows that the payo rnfng may also be zero
respectively negative.
Theorem 2.3.3. Let G =
 N ; (rS )S2P(N ) be a given quitting game and " > 0. If
1. rnfng   ~" for all players n 2 N and
2. rnfng  rnS for all S 2 P(N ) with n 2 S
hold, then G has a (cyclic subgame) ~"-equilibrium, where
~" := max

"+ 2rmax ("+ "
b a + "a + 4  "b); 2"1 b d + 4"1 b + 15rmax  "a + "
	
with a; b; d 2 (0; 1) such that b > a, d > a and (1  "a)1="d  ".
Remark 2.3.4. Let l 2 N be the length of the cyclic subgame prole mentioned in the
previous theorem, then we have:
~" :=
(
" := "(a; b) := "+ 2rmax ("+ "
b a + "a + 4  "b) for l = 1
~" := ~"(a; b; d) := 2"
1 b d + 4"1 b + 15rmax  "a + " for l > 1
:
The main structure of the proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 2.3.1 by Solan and
Vieille and divided into three parts, represented by the Propositions 2.3.5, 2.3.7 and 2.3.8.
But before quoting the mentioned propositions, another notation is needed.
Let V be a subset of RN and " 2 [0; 1) be given.  " denotes a correspondence1 from V
into V , where
 "(v) :=  ";V (v) (2.5)
:=

v(p)
 v(p) 2 V ; p 2 [0; 1]N ; p is 2"rmax -perfect; %(p;?)  1  "	:
So  " maps a vector v 2 V to a set of expected payos (in V ) from a one-step game  v ,
where the payos are generated by proles which are 2"rmax -perfect in  v and where the
game quits with a probability of at least ".
Proposition 2.3.5. Let " 2 [0; 1) be given. Dene
V :=

v 2 [ 2rmax ; 2rmax ]N
 9n 2 N : vn  rnfng	:
Assume that for every v 2 V , an equilibrium p in  v exists, such that either
a) p = c (that means all players choose continue) or
b) p 6= c and nv (p)  rnfng for some n 2 N with pn > 0.
Then  "(v) 6= ? for all v 2 V .
1Let K and L be sets. A correspondence J : K  L is a subset J of K L and one denes for all k 2 K :
J (k) := fl j(k ; l) 2 Jg. It is not assumed a priori that J (k) 6= ? for all or any particular k 2 K .
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Remark 2.3.6. 1. In comparison with Proposition 2.2 from [36], the set V is modied.
The requirement 9n 2 N : vn  1 from [36] is replaced by 9n 2 N : vn  rnfng and
additionally to that, instead of nv (p)  1 now nv (p)  rnfng has to be assumed.
2. Let G be a quitting game, which satises the second requirement of Theorem 2.3.3,
and  v a corresponding one-step game to G with v 2 V . Then a strategy prole
p 2 [0; 1]N exists, which satises the assumptions of Proposition 2.3.5.
Proof. That every one-step game has got an equilibrium is a well-known fact. Let
p be a Nash-equilibrium in  v , then either p = c or p 6= c holds. For the second
case, it remains to show, that a player n with pn > 0 and nv (p)  rnfng exists. Since
p 6= (0; : : : ; 0)T , at least one player n 2 N exists with pn > 0.
Assume that pn = 1. With assumption 2 of Theorem 2.3.3, one obtains
nv (p) =
X
S2P(N )
%(p; S )rnS
=
X
SNnfng
%(p; S [ fng)rnS[fng

X
SNnfng
%(p; S [ fng)rnfng
 rnfng:
Consider the case pn 2 (0; 1). Because p is an equilibrium in  v , p is also (0-)perfect
in  v . This implies 
n
v (p
 n ; 1)   nv (p n ; 0) = 0, i.e. n
 
(p n ; b)

is constant in
b 2 [0; 1], and equally to the case above,
nv (p) = 
n
v (p
 m ; 1)  rnfng
follows.
3. The assumptions of Proposition 2.3.5 are chosen in such a way that the estimate in
Remark 1.2.19 holds for p = c or, in the case p 6= c, to guarantee that pn 2 (0; 1].
Before giving details on the proof of the last one, we quote the other two propositions
which are used to proof the theorem.
Proposition 2.3.7. 2 Let " 2 (0; 1) be given. If a compact set V exists such that  "(v) 6= ?
for all v 2 V , then a cyclic prole  = (pi)i2N in G exists, such that for every i 2 N:
1. G is terminating under each subgame prole i = (pj )ij2N induced by ; and
2. pi is (2rmax + 2)"-perfect in  (i+1).
2See [36] Proposition 2.3. p. 270.
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Proposition 2.3.8. Let G =
 N ; (rS )S2P(N ) be a given quitting game, " 2 (0; 1) and
rnfng   " for all n 2 N and S 2 N with n 2 S. Furthermore let  = (pi)i2N be a strategy
prole in G and assume that the following properties hold for every i 2 N:
1. G is terminating under every subgame strategy prole i .
2. pi is "-perfect in  (i+1).
Then either  is a subgame ~"-equilibrium, or there exists a stationary "-equilibrium in
G, where
~" := ~"(a; b; d) := 2"
1 b d + 4"1 b + 15rmax  "a + " and
" := "(a; b) := "+ 2rmax  ("+ "b a + "a + 4  "b);
with a; b; d 2 (0; 1), b > a, d > a and (1  "a)1="d  ".
The next three sections are dedicated to the three propositions, which are used to prove
Theorem 2.3.3. First we prove Proposition 2.3.5 at length by using the known results about
one-step games and their strategy proles.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.5
Proof. Let v 2 V = v 2 [ 2rmax ; 2rmax ]N  9n 2 N : vn  rnfng	 and " 2 [0; 1) be
arbitrary but xed. The aim is to construct a p^ 2 [0; 1]N with v(p^) 2  "(v) (see (2.5)).
It holds  "(v) 6= ?, if a strategy prole p 2 [0; 1]N in  v exists, such that
(i) v(p) 2 V ,
(ii) p is 2"rmax -perfect in  v and
(iii) %(p;?)  1  ".
Now let p be an (0-)equilibrium in  v that satises the assumptions of the proposition.
If p = c, then v(p) = v 2 V , i.e. (i). For p 6= c, (i) holds by assumption b) of the
proposition. Furthermore Corollary 1.2.14 (see p. 17) implies that p is even 0-perfect in
 v , thus (ii) is fullled. For p = c, we have %(p;?) = 1  1  " and for p 6= c, %(p;?) < 1
but not necessarily %(p;?)  1  ", if " > 0. Otherwise with " = 0, (iii) follows.
So assume that " 2 (0; 1). Based on the given strategy prole p, a new prole p^ 2 [0; 1]N
like in Theorem 1.2.17 (see p. 19) for the one-step game  v will be constructed, such that
%(p^;?)  1  " holds. Afterwards we show that this prole p^ satises (i) and (ii).
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Construction of p^: Fix a player m with vm = rmfmg, if p = (0; : : : ; 0)
T , or with pm > 0 and
mv (p)  rmfmg otherwise3 and set p^ like in (1.13) (see p. 19), i.e.
p^ n =
(
(1  ")  pn + " for n = m
pn for n 6= m :
Theorem 1.2.17 1. implies
%(p^;?) = (1  ")  %(p;?)  1  ":
Now we prove that (i) and (ii) from the beginning of this proof hold for p^:
(i) We have to show that v(p^) 2 V =

v 2 [ 2rmax ; 2rmax ]N
 9n 2 N : vn  rnfng	.
Remark 1.2.6 (see p. 13) and v  2rmax imply v(p^) 2 [ 2rmax ; 2rmax ]N . Consider
the chosen player m. Because p is an equilibrium in  v ,
mv (p)  mv
 
(p m ; p^ m)

= mv (p^);
and with the requirements to the choice of player m,
rmfmg  mv (p)  mv (p^) (2.6)
follows, thus v(p^) 2 V .
(ii) It is to prove that p^ is 2"rmax -perfect in  v .
Case 1: pm 2 (0; 1]. With Theorem 1.2.17 4. and p (0 )perfect in  v , it follows
immediately, that p^ is 2"rmax -perfect in  v .
Case 2: pm = 0 (i.e. p = c).
(a) Consider player m. With the choice of m,
mv
 
(p^ m ; 1)
  mv  (p^ m ; 0) = mv  (p m ; 1)  mv  (p m ; 0)
= rmfmg   vm
= 0
follows.
(b) Consider player n 6= m. With Theorem 1.2.17 4. and Remark 1.2.19, we have
8n 2 N nfmg :
8><>:
nv ((p^
 n ; 1))  nv ((p^ n ; 0))  2"rmax for p^ n = 0
nv ((p^
 n ; 1))  nv ((p^ n ; 0)) 2 [ 2"rmax ; 2"rmax ] for p^ n 2 (0; 1)
nv ((p^
 n ; 1))  nv ((p^ n ; 0))   2"rmax for p^ n = 1
:
(a) and (b) imply that p^ is 2"rmax -perfect in the one-step game  v .
Finally p^ 2  "(v) and  "(v) 6= ? for all v 2 V .
Remark 2.3.9. The second requirement from Theorem 2.3.3 was not needed for this proof.
3Let p = (0; : : : ; 0)T be the given equilibrium in  v . Since v 2 V , a player m 2 N with vm  rmfmg
exists. Because p is an equilibrium in  v , v
m = rmfmg follows.
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Proof of Proposition 2.3.7
We want to give a short sketch of the proof for Proposition 2.3.7, which is stated in [36]
more detailed. It is mainly based on a partitioning of the compact set V .
In the rst step, the set V is partitioned into a family (Vj )j2K , K  N, of disjoint sets
with a diameter smaller than "2. Secondly one determines the image-set bVj := S
v2Vj
 "(v) of
each Vj and chooses one representing element v^j for each set bVj , j 2 K . Because jK j <1,
a cycle of representing elements (v1; : : : ; vk+1), k 2 N, exists, such that
(i) v1 = vk+1,
(ii) vi 2 f v^j j j 2 Kg and
(iii) vi+1 2 bVm = S
v2Vm
 "(v), where vi is the representing element of the set Vm , i.e
vi 2 Vm .
Using (iii), one determines a sequence (p1; : : : ; pk), such that vi+1 = v(pi), where v 2 Vm
with vi 2 Vm and pi 2"rmax -perfect, %(pi ;?)  1   ". With the help of this sequence
(p1; : : : ; pk), a prole  is constructed, which fullls the postulated properties. The proof
of the last fact is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.6.1, which is helpful in the context of
detecting cyclic "-equilibria in quitting games.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.8
Introductory remark
The Proposition 2.3.8 is a generalized version of Proposition 2.4 by Solan and Vieille stated
in [36] on page 270, where this proposition reads:
Let  = (pi)i2N be a prole in G. Assume that the following properties hold for every i:
1. G is terminating under each subgame prole i induced by ; and
2. pi is "-perfect in  (i+1).
Then either  is a subgame "1=6-equilibrium, or there is a stationary "1=6-equilibrium.
The proof in the original paper of Solan and Vieille provides two more exact estimates
for the "1=6-equilibria. Namely either  is a subgame ~&"-equilibrium, or a stationary
&"-equilibrium in G , where
~&" := ~&"(a; b; d) := 4"
1 b d + 2rmax  "a(7N + 1) + " and (2.7)
&" := &"(a; b) := 2rmax  ("+ "b a + "a + N "b) + "; (2.8)
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with a; b; d 2 (0; 1), b > a, d > a, (1  "a)1="d  ".
The estimates (2.7) and (2.8) could be improved for a number of players greater or equal
four. Furthermore it gures out, that the proof of the proposition by Solan and Vieille
needs some more requirements, which are not mentioned in their proposition. One of the
most restrictive one is rnfng = 1 for all n 2 N .
Here the proof will be shown for the less restrictive assumption rnfng   " for all n 2 N
and S 2 N with n 2 S together with the improved estimates, which are even independent
of the number of players.
Proof of Proposition 2.3.8
The structure of the proof is similar to the proof by Solan and Vieille in [36], but diers
in some details, which are commented by remarks or footnotes. Proof structure:
1. The stage set N is divided into disjoint consecutive blocks of stages.
2. The blocks are classied into two types.
3. Depending on the distribution of the blocks, a stationary ~"-equilibrium will be con-
structed, or
4. it will be shown, that the given strategy prole is an "-equilibrium in G by the
consideration of nite quitting games. Here it will be proved:
a) that deviation from the given strategy to a strategy, where the player plays quit
with certainty in at least one stage in the nite quitting game, respectively
b) that deviation from the given strategy to a strategy, where the player plays
continue all the time in the nite quitting game is not protable.
c) Finally, because of the given block structure, one can extend the estimate for
the nite quitting games to a global estimate for the whole quitting game.
1. Partitioning of the stage set N
First the stages of the game are divided into disjoint consecutive blocks of stages.
Let  = (pi)i2N be a given strategy prole and  the stopping time of the game with
respect to  (cf. (1.2)). Fix a; b; d 2 (0; 1) and " > 0 suciently small, such that the
following properties hold4
1. b > a, d > a and
2. (1  "a) 1"d  ".
4For every " 2 (0; 1) a combination of a, b and d exists, for which the stated properties hold. Solan and
Vieille stated in [36] a rule for choosing a, b and d , which not necessarily leads to a successful choice. It
is better to choose rst d 2 (0; 1), then calculate a as a = ln(1  ""d )= ln " and nally choose b 2 (0; 1),
with b > a.
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Dene (Bk)k2N as partition of N, where Bk := fik ; : : : ; ik+1   1g with i1 := 1 and
ik+1 := inf

i 2 N j i > ik ^ P( < i j  ik)  "a
	
for all k 2 N.
N = f1; 2; : : : ; i2   1| {z }
=:B1
; i2; i2 + 1; : : : ; i3   1| {z }
=:B2
; : : : ; ik ; ik + 1; : : : ; ik+1   1| {z }
=:Bk
; : : :g
The sets Bk , k 2 N, are dened such that the probability that at least one player plays
the action quit during the stages ik ; : : : ; ik+1 1 is greater than or equal to "a , whereas the
probability that at least one player plays the action quit during the stages ik ; : : : ; ik+1   2
is strictly lower than "a , i.e.
P( < ik+1   1j  ik) < "a  P( < ik+1j  ik) (2.9)
for all k 2 N respectively
1 
ik+1 2Y
j=ik
%(pj ;?) < "a  1 
ik+1 1Y
j=ik
%(pj ;?):
Observe that it may occur that a set Bk consists of only one stage. In that case
1  %(pik ;?)  "a
holds.
Since i is terminating for all i 2 N the sets Bk are nite for all k 2 N.
2. Classication of the blocks in type I and type II
Now for each player the blocks dened in the preceding section are categorized into two
types.
Denition 2.3.10 (Block of type I and type II). Let m 2 N be an arbitrarily but xed
chosen player. A set Bk , k 2 N, is called block of type I for player m, if
P( m ;c)( < ik+1j  ik)  "b
holds, otherwise Bk is called block of type II.
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Example for a block classication:
N = f1; 2; : : : ; i2   1| {z }
= B1, type I
; i2; i2 + 1; : : : ; i3   1| {z }
= B2, type I
; i3; i3 + 1; : : : ; i3+1   1| {z }
= B3, type II
; : : :g
Remark 2.3.11. 1. Observe that "b < "a and that the probability measure P( m ;c) is
used in the denition.
2. Interpretation of Denition 2.3.10:
 Type I: The termination of the game in this block is not essentially caused by
player m. That means, the probability that the action quit is played by the
other players is at least "b , b > a, b 2 (0; 1).
 Type II: The termination of the game in this block is essentially due to player
m. That means, the probability that at least one player n 2 N nfmg is playing
the action quit is less than "b , b > a, b 2 R.
Denition 2.3.12 (sparse blocks). 5 Let a player m 2 N be given. The blocks of type
I for player m are sparse, if there exist at least d1="de + 1 consecutive blocks of type II.
Otherwise the blocks of type I are regularly scattered 6.
Blocks of type I are sparse for a player m 2 N :
(Bk)k2N = (B1;B2;B3; : : : ; : : : ;Bj| {z }
type I
;Bj+1; : : : ;Bd1="de+j| {z }
blocks of type II
;Bd1="de+j+2; : : :| {z }
type I
; : : :)
In the next step, two dierent cases are considered:
1. Blocks of type I are sparse for at least one player m 2 N : We assume, that the rst
d1="de+ 1 blocks are from type II for player m 2 N and show that
~ := (~pi)i2N with ~pni :=
(
0 for n 2 N n fmg
max("; pm1 ) for n = m
is a stationary
 
2rmax ("+ "
b a + "a + 4"b) + "

-equilibrium in G .
2. Blocks of type I are regularly scattered: We prove that  is a (2"1 b d + 4"1 b +
16rmax"
a + ")-equilibrium in G .
5This denition diers from the denition in [36] in the requirement that there must be d1="de + 1
consecutive blocks of type II. Solan and Vieille dened the sparse property for d1="de consecutive type
II blocks. Later on we will see, why it is necessary to have one more.
6dze := n, n 2 Z such that n   1 < z  n
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3. Case 1.: Blocks of type I are sparse
Assumption 2.3.13. Assume that the blocks of type I are sparse for at least one player
m 2 N under the given strategy prole . Let the rst block of type I has an index
l  1="d + 2, l 2 N.
Remark 2.3.14. Let  be a strategy prole which fullls the requirements of Proposition
2.3.8. If the rst block of type I does not have the index l  1="d + 2, one has to
shift the strategy prole. In detail: Let j denote the index of the rst of the (at least)
d1="de + 1 consecutive blocks of type II. Then consider now the strategy prole ~ := j .
The requirements of Proposition 2.3.8 hold for the strategy prole ~ as well.
Given block structure for a player m 2 N under  = (p1; p2; : : :):
(Bk)k2N = (B1;B2;B3; : : : ; : : : ;Bj 1| {z }
type I
;Bj ; : : : ;Bd1="de+j+1| {z }
blocks of type II
;Bd1="de+j+2; : : :| {z }
type I
; : : :)
Shifted block structure as new block structure under ~ = (pj ; pj+1; : : :):
(Bk)k2N = (B1; : : : ;Bd1="de+1| {z }
blocks of type II
;Bd1="de+2; : : :| {z }
type I
; : : :)
Now all blocks (Bk)1k<l are of type II and
P( m ;c)( < ik+1j  ik) < "b
holds for 1  k < l .
We prove that  := (pi)i2N with pi := (c m ;max("; pm1 )) for all i 2 N, i.e.
pni :=
(
0 for n 2 N n fmg
max("; pm1 ) if n = m
; 8i 2 N;
is a stationary "-equilibrium
7 in G , where " := " + 2rmax (" + "
b a + "a + 4  "b) and
rmax = max
jrnS j  n 2 N ; S 2 P(N )	.
We have to show:
8n 2 N ;8~n 2 n : n()  n ( n ; ~n)  ": (2.10)
7Solan and Vieille stated, that  is an "1=6-equilibrium. But this is coupled with several conditions on
how to choose a, b and d . We only use the conditions given in the rst step of the proof (see p. 53).
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With (1.37) and (1.38), for the expected payo under 
() = ()(p1) =
1
1  (1  pm1 )
 pm1  rfmg = rfmg
holds.
Consider player m: For all stationary strategies ~m for player m,
m
 
( m ; ~m)

=
(
0 for ~m = c
rmfmg otherwise;
and since rmfmg   ", player m does not prot more than " by deviating. This implies
that (2.10) is true for player m8.
Consider the players n 2 N n fmg: Because  is a stationary strategy prole, it
is sucient to consider only stationary strategies as alternative strategy. Furthermore,
because of the structure from the prole  and with Remark 1.4.9, (2.10) can be reduced
to
n()  n ( n ;q)  "
for the players n 2 N n fmg.
Additionally
() = rnfmg = (2)(p1) = ()(p1) = rfmg(p1)
and

 
( n ;q)

= (2)
 
(p n1 ; 1)

= ()
 
(p n1 ; 1)

: (2.11)
This implies that proving that  is an "-equilibrium in G for the players n 2 N n fmg
is equivalent to showing that p1 is an "-equilibrium in  (). Based on the fact, that p1
is "-perfect in  (2), which implies that p1 is an "-equilibrium in  (2) as well, the proof
that p1 is an "-equilibrium in  () is arranged in 2 steps:
(i) It will be shown, that p1 is an (" + 8  "b  rmax )-equilibrium in  (2) for the players
n 2 N n fmg 9.
8Here we need the rst requirement of Theorem 2.3.3 mentioned also in Proposition 2.3.8.
9Solan and Vieille stated in [36], that p1 is an ("+ 2  rmax  N "b)-equilibrium in  (2), where N is the
number of players. Though they make no distinction of the cases pm1 = p
m
1 and p
m
1 = ". Nevertheless
the estimate proven here is better than the one by Solan and Vieille since the number of players is at
least four.
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(ii) Based on (i), p1 is an
 
" + 2rmax (" + "
b a + "a + 4  "b)-equilibrium in  () for the
players n 2 N n fmg 10.
Overview:
p1 "-perfect in  (2)
T1:2:12
=) p1 "-equilibrium in  (2)
(i)
=) p1 ("+ 8"brmax )-equilibrium in  (2)
(ii)
=) p1
 
"+ 2rmax ("+ "
b a + "a + 4"b)

-equilibrium in  ()
(2:11)
=) 1
 
"+ 2rmax ("+ "
b a + "a + 4"b)

-equilibrium in G
(under observance of the consideration for player m)
(i): In order to prove this, one needs several estimates, which should be stated and proven
rst.
Estimate 2.3.15.
(2)(p1)  (2)(p1) 
(
2  "b  rmax for pm1 = pm1
4  "b  rmax for pm1 = "
Proof. Consider the expected payo to the players in the one-step game  (2) under the
strategy prole p1. Using that the expected payo in a one-step game is linear in the
strategy of one player, here pm1 , yields (see additionally [13] or Appendix (A.1), (A.4) and
(A.5))
(2)(p1)
= pm1

%
 
(p m1 ; 1); fmg

rfmg +
X
S2P(Nnfmg)nf?g
%
 
(p m1 ; 1); S [ fmg

rS[fmg

+ (1  pm1 )

%
 
(p m1 ; 0);?

(2) +
X
S2P(Nnfmg)nf?g
%
 
(p m1 ; 0); S

rS

: (2.12)
On the other hand, the expected payo to the players in the one-step game  (2) under
the strategy prole p1 is given by
(2)(p1) = p
m
1  rfmg + (1  pm1 )  (2): (2.13)
10In [36], "+ 2rmax ("+ "
b a + "a +N  "b) is bounded by "1=6, using several assumptions on a, b and d .
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With (2.12) and (2.13), we get(2)(p1)  (2)(p1)
=
pm1 % (p m1 ; 1); fmgrfmg + X
S2P(Nnfmg)nf?g
%
 
(p m1 ; 1); S [ fmg

rS[fmg

+ (1  pm1 )

%
 
(p m1 ; 0);?

(2) +
X
S2P(Nnfmg)nf?g
%
 
(p m1 ; 0); S

rS

  pm1  rfmg   (1  pm1 )  (2)


pm1 % (p m1 ; 1); fmg  pm1 rfmg+ (1  pm1 ) X
S2P(Nnfmg)nf?g
%
 
(p m1 ; 0); S

rS

+
pm1  X
S2P(Nnfmg)nf?g
%
 
(p m1 ; 1); S [ fmg
  rS[fmg
+
(1  pm1 )  % (p m1 ; 0);?  (1  pm1 )  (2):
P
S2P(Nnfmg)nf?g %
 
(p m1 ; 1); S[fmg

as well as
P
S2P(Nnfmg)nf?g %
 
(p m1 ; 0); S

denote the
probability that at least one player n 2 N n fmg plays the action quit. Since B1 is a block
of type II (cf. Assumption 2.3.13),X
S2P(Nnfmg)nf?g
%
 
(p m1 ; 1); S [ fmg

=
X
S2P(Nnfmg)nf?g
%
 
(p m1 ; 0); S

< "b (2.14)
holds.
rS  1  rmax for all S 2 P(N ) implies(2)(p1)  (2)(p1)

pm1  % (p m1 ; 1); fmg  pm1   rfmg+ (1  pm1 )  "b  rmax + pm1  "b  rmax
+
(1  pm1 )  % (p m1 ; 0);?  (1  pm1 )  (2)

pm1  % (p m1 ; 1); fmg  pm1   rmax + "b  rmax
+
(1  pm1 )  % (p m1 ; 0);?  (1  pm1 )| {z }
=()
rmax :
Due to the term (), one has to observe two dierent cases in order to continue the evalu-
ation. In the rst case, pm1 = max("; p
m
1 ) = p
m
1 , and in the second, p1 = " = max("; p
m
1 ).
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a) pm1 = p
m
1 . We have(2)(p1)  (2)(p1)
 rmax
pm1 % (p m1 ; 1); fmg  1+ "b + (1  pm1 )% (p m1 ; 0);?  1
= rmax

pm1
1  % (p m1 ; 1); fmg| {z }
< "b (cf. (2.14))
+"b + (1  pm1 )
1  % (p m1 ; 0);?| {z }
< "b (cf. (2.14))

< 2  "b  rmax :
b) p1 = " implies
"  pm1  pm1  %
 
(p m1 ; 1); fmg

;
thus pm1  % (p m1 ; 1); fmg  pm1  = pm1  % (p m1 ; 1); fmg  "  " < "b :
Observe that b 2 (0; 1) and " < 1.
Furthermore(1  pm1 )  % (p m1 ; 0);?  (1  pm1 )
=
(1  pm1 )  % (p m1 ; 0);?  (1  ")
=
(1  pm1 )  1  X
S2P(Nnfmg)nf?g
%
 
(p m1 ; 0); S
  (1  ")
=
(1  pm1 )  (1  pm1 )  X
S2P(Nnfmg)nf?g
%
 
(p m1 ; 0); S
  (1  ")
=
"  pm1   (1  pm1 )  X
S2P(Nnfmg)nf?g
%
 
(p m1 ; 0); S


"  pm1 1  X
S2P(Nnfmg)nf?g
%
 
(p m1 ; 0); S

| {z }
= %
 
(p m ; 1); fmg
+ X
S2P(Nnfmg)nf?g
%
 
(p m1 ; 0); S

| {z }
< "b (cf. (2.14))
< "+ "b < 2  "b
holds. Finally we have
(2)(p1)  (2)(p1)  4  "b  rmax .
Estimate 2.3.16.
8n 2 N n fmg : n(2) (p n1 ; 1)  n(2) (p n1 ; 1) 
(
2"b  rmax for pm1 = pm1
4"b  rmax for pm1 = "
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Proof. Choose a player n 6= m arbitrary but xed. In the prole (p n1 ; 1), this player plays
the action quit with certainty. Thus for the expected payo to n in the one-step game
 (2) under the strategy prole (p
 n
1 ; 1),
n(2)
 
(p n1 ; 1)

=
X
S2P(N )
%
 
(p n1 ; 1); S
  rnS
holds. Using the linearity of the expected payo n(2)
 
(p n1 ; 1)

in the strategy pm1 , one
obtains (cf. [13] or Appendix (A.3), (A.4) and (A.5))
n(2)
 
(p n1 ; 1)

= pm1 

%
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 1

; fm; ng  rnfm;ng
+
X
S2P(Nnfm;ng)nf?g
%
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 1

; S [ fm; ng  rnS[fm;ng
+ (1  pm1 ) 

%
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 0

; fng  rnfng
+
X
S2P(Nnfm;ng)nf?g
%
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 0

; S [ fng  rnS[fng:
On the other hand, for the expected payo n(2)
 
(p n1 ; 1)

to the player n in the one-step
game  (2) under the strategy prole (p
 n
1 ; 1), we have
n(2)
 
(p n1 ; 1)

= pm1  rnfm;ng + (1  pm1 )  rnfng:
Observe, that all players except player m play the action continue in the strategy prole
p1 with certainty.
This yieldsn(2) (p n1 ; 1)  n(2) (p n1 ; 1)
=
pm1 %  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 1; fm; ng  pm1   rnfm;ng
+

(1  pm1 )%
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 0

; fng  (1  pm1 )  rnfng
+ pm1
X
S2P(Nnfm;ng)nf?g
%
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 1

; S [ fm; ng  rnS[fm;ng
+ (1  pm1 )
X
S2P(Nnfm;ng)nf?g
%
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 0

; S [ fng  rnS[fng:
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Since rnfm;ng. r
n
fng, r
n
S[fm;ng and r
n
S[fng are lower or equal rmax , we obtainn(2) (p n1 ; 1)  n(2) (p n1 ; 1)
 rmax 
pm1 %  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 1; fm; ng  pm1 
+
(1  pm1 )%  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 0; fng  (1  pm1 )
+ pm1
 X
S2P(Nnfm;ng)nf?g
%
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 1

; S [ fm; ng
+ (1  pm1 )
 X
S2P(Nnfm;ng)nf?g
%
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 0

; S [ fng:
Both sums
P
S2P(Nnfm;ng)nf?g %
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 1

; S [ fm; ng on the one hand andP
S2P(Nnfm;ng)nf?g %
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 0

; S [ fng on the other describe the probability that
at least one player except the players m and n plays the action quit. Since B1 is a block of
type II, X
S2P(Nnfm;ng)nf?g
%
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 1

; S [ fm; ng < "b (2.15)
respectivelyX
S2P(Nnfm;ng)nf?g
%
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 0

; S [ fng < "b
holds, which impliesn(2) (p n1 ; 1)  n(2) (p n1 ; 1)
 rmax 
pm1 %  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 1; fm; ng  pm1 
+
(1  pm1 )%  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 0; fng  (1  pm1 )+ "b:
In order to continue the evaluation, we have to distinguish again between the two cases
pm1 = p
m
1 and p
m
1 = ".
a) pm1 = p
m
1 . We havepm1 %  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 1; fm; ng  pm1  = pm1 %  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 1; fm; ng  pm1 
= pm1 
%  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 1; fm; ng  1
< pm1  "b
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respectively(1  pm1 )%  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 0; fng  (1  pm1 )
= (1  pm1 )
%  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 0; fng  1
< (1  pm1 )  "b
and nallyn(2) (p n1 ; 1)  n(2) (p n1 ; 1) <  pm1  "b + (1  pm1 )  "b + "b  rmax
= 2  "b  rmax :
b) pm1 = ". Thuspm1 %  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 1; fm; ng  pm1  = pm1 %  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 1; fm; ng  "
holds, and since "  pm1  pm1  %
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 1

; fm; ng,pm1 %  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 1; fm; ng  pm1   "  "b
follows. Furthermore(1  pm1 )%  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 0; fng  (1  pm1 )
=
(1  pm1 )%  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 0; fng  (1  ")
=
(1  pm1 )1  X
S2P(Nnfm;ng)nf?g
%
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 0

; S [ fng  (1  ")
Expansion and transposing leads to(1  pm1 )%  (p1 n ; 1) m ; 0; fng  (1  pm1 )
=
"  pm1   (1  pm1 )  X
S2P(Nnfm;ng)nf?g
%
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 0

; S [ fng

"  pm1 1  X
S2P(Nnfm;ng)nf?g
%
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 0

; S [ fng| {z }
= %
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 0

; fng

+
X
S2P(Nnfm;ng)nf?g
%
  
(p1
 n ; 1) m ; 0

; S [ fng| {z }
< "b (cf. (2.15))
< "+ "b < 2  "b :
Finally we getn(2) (p n1 ; 1)  n(2) (p n1 ; 1)  4  "b  rmax :
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Overview: Estimates in Step (i):
Estimate 2.3.15:
(2)(p1)  (2)(p1) 
(
2  "b  rmax for pm1 = pm1
4  "b  rmax for pm1 = "
Estimate 2.3.16:
8n 2 N n fmg : n(2) (p n1 ; 1)  n(2) (p n1 ; 1) 
(
2  "b  rmax for pm1 = pm1
4  "b  rmax for pm1 = "
With these estimates, we show that (i) holds. Because of Estimate 2.3.15,
n(2)(p1)  n(2)(p1)  4  "b  rmax
for all n 2 N n fmg.
Since p1 is an "-equilibrium in  (2), one has
n(2)(p1)  n(2)
 
(p n1 ; 1)
  " =) n(2)(p1)  n(2) (p n1 ; 1)  "  4"b  rmax
for all n 2 N n fmg. Using Estimate 2.3.16, one nally obtains
n(2)(p1)  n(2)
 
(p n1 ; 1)
  4"b  rmax   "  4"b  rmax
 n(2)
 
(p n1 ; 1)
  8"b  rmax   " (2.16)
for all n 2 N n fmg, which nishes the proof of (i).
(ii): Again the needed estimates are stated rst.
Estimate 2.3.17. For the probability, that the game terminates during the rst il   1
stages only because of player m, the inequality:
P
 
Y m = 1
	 \ Y n = 0 8n 6= m	 \  < il	  1  "b a   "
holds.
Proof. By Assumption 2.3.13, the rst block of type I has an index l > 1="d + 2 and all
blocks (Bk)1k<l are of type II. The denition of this blocks, i.e.
P( m ;c)( < ik+1j  ik) < "b
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for all 1  k < l , together with the deniton of the sets Bi , i 2 N, especially (2.9) (see p.
54) yield
P
 9n 6= m : Y n = 1   2 Bk
=
P
9n 6= m : Y n = 1	 \  2 Bk	
P( 2 Bk)
=
P
9n 6= m : Y n = 1	 \  < ik+1	  ik
P( < ik+1j  ik)
=
P( m ;c)( < ik+1 j   ik)
P( < ik+1 j   ik)
<
"b
"a
= "b a
for all k 2 f1; : : : ; l   1g with P( 2 Bk) 6= 0. That means the probability that at least
one player n 2 N nfmg plays the action quit under the condition that the game terminates
in the block Bk , k 2 f1; : : : ; l   1g, is bounded by "b a .
This implies
P

Y m = 1
	 \ Y n = 0 8n 6= m	   2 Bk
= 1  P
 9n 6= m : Y n = 1   2 Bk  P Y = 0   2 Bk| {z }
=0
 1  "b a : (2.17)
The second requirement for the choice of a and d , i.e. (1  ")1="d  " (cf. p. 53), stated at
the beginning of the proof of Proposition 2.3.8, gives that the probability that the game
does not terminate before stage il is reached with respect to the given strategy prole  is
bounded by ", since
P(  il) =
l 1Y
k=1
 
1  P( < ik+1j  ik)
  (1  "a)l 1  (1  "a)1="d  ":
Using
Sl 1
k=1f! 2 
j(!) 2 Bkg = f! 2 
j(!) < ilg, we obtain for the probability that
player m quits alone during the rst l   1 blocks:
P

Y m = 1
	 \ Y n = 0 8n 6= m	 \  < il	
=
l 1X
k=1
P

Y m = 1
	 \ Y n = 0 8n 6= m	 \  2 Bk	
=
l 1X
k=1
P

Y m = 1
	 \ Y n = 0 8n 6= m	  2 Bk  P  2 Bk:
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Inequality (2.17) is leading to
P

Y m = 1
	 \ Y n = 0 8n 6= m	 \  < il	

l 1X
k=1
(1  "b a)  P
 
 2 Bk

= (1  "b a) 
l 1X
k=1
P
 
 2 Bk

| {z }
= P( < il)
 (1  "b a)  (1  ")
= 1  "b a   "+ "1+b a
 1  "b a   ":
Remark 2.3.18. Assume, that at least one block Bk , k 2 f1; : : : ; l   1g exists, such
that P( 2 Bk) = 0. Because of the denition of the blocks, this case only occurs if a
player plays quit with certainty in at least one of the previous blocks. But the blocks Bk ,
k 2 f1; : : : ; l 1g, are of type II, which implies, that only player m may quit with certainty.
Let Bi be the rst block with P( 2 Bi) = 1. Then
P

Y m = 1
	 \ Y n = 0 8n 6= m	 \  < il	
=
l 1X
k=1
P

Y m = 1
	 \ Y n = 0 8n 6= mg	 \  2 Bk	
 P

Y m = 1
	 \ Y n = 0 8n 6= m	 \  2 Bi	
= P

Y m = 1
	 \ Y n = 0 8n 6= mg	 2 Bi  P  2 Bi
> 1  "b
> 1  "b a :
Estimate 2.3.19.
k()  rfmgk  2  rmax ("+ "b a)
Proof. We have
k()  rfmgk =
E r(Y )1f<+1g  rfmg
=
E r(Y )1f<+1g   rfmg
= max
n2N
E rn(Y )1f<+1g   rnfmg:
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Since rn as well as rnS are bounded by rmax for all n 2 N and S 2 P(N ), the random
variables rn(Y )1f<+1g   rnfmg on (
;A;P) are bounded by 2  rmax , n 2 N .
Set
D :=

Y m = 1
	 \ Y n = 0 8n 6= m	 \  < il	: (2.18)
This is the set of all ! 2 
, for which the game terminates during the rst il   1 stages
and the quitting coalition consists only of player m. Then
k()  rfmgk  max
n2N

2  rmax  P(Dc) + sup
!2D
rn(Y(!)(!))1f<+1g(!)  rnfmg;
where Dc := 
nD (cf. Lemma A.0.1). D contains only those ! 2 
, where player m quits
alone until the stage il is reached, i.e.
r
 
Y(!)(!)

1f(!)<+1g(!) = rfmg 8 ! 2 D :
Application of Estimate 2.3.17 nally leads to
k()  rfmgk  max
n2N

2  rmax  (1  P(D)) + sup
!2D
rnfmg   rnfmg
 2  rmax 
 
1  (1  "  "b a)
= 2  rmax ("+ "b a):
Estimate 2.3.20. If 1  %(p1;?) < "a then k()  (2)k  2  rmax"a .
Proof.()  (2) =  X
S2P(N )
%(p1; S )  rS + %(p1;?)  (2)  (2)

=
 X
S2P(N )
%(p1; S )  rS +
 
%(p1;?)  1
  (2)
  X
S2P(N )
%(p1; S )  rS
+  %(p1;?)  1  (2)

X
S2P(N )nf?g
%(p1; S )  rmax +
%(p1;?)  1  rmax
=
 
1  %(p1;?)
| {z }
< "a
rmax +
 
1  %(p1;?)
| {z }
< "a
rmax
< 2  rmax"a :
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Estimate 2.3.21.
k(2)  rfmgk  2  rmax  ("+ "b a + "a)
Proof. We consider two dierent cases. In the rst case, (1  %(p1;?)) < "a holds, and in
the second, (1  %(p1;?))  "a . The second case occurs only if jB1j = 1, i.e. B1 = f1g.
1. (1  %(p1;?)) < "a : The Estimates 2.3.19 and 2.3.20 yield(2)  rfmg = (2)  () + ()  rfmg
 (2)  ()+ ()  rfmg
 2rmax"a + 2rmax ("+ "b a) = 2rmax
 
"a + "+ "b a

:
2. (1   %(p1;?))  "a : We show:
(2)   rfmg  2rmax (" + "b a), which implies
Estimate 2.3.21.
The proof is analogous to the proof of Estimate 2.3.19. Observe that because of
(1   %(p1;?))  "a , the block B1 = f1g, and the block B2 starts with the index
i2 = 2.
k(2)  rfmgk =
E2 r(Y )1f<+1g  rfmg
= max
n2N
E2 rn(Y )1f<+1g   rnfmg
With D =

Y m = 1
	\Y n = 0 8n 6= m	\ < il	 (cf. proof of Estimate 2.3.17),
k(2)  rfmgk
 max
n2N

2  rmax  P2(Dc) + sup
!2D
rn(Y(!)(!))1f<+1g(!)  rnfmg
 2  rmax  (1  P2(D))
follows (cf. Lemma A.0.1).
Now we calculate respectively estimate the probability of D under the strategy prole
2. Using that the rst block of type I has an index l  1="d + 2 and with the same
arguments as in the proof of Estimate 2.3.17, we obtain11
P2(  il) =
l 1Y
k=2
 
1  P2( < ik+1j  ik)
  (1  "a)l 2  (1  "a) 1"d  "
and
P2
 
Y m = 1
	 \ Y n = 0 8n 6= m	   2 Bk > 1  "b a
11Observe the requirements to the choice of a and d from the beginning (see. 53), i.e. (1   "a)1="d  ".
Furthermore we need for this step that we have d 1
"d
e+ 1 consecutive blocks of type I.
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for all k 2 f2; 3; : : :g. This implies
P2
 
D

=
l 1X
k=2
P2
 
Y m = 1
	 \ Y n = 0 8n 6= m	  2 Bk  P2( 2 Bk)
 (1  "b a)  (1  ") > 1  "b a   "
and nally
k(2)  rfmgk  2  rmax 
 
1  (1  "b a   ") = 2  rmax  ("b a + "):
Overview: Estimates in Step (ii)
Estimate 2.3.17:
P
  
Y m = 1
 \  Y n = 0 8n 2 N n fmg \   < il  1  "b a   "
Estimate 2.3.19: k()  rfmgk  2  rmax ("+ "b a)
Estimate 2.3.20: If 1  %(p1;?) < "a then k()  (2)k  2  rmax"a .
Estimate 2.3.21: k(2)  rfmgk  2  rmax  ("+ "b a + "a)
Now we are able to prove (ii), i.e. p1 is an "-equilibrium in  () for the players n 2
N n fmg. With Estimate 2.3.21,(2)(p1)  ()(p1) = p1  rfmg + (1  p1)  (2)  p1  rfmg   (1  p1)  ()
=
(1  p1)   (2)  ()
=
(1  p1)   (2)  rfmg
 (2)  rfmg
 2rmax ("+ "b a + "a)
follows and hence ()(p1)  (2)(p1) 2rmax ("+"b a+"a) 1. Estimate (2.16) implies
n()(p1)  n(2)(p1)  2rmax ("+ "b a + "a)
 n(2)
 
(p n1 ; 1)
  8  rmax  "b   "  2rmax ("+ "b a + "a)
= n()
 
(p n1 ; 1)
  "  2rmax ("+ "b a + "a + 4  "b)
for all players n 2 N n fmg.
With " = "+ 2rmax ("+ "
b a + "a + 4  "b), p1 is an "-equilibrium in  () for the players
n 6= m. This nishes the part for the players n 6= m, and together with the consideration
for player m, we have shown that  is an "-equilibrium in G .
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Remark 2.3.22. To be more accurate: The strategy prole  is an "-equilibrium, where
" =
(
"+ 2rmax ("+ "
b a + "a + 2"b) if pm1 = p
m
1
"+ 2rmax ("+ "
b a + "a + 4"b) if pm1 = "
:
So for a quitting game with at least two players and the assumption that pm1 = p
m
1 , our
estimate for " is actually better than the one by Solan and Vieille.
4. Case 2.: Blocks of type I are regularly scattered
Assume that the blocks of type I are regularly scattered in the sense of Denition 2.3.12.
We show, that the given strategy prole  is an ~"-equilibrium in G . Therefore we dene
a sequence of nite quitting games (GBk )k2N, where
GBk := GBk ;vk :=
 
G ;Bk = fik ; : : : ; ik+1   1g; vk := (ik+1)

;
and a sequence of strategy proles (}k)k2N for the nite quitting games, where
}k := (pik ; : : : ; pik+1 1). First we prove, that the strategy proles }k are k -equilibria
in the corresponding nite quitting game GBk , with
k := max
n
4"a  rmax + "; max
n2N

11rmax"
aP(} nk ;(0;:::;0))
(Bk < ik+1   1) + 2"
	o
for k 2 N. Observe that by Lemma 1.3.5 it is sucient to consider only pure strategies for
the players as alternative strategies in a nite quitting game. Secondly we provide a global
estimation for the given quitting game and prole . That means we act in three steps:
a) We consider the expected payo in the nite quitting game for a player n under the
assumption, that she changes her strategy }n to the strategy, in which she plays quit
with certainty during the stages ik ; : : : ; ik+1   1.
b) We consider the expected payo in the nite quitting game for a player n under the
assumption, that she changes her strategy }n to the strategy, in which she plays continue
all the time with certainty.
c) With a) and b), we prove with a global estimation for the whole quitting game, that 
is an ~"-equilibrium.
Remark 2.3.23. For blocks Bk , which consist only of one stage, i.e. Bk = fikg, we have
gBk ;vk (}k) = g(}k) = g(pik ) = (ik+1 )(pik ):
With the second requirement from Proposition 2.3.8 (see p. 50), i.e. pi is an "-equilibrium
in  (ik+1 ), it immediately follows that
gn(}k) = 
n
(ik+1 )
(pik )  n(ik+1 )
 
(p nik ; 1)
  " = gn (} nk ; 1)  "
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and
gn(}k)  n(ik+1 )
 
(p nik ; 0)
  " = gn (} nk ; 0)  "
for all n 2 N , thus k = ".
With regard to the remark above, now we consider only blocks with two or more stages.
4.a) Quitting in the nite quitting game
We rst introduce the following notation:
Notation 2.3.24. Let GI ;v = (G ; I ; v) be a given nite quitting game. Denote
{ qi := (0; : : : ; 0; 1; 0; : : : ; 0) the strategy in the nite quitting game GI ;v , where a
player chooses to play the action continue all the time except for stage i 2 I , in
which the action quit is played with certainty,
{ c := (0; : : : ; 0) the strategy in the nite quitting game GI ;v , where a player plays the
action continue with certainty all the time.
The expected payo in the given nite quitting game GBk under the strategy prole }k
is
g(}k) = gBk ;vk (}k) = E}k
 
r( ~YBk )1fBk<ig + (i)1fBkig

= P}k (Bk < i)E}k
 
r( ~YBk )
Bk < i+ P}k (Bk  i)(i)
(see (1.30) p. 33). Therefore with the denition of the sets Bk (see (2.9) p. 54) and
ik  i < ik+1   1, we getgn(}k)  n(i)
=
P}k (Bk < i)E}k  rn( ~YBk )Bk < i+  P}k (Bk  i)  1n(i)
 P}k (Bk < i)E}k rn( ~YBk )Bk < i+  P}k (Bk  i)  1n(i)
= P}k (Bk < i)
E}k  rn( ~YBk )Bk < i+  P}k (Bk  i)  1  n(i)
 P}k (Bk < i)  rmax +
 
1  P}k (Bk  i)
  rmax
 2  P}k (Bk < i)  rmax
 2  "a  rmax (2.19)
and similarly
g
 
(} nk ; qi)

= P(} nk ;qi )
(Bk < i)  E(} nk ;qi )
 
r( ~YBk )
Bk < i
+ P(} nk ;qi )
(Bk  i)  (i+1)
 
(pi ; 1)

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for all n 2 N . Again the construction of the family of sets (Bk)k2N yields
P(} nk ;qi )
(Bk < i)  P}k (Bk < i) < "a
and hencegn (} nk ; qi)  n(i+1) (pi ; 1)  2  "a  rmax (2.20)
follows. The inequalities (2.19) and (2.20) imply
gn
 
(} nk ; qi)
  gn(}k)
= gn
 
(} nk ; qi)
  n(i+1) (pi ; 1)+ n(i+1) (pi ; 1)  n(i) + n(i)  gn(}k)
 2"a  rmax + n(i+1)
 
(pi ; 1)
  n(i) + 2"a  rmax :
Since pi is an "-equilibrium in  (i+1) (cf. Proposition 2.3.8)
n(i) = 
n
(i+1)
(pi)  n(i+1)
 
(p ni ; 1)
  " =) n(i+1) (p ni ; 1)  n(i) + "
holds for all n 2 N , and we obtain
gn
 
(} nk ; qi)
  gn(}k)  4"a  rmax + n(i) + "  n(i)
= 4"a  rmax + ";
respectively
gn
 
(} nk ; qi)
  gn(}k) + 4"a  rmax + " (2.21)
for all n 2 N .
4.b) Continuing in the nite quitting game
Fix a player n 2 N . For the expected payo g (} nk ;c) under the strategy prole (} nk ;c)
in the nite quitting game GBk we have
g
 
(} nk ;c)

= E(} nk ;c)
 
r( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g + (ik+1 )
 
(p nik+1 1; 0)

1fBkik+1 1g

= E(} nk ;c)
 
r( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

+ P(} nk ;c)
(Bk  ik+1   1)(ik+1 )
 
(p nik+1 1; 0)

:
Since pik+1 1 is an "-equilibrium in  (ik+1 ),
n(ik+1 1) = 
n
(ik+1 )
(pik+1 1)  n(ik+1 )
 
(p nik+1 1; 0)
  "
holds.
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This implies
gn
 
(} nk ;c)

 E(} nk ;c)
 
rn( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

+ P(} nk ;c)
(Bk  ik+1   1)
 
n(ik+1 1) + "

 E(} nk ;c)
 
rn( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

+ P(} nk ;c)
(Bk  ik+1   1)n(ik+1 1) + "
= E(} nk ;c)
 
rn( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

+ "+
 
1  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)

n(ik+1 1)
= E(} nk ;c)
 
rn( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

+ "+ n(ik+1 1)
  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)
n(ik+1 1): (2.22)
On the other hand, for the expected payo in the nite quitting game GBk under the
strategy prole }k ,
g(}k) = E}k
 
r( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g + (ik+1 1)1fBkik+1 1g

= E}k
 
r( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

+ E}k
 
(ik+1 1)1fBkik+1 1g

= E}k
 
r( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

+ P}k (Bk  ik+1   1)(ik+1 1)
= E}k
 
r( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

+
 
1  P}k (Bk < ik+1   1)

(ik+1 1)
holds or, equivalent
(ik+1 1) = g(}k)  E}k
 
r( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

+ P}k (Bk < ik+1   1)(ik+1 1):
Insertion into (2.22) leads to
gn
 
(} nk ;c)
  E(} nk ;c) rn( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g+ "+ gn(}k)
  E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

+ P}k (Bk < ik+1   1)n(ik+1 1)
  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)
n(ik+1 1): (2.23)
Furthermore with
P}k (Bk < ik+1   1) = P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0

+P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1

;
one obtains
gn
 
(} nk ;c)

 E(} nk ;c)
 
rn( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

+ "+ gn(}k)
  E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

+ P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1)  
n(ik+1 1)
+

P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0)  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)

n(ik+1 1): (2.24)
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Now the following estimate holds:
Estimate 2.3.25.P}k  Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)
 "a  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)
Proof. Because of
P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0
  P(} nk ;c) Bk < ik+1   1;
it is sucient to show
P(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1)  P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0

 "a  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1):
Therefore dene two sequences (Vi)i2fik ;:::;ik+1 2g and (Wi)i2fik ;:::;ik+1 2g of random variables
over (
Bk ;ABk ;P}k ) with values in f0; 1g by
Vi(!) :=
(
0 if 8m 2 N n fng : ~Y mi (!) = 0
1 otherwise
respectively
Wi(!) :=
(
0 if ~Y ni (!) = 0
1 otherwise
for all i 2 fik ; : : : ; ik+1   2g, ! 2 
Bk . Observe that Vik ; : : : ;Vik+1 2;Wik ; : : : ;Wik+1 2 are
independent random variables. Furthermore set
t1(!) := inf

i 2 fik ; : : : ; ik+1   2gj Vi(!) = 1
	
t2(!) := inf

i 2 fik ; : : : ; ik+1   2gj Wi(!) = 1
	
t(!) :=
(
t1 if t1(!) < t2(!)
+1 otherwise : (2.25)
Then
f! 2 
Bk j t(!) = ig  f! 2 
Bk j t1(!) = ig
and
f! 2 
Bk j t1(!) = ignf! 2 
Bk j t(!) = ig = f! 2 
Bk j t1(!) = ig\f! 2 
Bk j t2(!)  ig
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hold for all i 2 fik ; : : : ; ik+1   2g. This implies
P}k (t1 = i)  P}k (t = i) = P}k (t1 = i)  P}k (t2  i)
 P}k (t1 = i)  P}k (t2 < ik+1   1):
for all i 2 fik ; : : : ; ik+1   2g. Thus
ik+1 2X
i=ik
 
P}k (t1 = i)  P}k (t = i)

= P}k (
ik+1 2[
i=ik
t1 = i)  P}k (
ik+1 2[
i=ik
t = i)
= P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)  P}k (t < ik+1   1)
on the one hand and
ik+1 2X
i=ik
 
P}k (t1 = i)  P}k (t = i)
  ik+1 2X
i=ik
P}k (t1 = i)  P}k (t2 < ik+1   1)
= P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)  P}k (t2 < ik+1   1)
on the other. The denition of t1, t2 and t (cf. (2.25)) gives us
P}k (t1 < ik+1   1) = P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1);
P}k (t2 < ik+1   1) = P}k (Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1)
and
P}k (t < ik+1   1) = P}k (Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0);
such that
P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)  P}k (t < ik+1   1)
= P(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1)  P}k (Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0)
 P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)  P}k (t2 < ik+1   1) (2.26)
= P(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1)  P}k (Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1)
follows. Furthermore
P}k (Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1)  P}k (Bk < ik+1   1) < "
a
holds and we obtain
P(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1)  P}k (Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0)
 "a  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1):
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This estimate yields for the inequality (2.24) that
gn
 
(} nk ;c)

 E(} nk ;c)
 
rn( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

+ "+ gn(}k)
  E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

+ P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1)  
n(ik+1 1)
+ "a  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)  rmax : (2.27)
Furthermore we have
E(} nk ;c)
 
rn( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

= P(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1)E(} nk ;c)
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1 (2.28)
and
E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1g

= P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1

E}k
 
r( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1
+ P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0

E}k
 
r( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0: (2.29)
Using both (2.28) and (2.29), we get for (2.27)
gn
 
(} nk ;c)

 P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)E(} nk ;c)
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1+ "+ gn(}k)
  P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1

E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1
  P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0

E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0
+ P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1)  
n(ik+1 1)
+ "a  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)  rmax
= gn(}k) + "+ "
a  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)  rmax
+ P(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1)E(} nk ;c)
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1
  P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0

E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0
+ P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1

n(ik+1 1)
  E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1: (2.30)
In the next steps we provide estimates on
 E(} nk ;c) rn( ~YBk )Bk < ik+1   1  E}k  rn( ~YBk )Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0
(see Estimate 2.3.26) and
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 n(ik+1 1)  E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1
(see Estimate 2.3.27).
Estimate 2.3.26. Let n 2 N be given, thenE(} nk ;c) rn( ~YBk )Bk < ik+1   1  E}k  rn( ~YBk )Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0
 2rmax  "a :
Proof. We have (cf. Appendix (A.6) and (A.8))
E(} nk ;c)
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1
=
ik+1 2X
i=ik
P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk = i
Bk < ik+1   1E(} nk ;c) rn( ~YBk )Bk = i
respectively
E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0
=
ik+1 2X
i=ik
P}k
 
Bk = i
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0E}k rn( ~YBk )Bk = i ; ~Y nBk = 0:
Furthermore (cf. Appendix (A.10))
E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk = i ; ~Y nBk = 0 = E(} nk ;c) rn( ~YBk )Bk = i
holds, thusE(} nk ;c) rn( ~YBk )Bk < ik+1   1  E}k  rn( ~YBk )Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0
=
 ik+1 2X
i=ik
E(} nk ;c)
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk = iP(} nk ;c) Bk = iBk < ik+1   1
  P}k
 
Bk = i
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0

ik+1 2X
i=ik
E(} nk ;c) rn( ~YBk )Bk = i  P(} nk ;c) Bk = iBk < ik+1   1
  P}k
 
Bk = i
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0
 rmax
ik+1 2X
i=ik
P(} nk ;c) Bk = iBk < ik+1   1
  P}k
 
Bk = i
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0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follows. Using Vik ; : : : ;Vik+1 2;Wik ; : : : ;Wik+1 2; t1; t2 and t from the proof of Estimate
2.3.25, one obtains
P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk = i
Bk < ik+1   1 = P}k t1 = it1 < ik+1   1
and
P}k
 
Bk = i
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0 = P}k  t1 = it < ik+1   1:
In order to prove the Estimate 2.3.26, it is left to show that
ik+1 2X
i=ik
P}k t1 = it1 < ik+1   1  P}k  t1 = i t < ik+1   1  2  "a : (2.31)
Since
P}k (t1 = i) = P}k (t1 = i ; t2  i) + P}k (t1 = i ; t2 > i)
= P}k (t1 = i ; t2  i) + P}k (t = i)
respectively
P}k
 
t1 = i
t < ik+1   1
= P}k
 
t1 = i ; t2  i
t < ik+1   1+ P}k t1 = i ; t2 > it < ik+1   1
= 0 + P}k
 
t = i
t < ik+1   1;
we haveP}k  t1 = it1 < ik+1   1  P}k t1 = it < ik+1   1
=
P}k t1 = it1 < ik+1   1  P}k t = it < ik+1   1
=
 P}k (t1 = i)P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)   P}k (t = i)P}k (t < ik+1   1)

=
P}k (t1 = i ; t2  i)P}k (t1 < ik+1   1) + P}k (t = i)P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)   P}k (t = i)P}k (t < ik+1   1)

 P}k (t1 = i ; t2  i)
P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)| {z }
= ()
+
 P}k (t = i)P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)   P}k (t = i)P}k (t < ik+1   1)
| {z }
= ()
: (2.32)
Because t1 and t2 are independent, we get for the term ()
P}k (t1 = i ; t2  i)
P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)
=
P}k (t1 = i)
P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)
 P}k (t2  i)
 P}k (t1 = i)
P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)
 P}k (t2 < ik+1   1): (2.33)
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Consider now the term () in (2.32): P}k (t = i)P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)   P}k (t = i)P}k (t < ik+1   1)

= P}k (t = i) 
 1P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)   1P}k (t < ik+1   1)

=
P}k (t = i)
P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)  P}k (t < ik+1   1)
 jP}k (t < ik+1   1)  P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)j| {z }
 P}k (t1 < ik+1 1) P}k (t2 < ik+1 1)
(cf. (2.26))
=
P}k (t = i)
P}k (t < ik+1   1)
 P}k (t2 < ik+1   1)
for all i 2 fik ; : : : ; ik+1   2g. Insterting this and (2.33) into (2.32) leads toP}k  t1 = it1 < ik+1   1  P}k t1 = it < ik+1   1


P}k (t1 = i)
P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)
+
P}k (t = i)
P}k (t < ik+1   1)

P}k (t2 < ik+1   1)
and nally
ik+1 2X
i=ik
P}k t1 = it1 < ik+1   1  P}k t1 = it < ik+1   1

ik+1 2X
i=ik

P}k (t1 = i)
P}k (t1 < ik+1   1)
+
P}k (t = i)
P}k (t < ik+1   1)

P}k (t2 < ik+1   1)
= 2  P}k (t2 < ik+1   1):
Since P}k (t2 < ik+1   1) < "a , inequality (2.31) follows and therefore Estimate 2.3.26.
Estimate 2.3.27. Let n 2 N be given, then
n(ik+1 1)  E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1
 7rmaxP(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1) + ":
Proof. The proof is organized in four steps.
1. We showE}k rn( ~YBk )Bk < ik+1  1; ~Y nBk = 1  rnfng  2rmaxP(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1  1):
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2. Let  be the last time before ik+1   1 with pn > 0. Then
n(+1)  rnfng  4rmaxP(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1) + ":
3. We prove the inequality12n(+1)  n(ik+1 1)  2rmaxP(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1):
4. Finally we argue that 1., 2. and 3. imply the estimate.
1.: We have (see Appendix (A.7))
E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1
=
ik+1 2X
i=ik
P}k
 
Bk = i
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1E}k rn( ~YBk )Bk = i ; ~Y nBk = 1
for all players n 2 N . Since
ik+1 2X
i=ik
P}k
 
Bk = i
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1 = 1; (2.34)
one obtainsE}k  rn( ~YBk )Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1  rnfng
=
 ik+1 2X
i=ik
P}k
 
Bk = i
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1E}k rn( ~YBk )Bk = i ; ~Y nBk = 1
  rnfng

=
 ik+1 2X
i=ik
P}k
 
Bk = i
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1  E}k rn( ~YBk )Bk = i ; ~Y nBk = 1
  rnfng


ik+1 2X
i=ik
P}k
 
Bk = i
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1E}k rn( ~YBk )Bk = i ; ~Y nBk = 1
  rnfng
: (2.35)
12If no  2 fik ; : : : ; ik+1   2g exists such that pn > 0, then player n plays either continue all the time in
the block Bk or she plays quit only in the stage ik+1   1 with positive probability. In the rst case,
g
 
(} nk ;c)

= g(}k ) holds and nothing is to show for the part \Continuing in the nite quitting game"
for player n. In the second case, the Inequality (2.23) immediately reduces to gn
 
(} nk ;c)
  "+gn(}k ).
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For E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk = i ; ~Y nBk = 1 the following holds:
E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk = i ; ~Y nBk = 1
=
X
S2P(Nnfng)
%
 
(p ni ; 1); S [ fng
  rnS[fng
= rnfng  %
 
(p ni ; 1); fng

+
X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p ni ; 1); S [ fng
  rnS[fng;
which impliesE}k  rn( ~YBk )Bk = i ; ~Y nBk = 1  rnfng
=
rnfng  % (p ni ; 1); fng  1+ X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p ni ; 1); S [ fng
  rnS[fng

rnfng  % (p ni ; 1); fng  1+  X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p ni ; 1); S [ fng
  rnS[fng
 rmax 
 
1  % (p ni ; 1); fng+ rmax  X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p ni ; 1); S [ fng

= 2  rmax 
X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p ni ; 1); S [ fng

: (2.36)
The probability that at least one player m 2 N n fng plays quit in one stage i 2
fik ; : : : ; ik+1  2g is lower or equal to the probability that at least one player m 2 N n fng
plays quit during the stages ik and ik+1   2, i.e. (cf. (A.2))X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p ni ; 1); S [ fng
  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1) (2.37)
for all i 2 fik ; : : : ; ik+1   2g, where }k = (pik ; : : : ; pik+1 1). Now (2.34), (2.35), (2.36) and
(2.37) implyE}k  rn( ~YBk )Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1  rnfng  2rmaxP(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1):
2.: Let  2 Bk be the last stage before ik+1   1, for which pn > 0 holds, hence pni = 0
for all i 2 f + 1; : : : ; ik+1   2g. Since p is "-perfect in  (+1) (cf. requirement two in
Proposition 2.3.8) with pn > 0,
n(+1)
 
(p n ; 1)
  n(+1) (p n ; 0)   "
holds.
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By decomposition of the rst sum (cf. Appendix (A.4) and (A.5)), one obtains
 " 
X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p n ; 1); S [ fng

rnS[fng + %
 
(p n ; 1); fng

rnfng
 
X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p n ; 0); S

rnS   %
 
(p n ; 0);?

n(+1):
Furthermore %
 
(p n ; 1); S [ fng

= %
 
(p n ; 0); S

for all S  N n fng, which implies
 " 
X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p n ; 0); S
 
rnS[fng   rnS

+ %
 
(p n ; 0);?
 
rnfng   n(+1)

;
or equivalently
%
 
(p n ; 0);?
 
n(+1)  rnfng
  X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p n ; 0); S
 
rnS[fng   rnS

+ ":
Using %
 
(p n ; 0);?

= 1  P
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p n ; 0); S

we get
n(+1)  rnfng 
X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p n ; 0); S
 
rnS[fng   rnS

+ "
+
X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p n ; 0); S
 
n(+1)  rnfng

=
X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p n ; 0); S
 
rnS[fng   rnS + n(+1)  rnfng

+ "
 4rmax
X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p n ; 0); S

+ ": (2.38)
Remark 2.3.28. If we take into account that rnfng  0, this inequality improves to
n(+1)  rnfng  3rmax
X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p n ; 0); S

+ ":
If we assume that rnfng  rnS for all S 2 P(N ), where n 2 S (like in Theorem 2.3.3), we get
n(+1)  rnfng  2rmax
X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p n ; 0); S

+ ":
Finally because ofX
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p ni ; 0); S
  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)
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holds for all i 2 fik ; : : : ; ik+1   2g,
n(+1)  rnfng  4rmaxP(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1) + "
follows.
3.: The expected payo n(+1) can be calculated in the following way (see Appendix
formula (A.11)):
n(+1)
= E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )  1fBk<ik+1 1g + n(ik+1 1)  1fBkik+1 1g
Bk > 
= E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )  1fBk<ik+1 1g
Bk > + n(ik+1 1)E}k  1fBkik+1 1gBk > 
= P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1jBk > 
  E}k rn( ~YBk )j < Bk < ik+1   1
+ P}k
 
Bk  ik+1   1jBk > 

n(ik+1 1):
By the denition of , pni = 0 for all i 2 f+ 1; : : : ; ik+1   2g, which implies
n(+1) = P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk < ik+1   1jBk > 
  E(} nk ;c) rn( ~YBk )j < Bk < ik+1   1
+ P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk  ik+1   1jBk > 

n(ik+1 1):
Hencen(+1)  n(ik+1 1)
=
P(} nk ;c) Bk < ik+1   1jBk >   E(} nk ;c) rn( ~YBk )j < Bk < ik+1   1
+

P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk  ik+1   1jBk > 
  1n(ik+1 1)
follows. Furthermore with
P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk < ik+1   1jBk > 

= 1  P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk  ik+1   1jBk > 

= 1 
P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk  ik+1   1; Bk > 

P(} nk ;c)
(Bk > )
= 1 
P(} nk ;c)
(Bk  ik+1   1)
P(} nk ;c)
(Bk > )
 1  P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk  ik+1   1

= P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk < ik+1   1

;
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we obtainn(+1)  n(ik+1 1)
 P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk < ik+1   1jBk > 
  E(} nk ;c) rn( ~YBk )j < Bk < ik+1   1
+
1  P(} nk ;c) Bk  ik+1   1jBk > n(ik+1 1)
 P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk < ik+1   1
  rmax
+

1  P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk  ik+1   1jBk > 
  n(ik+1 1)
 P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk < ik+1   1
  rmax + P(} nk ;c) Bk < ik+1   1  rmax
 2  P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk < ik+1   1
  rmax :
4.: 1., 2. and 3. together imply
n(ik+1 1)  E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1
= n(ik+1 1)  E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1+ rnfng   rnfng
+ n(+1)  n(+1)

rnfng   E}k rn( ~YBk )Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1+ n(+1)  rnfng
+
n(ik+1 1)  n(+1)
 2rmaxP(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1) + 4rmaxP(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1) + "
+ 2rmaxP(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1)
= 8rmaxP(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1) + ":
Overview: Estimates in Continuing the nite quitting game
Estimate 2.3.25:
P}k Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1) "a  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)
Estimate 2.3.26:
E(} nk ;c) ~rn( ~YBk )Bk < ik+1   1
 E}k
 
~rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0 2rmax"a
Estimate 2.3.27: n(ik+1 1)  E}k
 
~rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1 8rmaxP(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1) + "
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Recall now estimate (2.30) on page 76
gn
 
(} nk ;c)

 gn(}k) + "+ "a  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)  rmax
+ P(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1)E(} nk ;c)
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1
  P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0

E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0
+ P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1

n(ik+1 1)
  E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1
Estimate 2.3.26 implies
E(} nk ;c)
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1  E}k rn( ~YBk )Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0
+ 2rmax  "a
and hence
gn
 
(} nk ;c)

 gn(}k) + "+ rmax"a  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)
+ P(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1)

E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0+ 2rmax  "a
  P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0

E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0
+ P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1

n(ik+1 1)
  E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1
 gn(}k) + "+ 3rmax"a  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)
+

P(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1)  P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0

 E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0
+ P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1

n(ik+1 1)
  E}k
 
rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1
holds and Estimates 2.3.25 and 2.3.27 lead to
gn
 
(} nk ;c)
  gn(}k) + "+ 3rmax"a  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)
+ rmax  "a  P(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1)
+ P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1

8rmaxP(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1) + "

:
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Since
P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1
  P}k Bk < ik+1   1 < "a ;
nally
gn
 
(} nk ;c)
  gn(}k) + 12rmax"aP(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1) + 2" (2.39)
follows for all n 2 N . This nishes part 4.b)\Continuing in the nite quitting game".
In summary we have
 with 4.a): gn (} nk ; qi)  gn(}k) + 4"a  rmax + "; (cf. (2.21)) and
 with 4.b): gn (} nk ;c)  gn(}k) + 12"a  rmaxP(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1) + 2";
which implies, that the strategy prole }k is an k -equilibrium in GBk , where
k = max
n
4"a  rmax + "; max
n2N

12"a  rmaxP(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1) + 2"
	o
:
4.c) Global estimate
The aim is to show, that  is an ~"-equilibrium in the given quitting game G under
the assumption that the blocks of type I are regularly scattered for all players n 2 N .
According to Denition 2.3.10 (see p. 54)
P( m ;c)( < ik+1j  ik)  "b
for all sets Bk = fik ; : : : ; ik+1   1g, k 2 N, which are of type I for player m 2 N .
Consider the player n 2 N : Dene a sequence of random variables (Z nk )k2N over the
probability space
 

;A;P

by
Z nk (!) :=
(
n(ik ) if (!)  ik
rn(Y(!)(!)) if (!) < ik
for all ! 2 
, k 2 N.
Remark 2.3.29. For i1 = 1, we have Z
n
1 (!) = 
n() for all ! 2 
, and hence
E( n ;c)(Z
n
k ) = E( n ;c)
 
Z nk 1f<ikg + Z
n
k 1fikg

= E( n ;c)(Z
n
k 1f<ikg) + E( n ;c)(Z
n
k 1fikg)
= E( n ;c)(r
n(Y )1f<ikg) + E( n ;c)(
n(ik )1fikg)
= E( n ;c)(r
n(Y )1f<ikg) + 
n(ik )  E( n ;c)(1fikg)
= E( n ;c)(r
n(Y )1f<ikg) + 
n(ik )  P( n ;c)(  ik)
for all k 2 N.
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Estimate 2.3.30. Let n 2 N be given, then
n
 
( n ; c)
  sup
k2N
E( n ;c)(Z
n
k ):
Proof. Observe that the blocks of type I are regularly scattered for all players n 2 N .
Thus the alternative strategy prole ( n ; c) is terminating and
n
 
( n ; c)

= E( n ;c)
 
rn(Y )1f<1g
  sup
k2N
E( n ;c)(Z
n
k ):
Estimate 2.3.31.
n
 
( n ;qi)
  sup
k2N
E( n ;c)(Z
n
k ) + "+ 4"
a  rmax 8k ; i 2 N; n 2 N
Proof. Choose i 2 N arbitrary but xed and let Bk = fik ; : : : ; ik+1   1g denote the set of
stages, where i 2 Bk . Then for the expected payo under the alternative strategy prole
( n ;qi),
n
 
( n ;qi)

= E( n ;c)
 
rn(Y )1f<ikg

+ E( n ;qi )
 
rn(Y )1fikg

= E( n ;c)
 
Z nk 1f<ikg

+ P( n ;qi )
 
  ik
  E( n ;qi) rn(Y )j  ik
= E( n ;c)
 
Z nk 1f<ikg

+ P( n ;qi )
 
  ik
  gn (} nk ; qi)
follows, where gn
 
(} nk ; qi)

is the expected payo for player n in the nite quitting game
GBk under the strategy prole }k = (pik ; : : : ; pik+1 1) (see p. 70). The inequalities (2.21)
and (1.30) (see p. 33) yield
n
 
( n ;qi)
  E( n ;c) Z nk 1f<ikg+ P( n ;qi )   ik gn(}k) + 4"a  rmax + "
 E( n ;c)
 
Z nk 1f<ikg

+ P( n ;qi )
 
  ik

gn(}k)| {z }
= n(ik )
+4"a  rmax + ":
Since i 2 Bk , respectively i  ik , we have
P( n ;qi )
 
  ik

= 1  P( n ;qi )
 
 < ik

= 1  P( n ;c)
 
 < ik

= P( n ;c)
 
  ik

= E( n ;c)
 
1fikg

;
which implies
n
 
( n ;qi)
  E( n ;c) Z nk 1f<ikg+ E( n ;c) 1fikgn(ik ) + 4"a  rmax + "
= E( n ;c)
 
Z nk 1f<ikg

+ E( n ;c)
 
n(ik )1fikg

+ 4"a  rmax + "
= E( n ;c)
 
Z nk 1f<ikg

+ E( n ;c)
 
Z nk 1fikg
| {z }
= E( n ;c)(Z
n
k )
+4"a  rmax + "
 sup
k2N
E( n ;c)(Z
n
k ) + 4"
a  rmax + ":
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Estimate 2.3.32. Let n 2 N be a given player, then
sup
k2N
E( n ;c)(Z
n
k )  n() + 2"1 b d + 12rmax"a :
Proof. As shown in 4.b) (cf. (2.39)),
gn
 
(} nk ;c)
  gn(}k) + 12rmax"aP(} nk ;c)(Bk < ik+1   1) + 2"
holds for all n 2 N . Since
gn
 
(} nk ;c)

= E( n ;c)
 
rn(Y )1f<ik+1g + 
n(ik+1)1fik+1g
  ik
= E( n ;c)
 
Z nk+1
  ik;
gn(}k) = 
n(ik ) = E( n ;c)
 
n(ik )
  ik = E( n ;c) Z nk   ik
and
P(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1) = P( n ;c)
 
 < ik+1   1
  ik;
we get
E( n ;c)
 
Z nk+1
  ik  E( n ;c) Z nk   ik+12rmax"aP( n ;c)  < ik+1 1  ik+2":
By multiplication with P( n ;c)(  ik), one obtains
P( n ;c)(  ik)E( n ;c)
 
Z nk+1
  ik
 P( n ;c)(  ik)E( n ;c)
 
Z nk
  ik+ 12rmax"a  P( n ;c) ik   < ik+1   1
+ 2"P( n ;c)(  ik)
 P( n ;c)(  ik)E( n ;c)
 
Z nk
  ik+ 12rmax"a  P( n ;c)  2 Bk
+ 2"P( n ;c)(  ik);
which is equal to
E( n ;c)
 
Z nk+11fikg

 E( n ;c)
 
Z nk 1fikg

+ 12rmax"
a  P( n ;c)
 
 2 Bk

+ 2"P( n ;c)(  ik): (2.40)
With Z nk+1 = Z
n
k for  < ik ,
E( n ;c)
 
Z nk 1f<ikg

= E( n ;c)
 
rn(Y )1f<ikg

= E( n ;c)
 
Z nk+11f<ikg

holds. Adding E( n ;c)
 
rn(Y )1f<ikg

on both sides of (2.40) leads to
E( n ;c)(Z
n
k+1)  E( n ;c)(Z nk ) + 12rmax"aP( n ;c)( 2 Bk) + 2"P( n ;c)(  ik)
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and summation over k = 1 to M (2 N) implies
MX
k=1
E( n ;c)(Z
n
k+1)

MX
k=1

E( n ;c)(Z
n
k ) + 12rmax"
a  P( n ;c)( 2 Bk) + 2"P( n ;c)(  ik)


MX
k=1
E( n ;c)(Z
n
k ) + 12rmax"
a  1 + 2"
X
k2N
P( n ;c)(  ik):
This leads to
E( n ;c)(Z
n
M+1)  E( n ;c)(Z n1 ) + 12rmax"a + 2"
X
k2N
P( n ;c)(  ik)
and nally
sup
M2N
E( n ;c)(Z
n
M )  E( n ;c)(Z n1 ) + 12rmax"a + 2"
X
k2N
P( n ;c)(  ik)
= E( n ;c)(
n())| {z }
= n()
+12rmax"
a + 2"
X
k2N
P( n ;c)(  ik): (2.41)
The blocks of type I are regularly scattered, i.e. two blocks of type I have a distance not
more than d1="de. So in the rst   (d1="de+1) blocks, there are at least  blocks of type
I for all players n 2 N . If Bk is a block of type I for a player n 2 N , then
P( n ;c)( < ik+1j  ik)  "b =) P( n ;c)(  ik+1j  ik)  1  "b
=) P( n ;c)(  i(d1="de+1))  (1  "b):
Furthermore one has
P( n ;c)(  ik)  P( n ;c)(  i(d1="de+1))
for all k    (d1="de+ 1) and thereforeX
k2N
P( n ;c)(  ik) 

1
"d

+ 1


X
2N0
P( m ;c)(  i(d1="de+1))


1
"d
+ 2


X
2N0
(1  "b)
=

1
"d
+ 2

 1
"b
;
where i0 := 1 = i1. Inserting this in (2.41) yields
sup
M2N
E( n ;c)(Z
n
M )  n() + 2"1 b d + 4"1 b + 12rmax"a :
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Overview: Estimates in Global estimate
Estimate 2.3.30: Let n 2 N be given, then
n
 
(n ; c)
  P
k2N
E( n ;c)(Z
n
k ):
Estimate 2.3.31: n
 
( n ;qi)
  sup
k2N
E( n ;c)(Z
n
k ) + "+ 4"
armax 8k ; i 2 N; n 2 N
Estimate 2.3.32: Let n 2 N be a given player, thenP
k2N
E( n ;c)(Z
n
k )  n() + 2"1 b d + 12rmax"a :
Estimates 2.3.30, 2.3.31 and 2.3.32 nally yield
n
 
( n ; c)
  n() + 2"1 b d + 4"1 b + 12rmax"a
and
n
 
( n ;qi)
  n() + 2"1 b d + 4"1 b + 15rmax"a + "
for all n 2 N and all i 2 N, which implies that  is an ~"-equilibrium in G , where
~" = 2"
1 b d + 4"1 b + 15rmax"a + ":
Now we are done with the proof of Proposition 2.3.8.
Remark to " = 0
The statement of Proposition 2.3.8 is also true for " = 0. In that case, rnfng  0 and
the requirement that G is terminating under every subgame strategy prole i , are not
necessary. Furthermore the property that pi is perfect in  (i+1) can be replaced by the
weaker property that pi is an equilibrium in  (i+1). The next lemma summarizes these
facts.
Corollary 2.3.33. Let G =
 N ; (rS )S2P(N ) be a quitting game and  = (pi)i2N a strategy
prole in G. Assume that pi is perfect in  (i+1) for every i 2 N. Then  is a subgame
equilibrium in G.
Proof. Because of " = 0, we obtain for the block-construction from the proof of Proposition
2.3.8, that the blocks Bk consist only of one stage, that means Bk := fkg for all k 2 N.
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Furthermore all blocks are of type I and we are situated in 4. Case 2.: Blocks of type I are
regularly scattered. With Remark 2.3.23 we only have to consider the global estimation.
As shown in Estimate 2.3.30
n
 
( n ; c)
  sup
k2N
E( n ;c)(Z
n
k ):
For n
 
( n ;qk)

we have
n
 
( n ;qk)

= E( n ;c)
 
Z nk 1f<kg

+ P( n ;qk)
 
  k  gn (} nk ; qk)
= E( n ;c)
 
Z nk 1f<kg

+ P( n ;qk)
 
  k  n(k+1) (p nk ; 1):
Since pk is perfect in  (k+1)
n
 
( n ;qk)
  E( n ;c) Z nk 1f<kg+ P( n ;qk)   k  n(k+1)(pk):
= E( n ;c)
 
Z nk 1f<kg

+ E( n ;c)
 
1fkg

n(k)
= E( n ;c)
 
Z nk 1f<kg

+ E( n ;c)
 
Z nk 1fkg

= E( n ;c)(Z
n
k )
 sup
k2N
E( n ;c)(Z
n
k ):
The same arguments like in 4. Global estimate leads to
sup
k2N
E( n ;c)(Z
n
k )  E( n ;c)(Z n1 )  n()
for all players n.
2.4. Equivalent conditions for the existence of
approximate equilibria in quitting games
Robert Simon published in the paper \The structure of non-zero-sum stochastic games"
([31]) some equivalent formulations for the existence of approximate equilibria in quitting
games. We end this chapter by quoting his results.
We start by introducing some new denitions.
Denition 2.4.1 (min-max value, ("-)min-max prole). Let G = (N ; (rS )S2P(N )) be a
given quitting game. For all players n 2 N , the value n , dened by
n := inf
2
max
~n2n
n
 
( n ; ~n)

; (2.42)
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is called min-max value for the player n in G . Furthermore a strategy prole
 n 2 [0; 1](N 1)N is called "-min-max prole for player n in G , if and only if
max
~n2n
n
 
( n ; ~n)
  n + ":
Denition 2.4.2 (normal player). Let G = (N ; (rS )S2P(N )) be a given quitting game. A
player n 2 N is called normal player, if and only if
rnfng  n
holds.
So a normal player always has the incentive to quit the game alone.
Denition 2.4.3 (feasible, "-rational). Let G = (N ; (rS )S2P(N )) be a given quitting game
and "  0. A vector v 2 RN is called feasible if, and only if
v 2 convfrS j S 2 P(N )g =: Ic:
The vector v 2 RN is called "-rational, if and only if
vn  n   "
holds for all n 2 N .
Notation 2.4.4. Let a quitting game G and an "  0 be given. Then the correspondences
E" := E
G
"  RN  [0; 1]N and F" := FG"  RN RN are dened by
E"(v) := E
G
" (v) := fp 2 [0; 1]N j p "-perfect in  vg
respectively
F"(v) := F
G
" (v) := fv(p)j p 2 E"(v)g
for all v 2 RN .
Denition 2.4.5 (nite orbit, innite orbit, extended orbit). Let G be a given quitting
game and "  0. A sequence (v1; : : : ; vl) with l 2 N [ f1g, vi 2 RN for all i 2 f1; : : : ; lg,
is called
 nite orbit, if l <1 and (vi ; vi+1) 2 F" for every i = 1; : : : ; l   1.
 innite orbit, if l =1 and (vi ; vi+1) 2 F" for every i 2 N.
A sequence (s1; s2; : : : ; sL) of sequences sj = (vj ;1; vj ;2; : : : ; vj ;nj ) with nj ;L 2 N [ f1g,
j = 1; : : : ;L, is called extended orbit, if (vj ;i ; vj ;i+1) 2 F" for every i = 1; : : : ; nj   1 and all
j = 1; : : : ;L and limi!1 vj ;i = vj+1;1 if nj =1 and vj ;nj = vj+1;1, j = 1; : : : ;L, otherwise.
The extended orbit has bounded total variation, if
LX
j=1
njX
i=1
kvj ;i   vj ;i 1k <1;
and unbounded total variation otherwise.
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Now to the theorem from Robert Simon (see [31] p. 18):
Theorem 2.4.6. Let G be a quitting game with neither stationary approximate equilibria
nor instant approximate equilibria under punishment. Then the following propositions are
equivalent:
(a) the game has approximate equilibria;
(b) for all " > 0 there is a cyclic strategy prole  = (p1; : : : ; pk ; p1; : : :) with
(i) (i) 2 F"((i+1)) for all i 2 N;
(ii) (i) "-rational for all i 2 N and
(iii) 1  %(pi ;?) > 0 for at least one i with 1  i  k;
(c) for all " > 0 and all b > 1 a nite orbit of F" of "-rational vectors within a distance of
" of feasible vectors with a total variation of at least b exists;
(d) for all " > 0 an innite orbit of F" of "-rational vectors with unbounded total variation
exists;
(e) for all " > 0 an innite extended orbit of F" of "-rational vectors with unbounded total
variation exists.
Remark 2.4.7. The proof that (d) implies (a) and (b) is based on the proof of Theorem
2.3.3.
This theorem shows that a general algorithm for the detection of an "-equilibrium for a
given quitting game should consists of three parts. The rst one is an algorithm detecting
an instant "-equilibrium under punishment. The second one is an algorithm which searches
for a stationary "-equilibrium and the third one is an algorithm which nds a cyclic "-
equilibrium for a given quitting game G . Theorem 2.4.6 also implies that in order to
show the non-existence of approximate equilibria for a given quitting game with the help
of an algorithm, a rst step is to exclude stationary approximate equilibria and instant
approximate equilibria under punishment.
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As already indicated in the introduction of this work, no algorithm or software is known
for the analysis of quitting games respectively stochastic games in general. One reason for
that may be the complexity of such algorithms. For one-step games and nite games, we
have in the case of a two-player zero-sum game that the search for a Nash-equilibrium can
be formulated in terms of linear programming (see, e.g. [22]), which can be solved e-
ciently. The articles \The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium" ([6]) and \On
the complexity of Nash equilibria and other xed points" ([11]) show that it is more com-
plicated for multi-player respectively non-zero-sum games. Kousha Etessami and Mihalis
Yannakakis proved that the calculation of an "-equilibrium by application of Brouwer's
xed point theorem is NP-hard1.
We want to cite McLennen (cf. [26]), who pointed out very well, why such programs or
algorithms are nevertheless needed: \[Consider] the complexity of the problem of comput-
ing the set of all Nash equilibria, as measured by the concepts of theoretical computer
science. Standard notions of complexity depend on the rate at which the resources (time
and/or memory) required by an algorithm grow as the size of the input increases. The
most fundamental division is between algorithms whose running times grow at rates that
are bounded by polynomial functions of the size of the input, and those for which the rate
of growth is exponential, or perhaps even faster. Generally, algorithms with polynomial
time and space requirements are described as `practical', while those with exponential rates
of growth are regarded as `impractical'. But many interesting games are small, and still
hard for people to solve by hand, so in game theory even exponential algorithms have
considerable practical utility."
We take this as motivation to develop algorithms respectively programs for the analysis of
quitting games.
This chapter is structured in the following way, which is similar to the usual recipe game
theorists would use to analyze a game (see e.g. [37]). In Section 3.1, we consider symmetric
1NP is the set of all problems, which can be solved with the help of nondeterministic algorithms in
polynomial time, cf. [5] pp. 160.
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quitting games and present two algorithms2. The rst one checks whether a given quitting
game is symmetric, and the second one determines an equilibrium for a given symmetric
quitting game. We implemented these algorithms in Fortran 90. The executable is called
qg symmetry and described at the end of the section3.
In the case that the given quitting game is not symmetric, one starts to test, if a reduction
of the game is possible. This case occurs, if at least one player has a dominated strategy.
We state an algorithm for the reduction by dominance in Section 3.2. This algorithm was
implemented in Fortran 90, as well. The routine qg dominant is explained at the end of
the section, the output is { if reduction is possible { a reduced game which can be further
analyzed.
Section 3.3 deals with pure "-equilibria. Again an algorithm is stated and the corresponding
implemented program called qg pure is described. Playing pure strategies can be seen
as restriction of the support set of a game, i.e. the set of actions which are played with a
positive probability. In case of pure "-equilibria, one would allow the players only to play
one action for sure at each stage. The next step in the analysis of a game would be to allow
all but one player to play both actions. The single player has to play quit with certainty.
As known from the previous chapters, we call such equilibria instant "-equilibria. Now we
consider a special kind of those equilibria called instant "-equilibria under punishment. It
is called punishment because, if the single player does not play quit in the rst stage of
the game, he is punished by the other players by playing his min-max prole. In Section
3.4, the necessary algorithms are stated and the implemented routine qg instant, which
oers the user several options, is documented. This section nishes with a discussion on
the presented algorithm.
In Chapter 1 and 2, we have introduced another important kind of equilibria, the so-called
stationary equilibria. In Section 3.5, we construct an algorithm to detect those equilibria.
The implementation is named qg stationary and explained, as well.
We close this chapter with a discussion on cyclic "-equilibria, where we state an intuitive
algorithm and mention the problems and questions, which occur if one wants to implement
it.
One remark at the end: We are mainly interested in nding a sample "-equilibrium, but
all programs can be used with a slightly modication to nd more than one.
2All algorithms are presented in a so called pseudocode, which is close to a programming language.
3The software is free and available on request directly from the author or from the Institut fur Math-
ematische Stochastik der Technischen Universitat Dresden. Hints referring bugs or implementation
alternatives are welcome.
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3.1. Symmetric quitting games
In this section we consider an algorithm to detect { or better to determine { equilibria in
symmetric quitting games. In this context we rst provide an algorithm, which checks,
whether a given quitting game has a symmetric payo structure or not.
Test-algorithm for symmetry
Let a quitting game G =
 N ; (rS )S2P(N ) be given. The algorithm analyzes the family
of payo vectors. If the game is symmetric, the output of the algorithm are two families
of numbers (k)k2N and (k)k2f1;:::;N 1g such that k respectively k is the payo to the
players who play quit respectively continue, where the quitting coalition S has the size
k (see Denition 2.1.1, p. 43).
Algorithm 1: Test for symmetry
Input : N , (rS )S2P(N )
Initialization: sym:= true, S := ?, N = r1N
for n = 1 to N   1 do
S = S [ fng
n = r
n
S
n = r
N
S
forall the S 2 P(N ) n f?g do
k := jS j
for n = 1 to N do
if (n 2 S and k 6= rnS ) or (n 2 N n S and k 6= rnS ) then
sym:= false
exit loop
Output: If sym = true then (k )k2N and (k )k2f1;m:::;N 1g else the quitting game is
not symmetric.
Remark 3.1.1. The run-time complexity of this algorithm for the worst-case scenario,
which occurs always, if the given game is symmetric, is O(N 2N ) { because all payos for
the players have to be compared.
Algorithm to determine an equilibrium in a symmetric quitting game
If the given quitting game G is symmetric, the following algorithm shows how one sample
equilibrium for G can be determined.
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Algorithm 2: Determination of an equilibrium for a symmetric quitting game
Input : N , (k )k2N , (k )k2f1;:::;N 1g
if 1  0 then
p := c
else if N  N 1 then
p := q
else
0 := 0
for n = 2 to N   1 do
if n+1  n and n  n 1 then
p1 := : : : := pn := 1
pn+1 := : : : := pN := 0
exit loop
Output: p, where  = (p; p; : : :) is a Nash-equilibrium in the given quitting game.
In Section 2.1, we mentioned that every symmetric quitting game has a pure, stationary
equilibrium. As one can see in the proof of this proposition, the algorithm is going to
terminate in one of the three steps and has an equilibrium prole as result. The run-time
complexity of this algorithm for the worst-case scenario, which occurs, if the algorithm
stops in the third case at the end of the loop for n = N   1, is O(N ).
qg symmetry
This module reads a game from standard input and tests, whether the quitting game is
symmetric or not. If the game is symmetric, one Nash-equilibrium will be determined.
The output of this routine { if the game is symmetric { consists of two sequences (k)k2N
and (k)k2f1;:::;N 1g together with the probability vector p, where  = (p; p; : : :) is a Nash-
equilibrium in the given game.
Example 4. We consider the following three-player quitting game:
Player 3 c Player 2 Player 3 q Player 2
c q c q
Player 1
c
q
	
(1; 1; 1)
(1; 1; 1)
(0; 0; 3)
Player 1
c
q
(1; 1; 1)
(0; 3; 0)
(3; 0; 0)
(2; 2; 2)
(see Example1.txt, Appendix B, for the input le).
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Then the output of qg symmetry is the le results.txt with the following content:
The quitting game is symmetric.
alpha = 1 0 2
beta = 1 3
One Nash-equilibrium is generated by
p = 1 0 0
3.2. Reduction by dominance
As we have seen in Chapter 2 (cf. Section 2.2), it could be useful to test, if a given game
has dominant respectively dominated strategies. We focus here on strongly dominant
strategies, since we can reduce the considered game (cf. Remark 2.2.4 3.).
In detail: Assume that m = (pm ; pm ; : : :) is a strongly dominant strategy for player m.
By denition we consider only stationary strategies, and in Remark 2.2.4 we argued that
m is pure, so in fact this leads to the following two cases:
1. If pm = 1, i.e. player m plays always quit, the given game has at least one Nash
equilibrium, which can be determined by the consideration of a reduced game, which
is a one-step game.
2. If pm = 0, i.e. player m plays always continue, it is sucient to consider a reduced
game, which is again a quitting game.
Algorithm
We present an optimized algorithm for the reduction by dominance. If a dominant strategy
for a player n 2 N exists, we immediately consider the reduced game without player n
and the corresponding payos for the other players. Therefore the resulting strategies do
not have to be strongly dominant strategies in the given quitting game.
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Algorithm 3: Reduction by dominance
Input : N , (rS )S2P(N )
Initialization: Nq := ?, M := N
for n = 1 to N do
if rnfng < 0 then dom(n) := 0
else
if rnfng > 0 then dom(n) := 1
else dom(n) := 2
(Player 1)
if dom(1) 6= 2 then
for m = 2 to N do
if (r1f1;mg  r1fmg and dom(1) = 1) or (r1f1;mg  r1fmg and dom(1) = 0) then
dom(1) := 2, exit loop
if dom(1) 6= 2 then
M :=Mn f1g
if dom(1) = 1 then Nq := f1g
(all the other players)
for n = 2 to N do
S := Nq
for all m 2M do
S := S [ fmg
if (rnfng[S  rnS and dom(n) = 1) or (rnfng[S  rnS and dom(n) = 0) then
dom(n) := 2, exit loop
if dom(n) 6= 2 then
M :=Mn fng
if dom(n) = 1 then Nq := Nq [ fng
Output: Nq , M, where Nq contains all players, for which playing quit all the time is
strongly dominant, and N n (M[Nq) contains all players, for which playing
continue all the time is strongly dominant.
qg dominant
qg dominant reads in a game in standard input (see Appendix B). The program de-
termines strongly dominated strategies (in the reduction sense as explained before) and
returns a reduced game, if such a strategy exists. Therefore the user has to provide the
name of a le, to which the reduced game is stored. All other results such as how many
players have strongly dominant strategies and which player has which dominant strategy,
are written to the le results.txt.
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Example 5. Consider the following three-player game (see Example2.txt, Appendix B):
Player 3 c Player 2 Player 3 q Player 2
c q c q
Player 1
c
q
	
( 1; 0; 0)
(0; 1; 0)
(1; 1; 0)
Player 1
c
q
(0; 2; 1)
(2; 1; 1)
(1; 3; 1)
(0; 2; 3)
The le containing the reduced game reads as:
1 player/s have a dominant strategy, which are:
Player 2 dominant strategy: 1
The content of the le, where the reduced game is stored is:
2
0:0000000 0:0000000
1:0000000 0:0000000
0:0000000   1:0000000
0:0000000 3:0000000
One-step game
3.3. Pure "-equilibria
In this section, we want to construct an algorithm, which nds a sample pure "-equilibrium
for a given quitting game G , if it exists. Instead of testing all possible pure strategy proles
 = (p1; p2; : : :) with pi 2 f0; 1gN , i 2 N, we apply Corollary 1.4.7 (see p. 39) which gives
us the following: Assume that a pure "-equilibrium  in a given quitting game G exists,
then either one of the three cases occurs:
1. All players play continue with certainty all the time, i.e.  = (1; : : : ; N )T with
n = c for all n 2 N .
2. One player m plays quit in the rst stage, while the other players play continue with
certainty in the rst stage, i.e. pm1 = 1 and p
 m
1 = 0.
3. At least two player play quit in the rst stage, i.e. m; n 2 N exist such that
pm1 = p
n
1 = 1.
or another pure "-equilibrium in G exists, such that one of the aforementioned cases ap-
plies.
We study all three cases in detail, referring to the property that  should be an "-
equilibrium.
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For the rst case we have: Since  is stationary with Lemma 1.4.8 and Remark 1.4.9, we
obtain, that  is an "-equilibrium, if and only if rnfng  " for all n 2 N .
To the third case: Because the game terminates for sure in the rst stage, () = 0(p1)
holds for the expected payo in the quitting game under the strategy prole . Because
two players play quit in the rst stage,

 
( k ; ~k)

= 0
 
(p k1 ; ~p
k
1 )

holds for all ~k = (~pk1 ; ~p
k
2 ; : : :) 2 k and all k 2 N . Thus  is an "-equilibrium in G if, and
only if p1 is an "-equilibrium in  0.
In the second case, the game terminates in the rst stage for sure, as well, and for the
expected payo we have () = 0(p1) = rfmg. All players n 2 N n fmg are situated in a
one-step game.  fullls the "-equilibrium condition for these players in the quitting game,
if and only if p1 fullls the "-equilibrium condition for these players in the one-step game
 0.
Consider the player m, who plays quit with certainty in the rst stage: Since the game
is terminating in stage one only because of her choice, we need to know, what the other
players play in the next stages. This fact is important and occurs again, if we consider
instant "-equilibria in general. In the pure case, we make the following two distinctions:
a) The other players play continue for certainty all the time. In that case,  is an "-
equilibrium in G only if rmfmg   ".
b) Otherwise there exists at least one player n 6= m, who plays quit with certainty in a
stage i , i  2. Corollary 1.4.7 shows that it is sucient to consider only the case,
where pn2 = 1 { otherwise we have a block of zero vectors in the prole without player
m, which could be eliminated here { and  is an "-equilibrium in G only if
m() = rmfmg  ~pm1  rmfmg + (1  ~pm1 )m0
 
(p m2 ; ~p
m
2 )
  " (3.1)
for all ~pm1 ; ~p
m
2 2 [0; 1].
In summary, it is sucient to focus only on all possible combinations of the probability
vectors p1 and p2 in order to verify, whether a given quitting game has a pure "-equilibrium
or not.
Algorithm
For programming purposes, we transform the second case from the previous section into
an equilibrium test in the context of one-step games. Therefore we dene
mp := min
p m2f0;1gN 1
max
pm2f0;1g
m0
 
(p m ; pm)

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as lowest upper bound for the payo that player m obtains in response to all pure strategy
choices of the other players. We call mp the pure min-max value for player m. This implies
for (3.1), that we have to test whether
rmfmg  ~pm1 rmfmg + (1  ~pm1 )  mp   " = mp1
 
(p m1 ; ~p
m
1 )
  "
holds for all ~pm1 2 [0; 1] or not. Since the expected payo in a one-step game is linear
in the strategy of one player, this reduces to rmfmg  mp   ". If the last inequality holds
and if p1 fullls the equilibrium condition for the players n 6= m in the one-step game
corresponding to the given quitting game, then  = (p1; p2; p3; : : :) with p1 = (c
 m ; 1), p2
such that m0 (p2) = 
m
p and pi 2 f0; 1gN for 3  i 2 N arbitrary, is a pure "-equilibrium
in G .
Algorithm 4: Pure "-equilibria
Input : N , (rS )S2P(N ), "
Initialization: pure:= true, S := 0
for n = 1 to N do
if " < rnfng then pure:= false, exit loop
if pure = true then p1 := 0
else
forall the S  N , S 6= ? do
pure:= true
if jS j = 1 then
for m = 1 to N do
if m 2 S then
call calculate mp (determine p2, such that 
m
0 (p2) = 
m
p )
if rmfmg < 
m
p   " then pure:= false, exit loop
else if rmS < r
m
S[fmg   " then pure:= false, exit loop
else
for m = 1 to N do
if (m 2 N n S and rmS < rmS[fng   ") then
pure:= false, exit loop
else if rmS < r
m
Snfng   " then pure:= false, exit loop
if pure = true then pm1 =
(
1 for m 2 S
0 for m 2 N n S , exit loop
Output: If pure = true then write S , p1 and if jS j = 1, p2 else the quitting game has
no pure "-equilibrium.
The calculation of mp is done as follows:
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Algorithm 5: calculate mp
Input : N , (rS )S2P(N ), m 2 N
Initialization: mp := 0, p2 := 0
if rmfmg > 0 then 
m
p := r
m
fmg, p
m
2 = 1
forall the S 2 P(N n fmg) n f?g do
if rmS < r
m
S[fmg then
if rmS[fmg < 
m
p then
mp := r
m
S[fmg, p
m
2 := 1 and p
k
2 :=
(
1 if k 2 S
0 if k 2 N n S ; k 6= m
else if rmS < 
m
p then
mp := r
m
S , p
m
2 := 0 and p
k
2 :=
(
1 if k 2 S
0 if k 2 N n S ; k 6= m
Output : mp , p2
Remark 3.3.1. The worst case run-time complexity of Algorithm 3.3 is obviously expo-
nential in N .
qg pure
qg pure reads a game from standard input, additionally an " has to be given. Then the
program tests all possible vectors p1 2 f0; 1gN , if they form a pure "-equilibrium or not
(see Algorithm 3.3). The results are stored in the le results.txt. In the case, that a pure
"-equilibrium exists, the output is the vector p1 and, if only one player plays quit according
to p1, then p2 is also given.
Example 6. We take the following three player game (see Example3.txt, Appendix B):
Pl. 3 c Pl. 2 Pl. 3 q Pl. 2
c q c q
Pl. 1
c
q
	
( 3; 1; 1)
( 2; 2; 2)
( 1; 1; 3)
Pl. 1
c
q
( 1; 1; 0)
( 3; 1; 4)
( 0; 1; 1)
( 1; 1; 1)
The output of the algorithm, stored in results.txt, is:
The prole pi = (p1; p2; p; p; :::) with
p1 = 0 1 0
p2 = 1 0 0
and p arbitrarily forms a pure eps-equilibrium in the given game.
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3.4. Instant "-equilibria
An instant "-equilibrium  = (pi)i2N for a given quitting game G = (N ; (rS )S2P(N )) was
dened as "-equilibrium, where at least one player n 2 N exists, for which pn1 = 1 holds.
Referring to [31], we want to dene a special kind of instant "-equilibria (see [31] p. 16).
Denition 3.4.1 (instant "-equilibrium under punishment). Let G = (N ; (rS )S2P(N )) be
a given quitting game, "  0. A strategy prole  = (p1; 2) for G is called instant
"-equilibrium under punishment, if at least one player n 2 N exists with:
 pn1 = 1,
  n2 is an "-min-max prole for player n and
 p1 is an "-equilibrium in  v = (G ; v), where vn = n + ", v 2 RN .
Recall that the min-max-value for a player n was given by (cf. Denition 2.4.1, p. 91)
n = inf
2
max
~n2n
n
 
( n ; ~n)

:
Remark 3.4.2. It is obvious, that a prole  = (p1; 2), that satises the requirements of
Denition 3.4.1, is an "-equilibrium in G . For the players m 6= n, this follows immediately
from the third condition and the fact that m(2)
 
(p m1 ; ~p
m
1 )

= m
 
( m ; ~m)

for all
~m = (~pm1 ; ~p
m
2 ; : : :) 2 m . For player n, we have:
n() = n(2)(p1) = 
n
v (p1)
 max
~pn1 2[0;1]
nv
 
(p n1 ; ~p
n
1 )
  "
= max
~pn1 2[0;1]

n0
 
(p n1 ; ~p
n
1 )

+ %
 
(p n1 ; ~p
n
1 );?
  (n + ")  "
 max
~pn1 2[0;1]

n0
 
(p n1 ; ~p
n
1 )

+ %
 
(p n1 ; ~p
n
1 );?
  max
~22n

 
( n2 ; ~
n
2 )
  "
= max
~n2n
n
 
( n ; ~n)
  ":
The Denition 3.4.1 implies, that an algorithm that should detect an instant "-equilibrium
under punishment consists of two main parts. One is the calculation of "-equilibria in one-
step games and the other the determination of the ("-)min-max value. We rst consider
the min-max value.
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3.4.1. Computing the min-max value
Assume that we want to calculate the min-max-value for player one. In every stage of the
quitting game the players m 6= 1 have to nd a quitting probability combination, such that
the payo to player one becomes minimal. Rigorously we have:
1 = inf
2
max
~121
X
k2N
k 1Y
i=1
(1  ~pi)%
 
(p 1i ; 0);?


 X
S2P(Nnf1g)
 
r 1S[f1g~p
1
k + r
1
S (1  ~p1k )

%
 
(p 1k ; 0); S

= inf
2
max
~121
X
k2N
k 1Y
i=1

~p1k 
X
S2P(Nnf1g)
 
r 1S[f1g   r 1S

%
 
(p 1k ; 0); S

+
X
S2P(Nnf1g)
r 1S%
 
(p 1k ; 0); S

:
Because player one reacts on what the other players play, their decisions have to be made
independently of the (random) choice of player one, hence it is the same for each stage.
Therefore it is sucient to consider only stationary strategies for the players m 6= 1 as so
called min-max-strategies. Furthermore in the rst chapter we pointed out that, given the
other players play stationary strategies, the expected payo maximizing strategy of player
one is pure. Consequently this leads to:
1 = inf
p2[0;1]
max
~p12f0;1g

 
(p; p; : : :) 1; (~p1; ~p1; : : :)

Furthermore we know (cf. [37]), that for all " > 0 a prole  exists, such that
1 + " = 1(): (3.2)
for all players n 2 N .
In summary, the determination of the min-max-value for a player is an optimization prob-
lem, which can be formulated in the form
minimizep n2[0;1]N 1H(p
 n);
where
H(p
 n) := max
b2f0;1g
n
 
((p; p; : : :) n ; (b; b; : : :))

:
The function H : [0; 1]N 1 ! R has discontinuous rst partial derivatives at each point
where the expected payos for player n are independent of playing quit or continue with
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certainty (cf. [4]). This makes the solution dicult. An introduction to the topic minimax
problems is given by the book \Introduction to Minimax" by Dem'yanov and Molozemov
([9]), some solution concepts are presented for example in [4] and [46].
The main problem is, that the expected payo is not continuous in the point, where all
players play continue all the time. Furthermore the expected payo in the quitting game
is not convex, so that there may exist more than one minimum of the function H . For
our case we need a global minimum, so we decided to implement an algorithm, which
approximates the min-max-value by the consideration of a grid over [0; 1]N .
Algorithm 6: Approximation of min-max-values
Input : N , (rS )S2P(N ), number of steps s
Initialization:  := 1000 (default value)
forall the ~p 2 p 2 [0; 1]N 1j pn = k  1s ; k 2 f0; : : : ; sg;n 2 f1; : : : ;N   1g	 do
for n = 1 to N do
p nc := ~p, pnc := 0
p nq := ~p, pnq := 1
if maxfn (pc ; pc ; : : :); n0 (pq)g < n then
if n
 
(pc ; pc ; : : :)

< n0 (pq) then
n = n0 (pc)
Minmaxn = pq
else
n = n
 
(pc ; pc ; : : :)

Minmaxn = pc
Output : , Minmax, where  is the vector with the (approximated) min-max-values
for the players and Minmax is an N N matrix, where each row contains
the min-max prole for the corresponding player.
Remark 3.4.3. The run-time complexity of this algorithm is exponential in the number
of players and the chosen number of steps.
3.4.2. Computing "-equilibria in one-step games
We present an algorithm for the detection of (all) "-equilibria in a one-step game, which
we use for the search for an instant "-equilibrium in a given quitting game. An overview
about the existing literature respectively programs which are useful to nd Nash-equilibria
in one-step games in general is given in Section 3.4.4.
The algorithm is based on a stepwise scanning of the set of all possible strategy proles
p 2 [0; 1]N for a given one-step game  v . Therefore the results are depending on the chosen
number of steps, here denoted by s 2 N.
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Algorithm 7: Search for "-equilibria in one-step games
Input : N , (rS )S2P(N ), v , "  0, number of steps s 2 N
Initialization: j := 0
forall the p 2 p 2 [0; 1]N j pn = k  1s ; k 2 f0; : : : ; sg; n 2 N	 do
eq:= true
for n = 1 to N do
if nv (p) < 
n
v
 
(p n ; 0)
  " then eq:= false, exit loop
else if nv (p) < 
n
v
 
(p n ; 1)
  " then eq:= false, exit loop
if eq = true then
j := j + 1
M(j ) := p
Output : j , M, where j denotes the number of found "-equilibria and M 2 [0; 1]jN
is a matrix, where each row contains an "-equilibrium prole in the given
one-step game.
Since every one-step game has an (0-)equilibrium, the algorithm should detect at least
one "-equilibrium, assumed that the step size is small enough respectively the number of
steps is high enough. The next section should answer the question for an optimal step size
referring to a given ".
Optimal step size
Let p 2 [0; 1]N be a 0-equilibrium in  v and s the given number of steps. Dene
Fs :=

p 2 [0; 1]N j pn = k  1
s
; k 2 f0; : : : ; sg; n 2 N	:
If p 2 Fs , the algorithm should detect p for every "  0:4 If p =2 Fs then denote by ps the
ps 2 Fs , where
kp   psk  kp   ~psk 8 ~ps 2 Fs :
Furthermore kp   psk  12  1s holds. Consider now player one and the player-wise change
from p to ps . Therefore dene the family (ps;i)i2N by
ps;i := (p
1
s ; : : : ; p
i
s ; p
i+1; : : : ; pN )T :
We distinguish between p1s < p
1 and p1s > p
1.
4Due to the computational accuracy it might be possible that the algorithm does not detect p for " = 0.
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p1s < p
1: Then a  2 [0; 1] exists, such that p1s = (1   )p1, where 12s  p1. Since p is a
0-equilibrium in  v , with Lemma 1.2.21 we have
1v (ps;1)  1v (p)  p1(rmax + v)
 1v
 
(p 1; b)
  p1(rmax + v)
= 1v
 
(p 1s;1 ; b)
  p1(rmax + v)
 1v
 
(p 1s;1 ; b)
  1
2s
(rmax + v); b 2 [0; 1]:
p1s > p
1: Then a  2 [0; 1] exists, such that p1s = (1   )p1 + , where 12s  (1   p1).
With Theorem 1.2.17, we get
1v (ps;1)  1v (p)  (1  p1)(rmax + v)
 1v
 
(p 1; b)
  (1  p1)(rmax + v)
= 1v
 
(p 1s;1 ; b)
  (1  p1)(rmax + v)
 1v
 
(p 1s;1 ; b)
  1
2s
(rmax + v); b 2 [0; 1]:
Case 1 and 2 imply that ps;1 is an "1-equilibrium in  v for player one with
"1 :=
1
2s
(rmax + v):
Consider now the expected payo for player one under ps;2. If p
2
s < p
2, then again a
 2 [0; 1] exists, such that p2s = (1   )p2, where 12s  p2 and since p is a 0-equilibrium
in  v , with Lemma 1.2.21 it follows:
1v (ps;2)  1v (ps;1)  p2(rmax + v)
 1v
 
(p 1s;1 ; b)
  "1   p2(rmax + v)
 1v
 
(p 1s;2 ; b)
  "1   2  p2(rmax + v)
 1v
 
(p 1s;2 ; b)
  "1   1
s
(rmax + v)
 1v
 
(p 1s;2 ; b)
  2  1
s
(rmax + v); b 2 [0; 1]:
On the other hand, if p2s > p
1, then a  2 [0; 1] exists, such that p2s = (1 )p2+, where
1
2s
 (1  p2), and Theorem 1.2.17 yields
1v (ps;2)  1v (ps;1)  (1  p2)(rmax + v)
 1v
 
(p 1s;1 ; b)
  "1   (1  p2)(rmax + v)
= 1v
 
(p 1s;2 ; b)
  "1   2  (1  p2)(rmax + v)
 1v
 
(p 1s;2 ; b)
  "1   1
s
(rmax + v)
 1v
 
(p 1s;2 ; b)
  2  1
s
(rmax + v); b 2 [0; 1]:
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This implies that ps;2 is an "2-equilibrium in  v for player one with
"2 := 2  1
s
(rmax + v):
The same procedure for the players three to N gives, that ps is an
N  1
s
(rmax + v)-equilibrium in  v for player one. The other players are similar, hence
ps is an N  1s (rmax + v)-equilibrium in  v in for all players.
Corollary 3.4.4. Let  v be a given one-step game and " > 0. Then Algorithm 7 detects
an "-equilibrium in  v , if the chosen number of steps is at least

N
"
(rmax + v)

.
Remark 3.4.5. If " is small, the number of steps is accordingly high. Because every
"-equilibrium for  v is an ~"-equilibrium for  v as well for "  ~", it is better to do a
precalculation in a rst step, choosing an ~" > " and a number of steps ~s >

N
~"
(rmax + v)

to determine an area, where the "-equilibrium to be found may be located. In the second
step this area should be analyzed again with the real parameter " and an adapted number
of steps s .
Observe that we need to determine (if possible) all "-equilibria in a given one-step game
and not only a sample one (see also Section 3.4.4). If one is only interested in one sample
"-equilibrium, there are of course other more ecient algorithms. Some of them are im-
plemented in Gambit, a library of game theory software. We give a brief summary about
important algorithms implemented there in Section 4.1.
3.4.3. Algorithm to detect an instant "-equilibrium under punishment
in quitting games
The algorithm for the detection of an instant "-equilibrium under punishment is a combi-
nation of the previously described algorithms. Here we assume, that a -min-max-value for
each player is already given. We denote  := (
1
 ; : : : ; 
N
 ) as such a vector of -min-max
values for the players,   0, i.e. i  i  i +  for all i 2 N and assume, that such a
vector is provided. We give a sketch of an algorithm5:
5With abuse of notation, we denote the family of payos in the reduced one-step game also r and keep
in mind, that these are vectors in RN 1, which are the same as in the corresponding quitting game,
but missing the component for player n.
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Algorithm 8: Search for an instant "-equilibrium
Input : N , (rS )S2P(N ), "  0,  with "  
Initialization: insteq:= false for n = 1 to N do
Determine all "-equilibria ~p1; ~p2; : : : ; ~pkn of the one-step game
 v :=
 
~N := N n fng; (rS[fng)S2P( ~N ); v := 0

(Using Algorithm 7, we get kn := j   1 and ~pi := M(i))
for i = 1 to kn do
p^ ni := ~pi , p^
n
i := 1
if n0 (p^i)  n0
 
(p^ n ; 0)

+ %
 
(p^ n ; 0);?
  n   " then insteq:= true, exit all
loops
Output : If insteq = true then an "-instant equilibria exits, where player n plays quit
with certainty, and p1 is the rst entry in the prole , otherwise no
"-equilibrium could be found.
Remark 3.4.6. 1. The run-time complexity of this algorithm is exponential in the
number of players and furthermore dependent of the chosen algorithm for the calcu-
lation of the "-equilibria in the reduced one-step games.
2. The algorithm terminates after checking all players. The result is either an "-instant
equilibrium or the statement that no such equilibrium could be found. If we assume
that we are able to determine all "-equilibria in a given one-step game and that
 is given, then we are able to say that the given quitting game has no instant
"-equilibrium under punishment and hence no "-instant equilibrium. For a further
discussion of this point see Section 3.4.4.
3. In some cases, it is not necessary to know respectively to calculate the min-max-value
for a player, i.e. if the reduced one-step game (see the third step of the algorithm) has
an "-equilibrium ~pi , such that a player m exists with ~p
m
i = 1. Such a precalculation
might be useful, if the min-max-value is not known and has to be calculated in the
program.
qg instant
qg instant reads in a game in standard input. Since it is already known, that two-player
quitting games have "-stationary proles (cf. [37]), the algorithm is conceptualized only
for games with more than two players. We have to mention that this program as a whole
is only usable for a rough precalculation. On the other hand, the user has several options
in order to use only several parts of the program. The main problem is the calculation of
the min-max-values, where we cannot a priori recommend an optimal step size, so we use
here the same step size as for the search for "-equilibria in one-step games.
After entering the lename, where the game is stored, and an ", the user has the following
options
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0. Use the whole program, i.e. the min-max-values and the "-equilibria for the reduced
one-step games are determined by a stepwise scanning of [0; 1]N 1 { step size is given
by the user { (see Algorithm 6 and Algorithm 7). Furthermore it will be tested, if
the "-equilibria together with the min-max-values generate an instant "-equilibrium
for the given quitting game.
1. The user provides the program with min-max-values and uses only the detection of
an "-equilibrium for the reduced one-step games and the test for instant "-equilibria.
2. The user has the possibility to enter a lename, where "-equilibria for the reduced
one-step games are stored. The program then determines min-max-values for the
players by a stepwise scanning of [0; 1]N 1 and test, if the given equilibria generate
an instant "-equilibrium in the given quitting game. The input le should have the
following form:
{ the rst line gives the number of "-equilibria for each player (we assume that
the numbers are at least one),
{ the second line starts with player one and has only the player number 1 as entry,
{ then the "-equilibria for the reduced one-step game referring to player one, i.e.
the one-step game resulting from the quitting game for the player n 6= 1, if we
assume that player one plays quit with certainty,
{ after stating all equilibria for player one, the next line contains player number
2 followed by the equilibria referring to him, and so on.
For the three player game provided in Example4.txt, we have for example the follow-
ing input le for Case 2.:
2 1 1 (number of "-equilibria for each player)
1 (the equilibria for player one follow next)
0:625 0:0 ("-equil. for reduced one-step game referring to player 1)
1 0:3 ("-equil. for reduced one-step game referring to player 1)
2 (the equilibria for player two follow next)
1:0 0:0 ("-equil. for reduced one-step game referring to player 2)
3 (the equilibria for player three follow next)
0:0 1:0 ("-equil. for reduced one-step game referring to player 3)
3. The user types in a lename, where the min-max-values and the "-equilibrium proles
are stored, which should only be tested by the program. The input le has the same
style like in the previous case, with one dierence: In the rst line, now the min-
max-values are stated, followed by the number of "-equilibria referring to the single
players and so on. For the three player game provided in Example4.txt, we have for
example the following input le:
2:0 0:0 0:0 (min-max-value for each player)
1 1 1 (number of "-equilibria for each player)
1
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0:625 0:0 ("-equil. for reduced one-step game referring to player 1)
2
1:0 0:0 ("-equil. for reduced one-step game referring to player 2)
3
0:0 1:0 ("-equil. for reduced one-step game referring to player 3)
Observe, that the equilibria for the players have to be given in the right order, i.e.
the equilibria for player n has to be followed by the equilibria for player n+1 and so
on. The decision for this input style is for reasons of clarity and comprehensibility.
Furthermore the number of the equilibria has to be stated rst, since we want to
allocate only the really needed memory space.
The output of this program is stored again in the le named results.txt. The program stops,
if an instant "-equilibrium is detected { otherwise it terminates with the output, that no
instant "-equilibrium was detected with the chosen step size { in this case the output le
contains the equilibrium, the player who plays quit with certainty and if it was executed
in the modus 0 or 2. The output contains beside this also the used min-max-values and
the min-max-prole of the player, who plays quit.
3.4.4. Discussion
In this section we discuss aspects and problems related to the detection of instant equilibria
under punishment. These are mainly
1. The calculation of the min-max-value
a) as game theoretic problem concerning a team game.
b) as problem in operations research.
2. The number of Nash-equilibria in one-step games.
3. Do I really need to know all "-equilibria of the reduced one-step games?
Calculation of the min-max-value
We want to give some equivalent formulations for the calculation of the min-max-value for
a player. First we consider a so-called two-player team game.
Assume that we want to calculate the min-max value of player one. In this case, all the
other players play against her and try to minimize her expected payo, regardless of their
own expected payo. Because of this, we can dene a two player game in the following
way: Player one from the quitting game is also player one from the new game and all the
other players play in a team, which is represented by player two of the new game. The
new player two has of course more than two possible actions. The actions of this player
are vectors, which components constitute the action played by the corresponding player in
the old game. We illustrate this with a small example:
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Consider the game from Flesh, Thuijsmann and Vrieze, stated in [14]. The quitting game
was given by:
Player 3 c Player 2 Player 3 q Player 2
c q c q
Player 1
c
q
	
(1; 3; 0)
(0; 1; 3)
(1; 0; 1)
Player 1
c
q
(3; 0; 1)
(0; 1; 1)
(1; 1; 0)
(0; 0; 0)
Since we want to calculate the min-max value 1 of player one, the players two and three
are in a team and play as player two of the new game against player one. The action sets
are given by
A1 := f0; 1g and A2 :=

0
0

;

1
0

;

0
1

;

1
1

;
where Ai denotes the action set for player i , i = 1; 2.
Furthermore we have to dene a payo function for the new players one and two. This
function should reect three important things:
1. All players, who play against player one are { in the context of calculating the min-
max value for player one { only interested in minimizing the payo for player one.
Therefore we can assume that the payo to the new player two is the negative of the
payo from the new player one. For our example, this leads to the following table of
payos:
Player 2
(0; 0) (1; 0) (0; 1) (1; 1)
Player 1
0
1
	
(1; 1)
(0; 0)
(1; 1)
(3; 3)
(0; 0)
(1; 1)
(0; 0)
2. The resulting game is again a repeated game with absorbing states. Since it is
sucient to consider only stationary strategies for the players in order to calculate
the min-max value, we can substitute the continue payo, which is represented in
this table by 	 with the expected payo from the quitting game for player one, which
can be calculated easily for a given strategy prole.
3. We have to keep in mind, that the strategies of the players are correlated. That
means, we can not dene the strategy for player two similarly to the denition from
the strategy of the quitting game. We come back to this at the end of this section
(keyword team games).
We make an excursion to operations research and dene a general N -player game (see, e.g.
[12]) in order to describe the min-max-value calculation with help of this.
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Denition 3.4.7 (General N -player game). A general N -player game is a tuple
G =
 N ;p; (Bi)i2N ; 
where
 N = f1; 2; : : : ;N g  N is a nite set of players, N 2 N,
 p = (p1; : : : ; pN )T 2 Rn with pi = (pi1; : : : pini ) 2 Rni , ni 2 N, where pi is called
decision variable of player i , i 2 N and n =PNi=1 ni ,
 (Bi)i2N is the family of feasible sets for the players, where Bi  Rni is the set of
feasible decision variables for player i 2 N and
  = (1; : : : ; N ) 2 RN with i : Rn ! R, where i is called the payo-function for
player i 2 N .
Remark 3.4.8. 1. Analogously to the denition in the quitting game or one-step game
we denote with p i the vector of decision variables without the decision variable
corresponding to player i and (p i ; ~pi) as alternative vector of decision variables for
player i , where i now plays ~pi 2 Rni .
2. In the literature, a more general denition can be found, where the feasible sets for
the players depend also on the decision variables of the other players (see, e.g. [12]).
In the context of Nash-equilibria we speak in that case of generalized Nash-equilibria.
Denition 3.4.9 (Nash-equilibrium). Let G =
 N ;p; (Bi)i2N ;  be a given general
N -player game. A vector of decision variables p = (p1; : : : ; pN ) is called Nash-equilibrium
for G, if and only if
i(p) = max
~pi2Bi
i
 
(p i ; ~pi)

for all players i 2 N .
In the context of calculating the min-max value for player one of an N -person quitting
game G =
 N ; (rS )S2P(N ), we consider the following general two-player game:
G =
 N := f1; 2g;p; (Bi)i=1;2; ;
where
 p = (p1; p2) with p1 2 R and p2 = (p21 ; p22 ; : : : ; p2n2) 2 Rn2 having n2 := 2N 1,
 B1 := [0; 1] and B2 := [0; 1]n2 ,
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  = (1; 2) with
1(p) =  2(p) :=
8<:0 for p = 011 %(p;?) P
S2P(N )
%(p; S )  r 1S otherwise
and % being the extension of the function % to the real numbers, i.e.
% : Rn2+1  P(N )  ! R such that
(p; S ) 7! %(p; S ) :=
8>>><>>>:
p1
Q
i2S
i 6=1
p2i 1
Q
j2NnS
(1  p2j 1) for 1 2 S
(1  p1) Q
i2S
p2i 1
Q
j2NnS
j 6=1
(1  p2j 1) for 1 =2 S .
The aim of the new player two is to minimize the payo to player one, which is similar to
the maximization of her own payo. Observe that player two does not know the strategy
of player one. On the other hand, player one tries to maximize her own payo given a
strategy of player two. For both players, the resulting strategy has to be an element of
the corresponding feasible set. That means, we are searching for a Nash-equilibrium for
the general 2-player game, if there are more than one, we are looking for the one with the
lowest payo for player one.
Let us return to the idea of forming teams. Instead of forming a new game with only two
players, we consider a so-called team game.
Assume that we would still like to calculate the min-max-value for player one. So the
rst team consists of this player and the second team is formed by all the other players.
Or in words of Stengel and Koller ([44]), we have one team, which plays against a single
adversary. The payos for the team players are in our case equal and equivalent to the
negative of the payo from the adversary divided by the number of players in the team.
Under these assumptions, we are dealing with a zero-sum game { it is still an N -player
game. One may think that the determination of an equilibrium for a zero-sum team game
is equivalent to the determination of an equilibrium in a two-player zero-sum game, where
it is known that this game has an equilibrium which is easy to calculate. But unfortunately
this is not the case, the explanation therefor is given in [35] by Solan: \One could attempt
to analyze a team game as a two-player game by considering each team as a single player.
However, such a reduction misses an important feature of team games. Players on the
same team cannot necessarily correlate their actions. Therefore, viewing a team as a single
player adds new strategies to the game. In particular, an equilibrium in a team game
is not necessarily an equilibrium in the same game, where each team is considered as a
single player, and vice versa. Moreover, existence of an equilibrium in a team game does
not imply and neither is implied by the existence of an equilibrium in the corresponding
two-player game." In [35] it is shown that every absorbing team game has an equilibrium
payo and that there are "-equilibrium proles.
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Number of Nash-equilibria in one-step games
There exist several articles on the number of Nash-equilibria in nite games. Referring to
the number of equilibria in one-step games the following papers are of interest:
1. The maximal generic number of pure Nash equilibria
from McLennan ([25])
McLennan shows how the maximum number of pure Nash-equilibria can be esti-
mated. Trivially the maximum number of pure Nash-equilibria has the number of
possible action-combinations for the N players as upper bound { for the one-step
game corresponding to a quitting game this is 2N .
Denition 3.4.10 (thin). Let  v be a given one-step game corresponding to a quit-
ting game G =
 N ; (rS )S2P(N ). A subset E  f0; 1gN is called thin, if for all
p = (p1; : : : ; pN )T ; ~p = (~p1; : : : ; ~pN )T 2 E with p 6= ~p there are at least two players
n and m such that pn 6= ~pn and pm 6= ~pm .
The denition given here is based on the denition for \thin" stated in the paper (cf.
[25] p. 409).
Lemma 3.4.11. Let  v =
 
G ; v

be a given one-step game and E the set of pure
Nash-equilibria for  v . If r
n
S 6= rn~S holds for all players n 2 N and all S ; ~S 2 P(N ),
then E is thin. Furthermore the maximum number of element from E is 2N 1.
This lemma could be useful for the detection of all pure 0-equilibria in a one-step
game. Because if one has found one pure Nash-equilibria, one knows that if another
equilibrium exists it has to dier in at least two components from the found one.
This may lead to a reduction of the computational eort.
2. The maximal number of regular totally mixed Nash equilibria
from McKelvey ([23])
This article gives an estimate for the maximal number of regular (see [23] for the
denition of regular) totally mixed Nash-equilibria, where totally mixed means that
every action is chosen by the strategy with positive probability, i.e. in the context of
one-step games corresponding to a quitting game p 2 (0; 1)N . The following table
shows the maximum number of totally mixed Nash-equilibria for N -person one-step
games:
N 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
number Nash-equilibria 1 2 9 44 265 1854 14833 133496 1:3 106
3. The expected number of Nash equilibria of a normal form game
from McLennan ([26])
In this paper, a formula for the calculation of the expected number of Nash equilibria
for a so-called random game is presented. A random game is dened as game where,
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given the number of players and nonempty nite sets of pure strategies for the players,
the payos to the players are chosen randomly (see for example [1]).
Do I need all "-equilibria?
Assume that we want to test, if an instant "-equilibrium under punishment for player one
exists. Let the -min-max-value 1 be given. Then we rst have to determine all "-equilibria
for the reduced one-step game, given by  v :=
 
~N := N n f1g; (rS[f1g)S2P( ~N ); v := 0

. If
this game has innitely many "-equilibria, then we are in the situation, where a player m
and two vectors ~p1 and ~p2 exist, such that
 ~p m1 = ~p m2 and ~pm1 6= ~pm2 , i.e. the vectors ~p1 and ~p2 dier only in the component for
player m
 all vectors ~p := (1  )~p1 + ~p2 with  2 [0; 1] are "-equilibria in the given one-step
game,
 all other vectors p^ := (1  )~p1 + ~p2 with  2 R n [0; 1] are { if they are in [0; 1]N 1
{ no "-equilibrium in the given one-step game.
Then it is sucient to test, whether the vectors ~p1 and ~p2 generate an instant "-equilibrium
for player one in the quitting game. This follows immediately from the linearity of the
expected payo in a one-step game in the strategy of one player (see also Theorem 1.2.17
p. 19).
To answer the question: We do not need all "-equilibria, but we have to determine the
boundary proles and test them.
3.5. Stationary "-equilibria
A stationary "-equilibrium  = (pi)i2N for a given quitting game G = (N ; (rS )S2P(N ))
was dened as "-equilibrium, where  is a stationary strategy prole, i.e. pi = p1 for all
i 2 N. Resume, that the expected payo to the players under a stationary strategy prole
 = (p; p; : : :) can be calculated by
() =
X
S2P(N )
rS  %(p; S ) + %(p;?)  () = ()(p)
respectively
() =
(
0 for p = c
1
1 %(p;?)  0(p) otherwise
: (3.3)
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Furthermore the stationary strategy prole  is an "-equilibrium, if and only if
8n 2 N : n()  max
b2fc;qg
n
 
( n ;b)
  ": (3.4)
This implies in detail:
Corollary 3.5.1. Let G =
 N ; (rS )S2P(N ) be a given quitting game and "  0. A
stationary prole  = (p; p; : : :), p 2 [0; 1]N , is an (stationary) "-equilibrium in G if8>>><>>>:
rnfng  " for p = c
rnfng   " for p n = c n ^ pn 6= 0
n0 (p)  (1  %(p;?))

max
n
n0
 
(p n ;0)

1 %
 
(p n ;0);?
 ; n0  (p n ; 1)o  " for p n 6= c n
for all players n 2 N .
Proof. With (3.3) and (3.4), we immediately obtain the last case, and for p = c we have
n() = 0  1
1  % (c n ; 1);?  n0  (c n ; 1)  " = rnfng   ":
In the second case, i.e. p n = c n ^ pn 6= 0 formula (3.4) yields
n() =
pnrnfng
1  (1  pn) = r
n
fng  max

n
 
(c; c; : : :)

; n
 
( n ;q)
	  "
= max

0; rnfng
	  ";
hence rnfng   " has to hold.
Algorithm
The algorithm is based on a stepwise scanning of the set of all possible stationary strategy
proles  = (p; p; : : :), p 2 [0; 1]N , for a given quitting game G . Therefore the results are
depending on the chosen number of steps, here denoted by s 2 N.
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Algorithm 9: Search for a stationary "-equilibrium
Input : N , (rS )S2P(N ), ", s
Initialization: p := 0, eq:= true
(all players play continue)
for n = 1 to N do
if 0 < rnfng   " then eq:= false, exit loop
if eq 6= true then
(all the other cases)
forall the p 2 p 2 [0; 1]N j pn = k  1s ; k 2 f0; : : : ; sg; n 2 N	, p 6= 0 do
eq:= true
for n = 1 to N do
if p n = 0 n , pn 6= 0 then
if rnfng <  " then eq:= false, exit loop
else if n0 (p) < (1  %(p;?))

max
n
n0
 
(p n ;0)

1 %
 
(p n ;0);?
 ; n0  (p n ; 1)o  "
then eq:= false, exit loop
if eq = true then exit loop
Output : If eq = true then  := (p; p; : : :) is an stationary "-equilibrium in G , else no
stationary "-equilibria could be found for G with respect to the step size s.
qg stationary
qg stationary reads in a game in standard input format and tests with a stepwise search
in [0; 1]N , whether a stationary "-equilibrium exists under a given step size or not. The
input of the step size is as power of 2. The results of the program are stored in the le
results.txt. The program terminates, if one stationary "-equilibrium was found or after the
whole space was searched according to the given step size. In the rst case, the vector p
is given, in the second, the remark that no stationary "-equilibrium with the given " and
step size will be stated.
3.6. Cyclic "-equilibria
In this section, we want to discuss what is important for an algorithm that should detect
cyclic "-equilibria in a given quitting game. First we have a look at the theoretical back-
ground. As a basis of such an algorithm we can use for example Proposition 2.3.8 and the
following lemma, which is stated and proven here including  = 1 (cf. [31] for  2 (0; 1)).
Lemma 3.6.1. Let G =
 N ; (rS )S2P(N ) be a given quitting game, k 2 N,  > 0, "  0
and (p1; : : : ; pk) a sequence with pi 2 [0; 1]N , i 2 f1; : : : ; kg. Furthermore let v1 2 RN be
given and dene iteratively vi+1 := vi (pi), 8i 2 f1; : : : ; kg.
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Assume that for the sequences (p1; : : : ; pk) and (v1; : : : ; vk+1) the properties
 pi "-perfect in  vi = (G ; vi), 8i 2 f1; : : : ; kg,
  := 1 
kQ
i=1
%(pi ;?) 2 (0; 1] and
 kv1   vk+1k  
hold. Then for the strategy prole  := (pi)i2N := (pk ; : : : ; p1; pk ; : : : ; p1; : : :) in G we have:
1. G is terminating under every subgame strategy prole i and
2. pi is
 
"+ 


-perfect in  (i+1)
for all i 2 N.
Proof. 1.:
kY
i=1
%(pi ;?) = 1   2 [0; 1)
=)
kY
i=1
%(pi ;?) =
mY
j=1
(1  ) = (1  )m m!1 ! 0; k = k m; m 2 N
Since  is cyclic, this implies that the game terminates under every subgame prole i .
2.: Dene the sequence (vi)i2N := (vk ; : : : ; v1; vk ; : : : ; v1; : : :) and v0 := vk+1. The require-
ments of the lemma yield
 kv0   vkk  ,
 vi (pi) = vi 1, 8i 2 f1; : : : ; kg and
 pi "-perfect in  vi , 8i 2 f1; : : : ; kg.
It is left to show, that pi is
 
"+ 


-perfect in  (i+1), for all i 2 N, i.e. 8i 2 N 8n 2 N :8><>:
n(i+1)((p
 n
i ; 1))  n(i+1)((p ni ; 0))  "+  for pni = 0
n(i+1)((p
 n
i ; 1))  n(i+1)((p ni ; 0)) 2 [ "   ; "+  ] for pni 2 (0; 1)
n(i+1)((p
 n
i ; 1))  n(i+1)((p ni ; 0))   "   for pni = 1
:
Let n 2 N be a given player. First we prove the following three estimates:
n(i+1) (p ni ; 0)  nvi (p ni ; 0) (1:) n(i+1)  vni  (2:) n(1)  vnk  (3:)  (3.5)
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Estimate (1.) follows from:n(i+1) (p ni ; 0)  nvi (p ni ; 0)
=
 X
S2P(N )
rnS  %
 
(p ni ; 0); S

+ %
 
(p ni ; 0);?

n(i+1)
 
X
S2P(N )
rnS  %
 
(p ni ; 0); S
  % (p ni ; 0);?vni 
= %
 
(p ni ; 0);?
  n(i+1)  vni 
If %
 
(p ni ; 0);?

= 0, this immediately leads ton(i+1) (p ni ; 0)  nvi (p ni ; 0) = 0  ;
otherwise we haven(i+1) (p ni ; 0)  nvi (p ni ; 0)  n(i+1)  vni : (3.6)
Estimate (2.): We consider the expected payo under the subgame prole i+1. Because
 is cyclic, we obtain
(i+1) =
kX
j=(i+1)mod k
 X
S2P(N )
rS  %(pj ; S ) 
j 1Y
l=1
%(pl ;?)

+
kY
j=(i+1)mod k
%(pj ;?)(k+1)
=
kX
j=(i+1)mod k
 X
S2P(N )
rS%(pj ; S )
j 1Y
l=1
%(pl ;?)

+
kY
j=(i+1)mod k
%(pj ;?)(1);
(3.7)
for all i 2 N, where mod means the modulo operator. Especially for i = 1 and the case
 < 1, we get
(1) =
kX
j=1
 X
S2P(N )
rS  %(pj ; S ) 
j 1Y
l=1
%(pl ;?)

+
kY
j=1
%(pj ;?)(1)
=
kX
j=1
 X
S2P(N )
rS  %(pj ; S ) 
j 1Y
l=1
%(pl ;?)

+ (1  )(1)
=
1


kX
j=1
 X
S2P(N )
rS  %(pj ; S ) 
j 1Y
l=1
%(pl ;?)

: (3.8)
For  = 1,
kY
j=1
%(pj ;?) = 0 () 9j 2 f1; : : : ; kg : %(pj ;?) = 0
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which implies
(1) =
kX
j=1
 X
S2P(N )
rS  %(pj ; S ) 
j 1Y
l=1
%(pl ;?)

: (3.9)
Furthermore
vi = vi+1(pi+1) =
X
S2P(N )
rS  %(pi+1; S ) + %(pi+1;?)  vi+1
=
X
S2P(N )
rS  %(pi+1; S ) + %(pi+1;?)  vi+2(pi+2)
= : : :
=
kX
j=(i+1)mod k
 X
S2P(N )
rS  %(pj ; S ) 
j 1Y
l=1
%(pl ;?)

+
kY
j=(i+1)mod k
%(pj ;?)  vk (3.10)
holds for all i 2 N0, and especially for i = 0, we have
v0 =
kX
j=1
 X
S2P(N )
rS  %(pj ; S ) 
j 1Y
l=1
%(pl ;?)

+
kY
j=1
%(pj ;?)  vk
=
kX
j=1
 X
S2P(N )
rS  %(pj ; S ) 
j 1Y
l=1
%(pl ;?)

+ (1  )  vk ;
which implies
kX
j=1
 X
S2P(N )
rS  %(pj ; S ) 
j 1Y
l=1
%(pl ;?)

= v0   (1  )  vk : (3.11)
Consider now
n(i+1)  vni  from (3.6). With (3.7) and (3.10), we getn(i+1)  vni 
=
 kX
j=(i+1)mod k
 X
S2P(N )
rnS  %(pj ; S )
j 1Y
l=1
%(pl ;?)

+
kY
j=(i+1)mod k
%(pj ;?)n(1)
 
kX
j=(i+1)mod k
 X
S2P(N )
rnS  %(pj ; S ) 
j 1Y
l=1
%(pl ;?)

 
kY
j=(i+1)mod k
%(pj ;?)  vnk

=
 kY
j=(i+1)mod k
%(pj ;?)n(1) 
kY
j=(i+1)mod k
%(pj ;?)  vnk

=
kY
j=(i+1)mod k
%(pj ;?) 
n(1)  vnk   n(1)  vnk :
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Estimate (3.): Using (3.8) respectively (3.9) and (3.11) gives us
n(1)  vnk  =
1 
kX
j=1
 X
S2P(N )
rnS  %(pj ; S ) 
j 1Y
l=1
%(pl ;?)

  vnk

=
1 vn0   (1  )  vnk   vnk

=
1  (vn0   vnk )
  
and consequently (3.5).
Now we are able to show, that pi is
 
"+ 


-perfect in  (i+1). Consider
n(i+1)((p
 n
i ; 1))  n(i+1)((p ni ; 0)):
Since
n(i+1)
 
(p ni ; 1)

=
X
S2P(N )
rnS  %
 
(p ni ; 1); S

= nvi
 
(p ni ; 1)

for all i 2 N, one obtains
n(i+1)((p
 n
i ; 1))  n(i+1)((p ni ; 0))
= nvi
 
(p ni ; 1)
  n(i+1) (p ni ; 0)
= nvi
 
(p ni ; 1)
  nvi (p ni ; 0)+ nvi (p ni ; 0)  n(i+1) (p ni ; 0):
Due to the fact that pi is "-perfect in  vi for p
n
i = 0,
n(i+1)((p
 n
i ; 1))  n(i+1)((p ni ; 0))  "+ nvi
 
(p ni ; 0)
  n(i+1) (p ni ; 0)
holds and with (3.5)
n(i+1)
 
(p ni ; 1)
  n(i+1) (p ni ; 0)  "+ 
follows for all i 2 N. For pni 2 (0; 1), one obtains analogously
n(i+1)((p
 n
i ; 1))  n(i+1)
 
(p ni ; 0)
   "  

and
n(i+1)((p
 n
i ; 1))  n(i+1)
 
(p ni ; 0)
  "+ 

respectively for pni = 1
n(i+1)((p
 n
i ; 1))  n(i+1)
 
(p ni ; 0)
   "  

:
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Algorithm
According to Lemma 3.6.1, a rst algorithm for the detection of cyclic "-equilibria could
be formulated in the following way:
Algorithm 10: Search for a cycle
Input : N , (rS )S2P(N ), " 2 (0; 1),  2 (0; 1), initial value vk 2 convfrS jS 2 P(N )g,
maximum number of iterations l 2 N
Initialization: k := 1, cycle:= false
while k  l and cycle = false do
1 Determine E"(vk ) :=

p 2 [0; 1]N p "-perfect in  vk and %(p;?) < 1	 (for example
with Algorithm 7) and F"(vk ) :=

vk (p)
p 2 E"(vk )	.
2 if E"(vk ) 6= ? then
forall the v 2 F"(vk ) do
if kv1   vk   then
cycle:= true
vk+1 := v
choose pk 2

p 2 E"(vk )
vk (p) = vk+1	
exit loop
if cycle 6= true then
choose pk 2 E"(vk )
vk+1 := vk (pk )
k := k + 1
Output : If cycle = true then p1; p2; : : : ; pk 1 dene a cyclic for the given quitting
game,  and ", else no cycle could be found in l iterations.
We illustrate the workow of the algorithm with an example.
Example 7. Consider the example by Flesh, Thuijsmann and Vrieze (cf. [14]), which is
given by (see Example4.txt, Appendix B)
Player 3 c Player 2 Player 3 q Player 2
c q c q
Player 1
c
q
	
(1; 3; 0)
(0; 1; 3)
(1; 0; 1)
Player 1
c
q
(3; 0; 1)
(0; 1; 1)
(1; 1; 0)
(0; 0; 0)
c represents the action continue and q the action quit.
We choose as input N = 3, (rS )S2P(N ) as given in the tabular, " = 10 6,  = 10 6,
v1 := (1; 2; 1)
T and l = 100. Assume that we compute the set E"(vk) with help of a
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modied version6 of Algorithm 7 with step size s = 1=8.
First we set k := 1 and obtain with the mentioned algorithm the following sets
E"(v1) =
8<:
0@ 00
0:125
1A ;
0@ 00
0:25
1A ;
0@ 00
0:375
1A ;
0@ 00
0:5
1A9=;
and
F"(v1) =
8<:
0@ 1:251:75
1
1A ;
0@ 1:51:5
1
1A ;
0@ 1:751:25
1
1A ;
0@ 21
1
1A9=;
Since E"(v1) 6= ?, we test all v 2 F"(v1) according to Step 2 of the algorithm and note
that no v exists, such that kv1   vk  . We decide to choose p1 := (0; 0; 0:5)T , implying
that v2 := (2; 1; 1)
T . Furthermore we set k := 2, which is lower than l = 100, hence we
go to Step 1 of the algorithm. We get
E"(v2) =
8<:
0@ 00:125
0
1A ;
0@ 00:25
0
1A ;
0@ 00:375
0
1A ;
0@ 00:5
0
1A9=;
and
F"(v2) =
8<:
0@ 1:751
1:25
1A ;
0@ 1:51
1:5
1A ;
0@ 1:251
1:75
1A ;
0@ 11
2
1A9=;
Again E"(v2) 6= ? holds and no v 2 F"(v2) exists with kv1   vk  . Therefore we take
p2 := (0; 0:5; 0)
T , v3 := (1; 1; 2)
T and increase k to 3. Going back to Step 1 yields
E"(v3) =
8<:
0@ 0:1250
0
1A ;
0@ 0:250
0
1A ;
0@ 0:3750
0
1A ;
0@ 0:50
0
1A9=;
and
F"(v3) =
8<:
0@ 11:25
1:75
1A ;
0@ 11:5
1:5
1A ;
0@ 11:75
1:25
1A ;
0@ 12
1
1A9=; 6= ?:
6Instead of "-equilibria for one-step games, we are testing for "-perfect proles in the one-step game.
So one has to change the rst if-statement of Algorithm 7 and replace it with the requirements for
"-perfect proles.
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Now a vector v 2 F"(v3) exists such that kv1   vk = 0  . The corresponding p3 is given
by (0:5; 0; 0)T , and we have v4 := v1 = (1; 2; 1)
T . Hence the algorithm terminates here {
since we have to set cycle = true in the algorithm. The output is
p3 =
0@ 0:50
0
1A ; p2 =
0@ 00:5
0
1A ; p1 =
0@ 00
0:5
1A :
With help of Lemma 3.6.1 and Proposition 2.3.8 it turns out, that
 :=
0@0@ 0:50
0
1A ;
0@ 00:5
0
1A ;
0@ 00
0:5
1A ;
0@ 0:50
0
1A ; : : :
1A
is at least an
 
max(~"^; "^)

-equilibrium, where "^ = 10 6 + kv1 v4k
0:875106 = 10
 6:
Discussion
Although the algorithm works well for our example, several questions respectively problems
arise during or after the execution. Before one starts with the implementations of an
program referring to that algorithm, one should answer the following questions:
1. How to choose the initial value?
2. How can the sets E"() and F"() be computed?
3. What happens, if E"() is empty? This only occurs, if p = 0 is the sole "-perfect
strategy prole in the one-step game  vk . Instead of stopping the algorithm in that
case, one may go one (or more) iteration of the algorithm backward and choose
another vk respectively another pk 2 E"(vk 1). How to realize this?
4. The cycle does not need to start with the initial value. Is it possible to formulate
and implement an alternative test for a cycle?
5. In all cases, where jE"(vk)j > 1, we have a selection problem, if we should choose a
pk arbitrarily.
6. Suppose that the algorithm could nd a cycle and terminates. The output is a
sequence of vectors pk 1; : : : ; p1. What kind of "^-equilibrium is generated by this
sequence? Respectively how to evaluate the results?
We consider some of these questions in detail and start with the rst one.
Initial value
Which initial value v1 would be the best? Or do there exist any criteria for good initial
values?
127
Chapter 3. Basic algorithms and software
Example 8. Assume that we choose v1 := (0; 0; 0)
T as initial value, instead of (1; 2; 1)T
in the prior example. One possible sequence of sets E"() and F"(), produced by the
algorithm in Step 1, could be:
E"(v1) =
8<:p1 :=
0@ 0:2929690:292969
0:292969
1A9=; and F"(v1) =
8<:v2 :=
0@ 0:6948850:694885
0:694885
1A9=; ;
E"(v2) =
8<:p2 :=
0@ 0:1210940:121094
0:121094
1A ;
0@ 0:1250:125
0:125
1A ;
0@ 0:1289060:128906
0:128906
1A9=;
and
F"(v2) =
8<:v3 :=
0@ 0:8717260:871726
0:871726
1A ;
0@ 0:8756750:875675
0:875675
1A ;
0@ 0:879520:87952
0:87952
1A9=; ;
E"(v3) =
8<:
0@ 0:0546880:054688
0:054688
1A ;
0@ 0:0585940:058594
0:058594
1A ;
0@ 0:06250:0625
0:0625
1A9=; ;
and
F"(v3) =
8<:
0@ 0:937520:93752
0:93752
1A ;
0@ 0:9414740:941474
0:941474
1A ;
0@ 0:945330:94533
0:94533
1A9=; ; : : :
It is obvious, that the initial value (0; 0; 0)T is not as good as the initial value (1; 2; 1)T .
Unfortunately a good a priori recommendation can not be given yet, but we can get, with
a precalculation, a smaller set than the convex hull Ic (cf. Denition 2.4.3 of feasible, p.
92), from where the vectors v1 should be taken from. Therefore we observe that
 at least one "-perfect vector p 2 [0; 1]N should exist in the one-step game  v1 with
%(p;?) < 1 and
 for all players n, the continue payo vn1 should be bigger than the min-max value n
or at least bigger than n   ", i.e. vn1 should be "-rational (cf. Denition 2.4.3) .
To the rst point: Using Theorem 1.2.24 (see p. 27), we dene f : [0; 1)N ! RN , where
p 7! f (p) =  f1(p); : : : fN (p) and
fn(p) :=
n0
 
(p n ; 1)
  n0  (p n ; 0)
%
 
(p n ; 0);?
 ; n 2 N :
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This leads to the set
I" :=

v 2 RN
vn 2 fn(p)  "
%
 
(p n ; 0);?
 ; fn(p) + "
%
 
(p n ; 0);?
; n 2 N ;
p 2 [0; 1)N ; %(p;?) < 1

:
Observe that p 2 [0; 1)N is used in the denition of I", i.e. we exclude all probability
vectors p, where at least one player plays quit with certainty. This is no restriction, if
we can exclude instant "-equilibria { or if we are only interested in a cyclic "-equilibrium
detected by the algorithm, which is not an instant one.
Suppose that the algorithm detects a cycle with length l of vectors (pk)k2f1;:::;lg, where at
least one vector exists, such that pmk = 1 for at least one player m 2 N . Proposition
2.3.8 gives us, that the prole generated by the sequence of this vectors is a subgame "-
equilibrium. Hence the shifted prole starting with the column vector pk is an "-equilibrium
as well. But it is also an instant-equilibrium for G , which can be found for example by the
algorithm stated in Section 3.4.3.
The set I" combined with the requirements, that the initial value should be feasible, and
"-rationality leads to a set I as set of good initial values v1, where
I := I" [ Ic [ fv 2 RN jvn  n ; n 2 Ng:
Example 9. We illustrate the achieved restriction with the following two-player one-step
game:
Player 2
continue quit
Player 1
continue
quit
(v1; v2)
( 1 ; 1 )
( 0:5; 1 )
( 1 ; 7 )
For simplication choose " = 0. The function f is given by
f (p) =

f1(p)
f2(p)

=
0BB@
1  1:5p2
1  p2
1  7p1
1  p1
1CCA for p = (p1; p2)T 2 [0; 1)2:
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Consider the graphs of f1 and f2:
graph of f1 graph of f2
They show that for all vectors in the convex hull Ic a 0-perfect prole exists. Observe that
because of %((0; 0)T ;?) = 0, the vector (1; 1)T is no element of I0. In the next picture, the
convex hull Ic together with the set of all feasible vectors v are repesented. One can see
that the greatest restriction to the set of the initial values I comes from the postulation
that the vectors should be feasible (remember that we only regarded 0-feasible vectors).
Computation of E"() and F"()
Since every one-step game has a Nash-equilibrium, every one-step game has a 0-perfect
prole as well. That means the sets E"(vk) and F"(vk) are empty, if and only if p = 0
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is the only "-perfect strategy prole in the one-step game  vk . If we forget the condition
%(p;?) < 1 and focus only on Nash-equilibria for the given one-step game, the Step 3. of
the algorithm is equal to determining (if possible) all Nash-equilibria of that game. This
could be done for example using of Algorithm 7 or Gambit (cf. 4.2). Hints for the use of
Gambit are given in the next chapter. For "-perfect proles in general, one may modify
the Algorithm 7 and has to think about the best step size. Furthermore with the same
thoughts like in the previous point, we can restrict the set, in which the "-perfect proles
have to be searched. For an illustration we use again Example 9.
Example 10 (Continuation of Example 9). We consider again the graphs of f1 and f2,
now under the aspect, that the continue-payos for the players have to be "-feasible (here
" = 0).
graph of f1 graph of f2
with dotted line at 1 =  0:5 with dotted line at 2 =  1.
The dotted lines represent the lower bound of the continue-payo for player one respectively
player two, which is their min-max value. The graph of f1 implies, that for p
2 > 3=4 the
continue-payo v 1 of player one has to be lower than the min-max value of that player,
to achieve, that a prole p = (p1; p2)T with the strategy p2 for player two is 0-perfect in
 f (p) = (G ; f (p)). On the other hand, the graph of f2, which only depends on p
1, shows
that for p1 > 1=4 the continue-payo for player two has to be smaller than  1 in order to
let p = (p1; p2)T be 0-perfect in  f (p). Payos less than  0:5 for player one respectively
less than  1 for player two are not feasible (in the sense of Denition 2.4.3).
Consequently we can delimit the set in which we search for 0-perfect proles p here from
[0; 1)2 to [0; 0:25] [0; 0:75].
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Evaluation of the result
Let G be a given quitting game such that rnfng  0 for all n 2 N . Assume that the
algorithm terminates because a cycle was detected. Denote with (v1; : : : ; vk+1) the sequence
of continue-payo vectors and with (p1; : : : ; pk), k 2 N, the corresponding sequence of
proles for the one-step games obtained with the algorithm. Then
 kv1   vk+1k  ,
 vi (pi) = vi+1 for all i 2 f1; : : : ; kg and
 pi "-perfect in  vi , for all i 2 f1; : : : ; kg.
Using Lemma 3.6.1, we obtain that the strategy prole  = (pi)i2N := (pk ; : : : ; p1; pk ; : : :)
for the given quitting game G has the following properties:
1. G is terminating under every subgame strategy prole i , i 2 N.
2. pi is
 
"+ 


-perfect in  (i+1), 8i 2 f1; : : : ; kg.
For ("+ =) 2 [0; 1) Proposition 2.3.8 nally implies, that  is a subgame ~"^-equilibrium,
or a stationary "^-equilibrium exists in G , where
"^ := "+


~"^ := 2"^
1 b d + 4"^1 b + 15rmax  "^a + "^ and
"^ := "^+ 2rmax ("^+ "^
b a + "^a + 4  "^b);
with a; b; d 2 (0; 1), b > a, d > a and (1  "^a)1="^d  "^.
If " + =  1, then Proposition 2.3.8 can not be used. Maybe a change of the input
parameters of the algorithm { for example a smaller  { leads to a more \successful"
output.
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Parallel computation, Gambit and
PHCpack
In the previous chapter we are mainly focused on nding one sample "-equilibrium of a spe-
cial kind for a given quitting game. For some reasons, especially in economics, it might be
useful to nd all, or as many as possible, "-equilibria. The sequential execution of a brute-
force algorithm respectively of an algorithm which is NP-hard has its limitations in the
time. The only way to analyze games with more than three or four players and a small step
size in an acceptable time is to use high performance computing. Therefore we present in
the rst section of this chapter two parallel programs, namely the parallel implementations
of algorithms for the detection of instant, respectively, stationary "-equilibria.
Furthermore we want to mention two software packages, which are often used in game
theory. We already referred to the rst one at the end of Section 3.4.2, it is a library
of game theory software called Gambit and can be used for the computation of Nash-
equilibria in one-step games. In Section 4.1 we give a brief summary about the algorithms
which are implemented there. The second software which is often used to determine Nash-
equilibria in games is PHCpack. It is even applied by Gambit to nd all Nash-equilibria of
a given one-step game. In Section 4.3 we show how it can be used to determine stationary
Nash-equilibria for a given quitting game.
4.1. Parallel computation
For some applications it might be useful to know not only one, but all or as much as possi-
ble "-equilibria. For this we provide a parallel version of the programs for the detection of
instant and stationary "-equilibria1. On the other hand, { motivated by Theorem 2.4.6 by
Simon { it would be good to have algorithms, which could exclude instant or stationary
1Since both algorithms together nd also pure "-equilibria, we waive a parallel version of the corresponding
program.
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approximate equilibria. We cannot exclude those equilibria with the implemented algo-
rithms, but we can get a feeling if a given game might have such equilibria or not and may
prove the non-existence then in a theoretical way.
Both mentioned algorithms are based on a step wise search of the space [0; 1]N 1 respec-
tively [0; 1]N , i.e. we are concerning a grind on that space and test all grid-points if they
are an "-equilibrium or not, with respect to the regarded structure.
For the implementation we use MPI (Message Passing Interface)2. The number of pro-
cessors, which should be used for the execution of the program is given by the user {
or the system the user works with. Each processor in a message passing system runs a
sub-program, which is written here in Fortran 90. The communication between the pro-
cessors is usually expensive referring to the time, so that we restrict it to a minimum. At
the beginning of both programs one process reads in the number of players, the payo,
the step size, the " and the maximal number of results which should be stored from each
process. After that this process sends the data to the others. The distribution of the work
happens over a segmentation of the space concerning the rst player. At the end of each
program one process is collecting the results from the others and writes them out in the
le results.txt.
We run the programs on the SGI Altix 4700 from the ZIH at the Technical Univer-
sity in Dresden. The SGI Altix is featured with 1024 dual-core Intel Itanium proces-
sors with 1.6 GHz and 1GB memory per core. For more information on the system see
http://tu-dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/zentrale_einrichtungen/zih.
The performance of these programs is analyzed with Vampir, a graphical analysis frame-
work that provides a large set of dierent chart representations of event based performance
data generated through source code instrumentation (see www.vampir.eu).
Parallel search for instant-"-equilibria
The program is based on Algorithm 8, where the calculation of the used min-max-values is
done with a parallel version of Algorithm 6. The search for the instant "-equilibria under
the grid points is based on the test used in Algorithm 7, where we use parallel programming
as well.
First we use the parallel program for the detection of instant "-equilibria to determine
those equilibria for a three-player quitting game, from which we know that it has instant
"-equilibria. The input le for the example is given in the Appendix in Example5.txt. We
chose as step size 12, i.e. 212 steps, " = 0:0001 and want at maximum 100 results per cpu.
The performance is analyzed with Vampir, where we are interested in:
 the total time, which is the sum of the time from each cpu,
2For an introduction to MPI see for example [28].
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 the time for the approximation of the min-max-values3,
 the time which is needed to test all grid points, if they form an instant "-equilibrium
 the time which is needed for the execution of the MPI commands and
 the time which is needed for the generation of the trace les for the performance
analysis.
Example5.txt
cpu's total time time min-max-value time eq. search MPI VT API
1 205.19s 113.67s 91.51s <10ms {
4 236.56s 28.53s 39.61s 18.36s 17.94s
8 240.11s 14.24s 19.81s <1s 32.24s
We see, that the total time is slightly increasing, which is because of the communication
of the cpu's on the one side and the generation of the trace les on the other. The time for
the approximation of the min-max-values as well as the time for the search of equilibria
is decreasing with the number of cpu's, the time for the approximation of the min-max-
value nearly proportional. The behavior of the time for the equilibrium test is due to the
maximum number of results. Consider the chart below, which is produced with Vampir :
Process 2 is the rst that nishes the equilibrium test (after 12.60s), because it reaches the
maximum number of results that should be stored. It has to wait for the other processes
in order to collect the results from all.
Now consider a four-player game. We take the example studied by Solan and Vieille in
[37] (see Example6.txt in Appendix B). We know that this example has no instant "-
equilibrium for " suciently small. We choose as step size 8 (i.e. 28 steps), " = 0:001 and
a maximal amount of 100 equilibria per cpu.
3The time stated in the tables is the longest time for the execution of the approximation part, the time
varies from process to process (the same holds for the execution time of the equilibrium test).
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Example6.txt
cpu's total time time min-max-value time eq. search MPI VT API
1 771.90s 357.58s 413.93s < 10ms {
4 823.45s 90.45s 115.06s 4.86s 45.74s
8 839.50s 45.87s 58.85s 11.01s 55.16s
(now: step size 10 (i.e. 210 steps))
16 52722.06s 1442.79s 1851.58s 359.3s 3367.2s
Parallel search for stationary "-equilibria
The program for the parallel detection of stationary "-equilibria is based on Algorithm
9. First we examine a three-player quitting game, where we know that it has stationary
"-equilibria (see Example7.txt, Appendix B). We chose step size 12 (i.e. 212 steps), " =
0:0001 and want at most 100 results per cpu. With Vampir we get:
Example7.txt
cpu's total time time eq. search MPI VT API
1 338.06s 337.77s <10ms {
4 3481.57s 870.18s 538.78s 564.89s
8 3586.96s 447.83s 133.9s 595.93s
16 3618.67s 225.78s 19.00s 377.55s
The chart for 8 cpu's is the following:
The rst four processes are nishing the equilibrium test rst because they reach the
maximum limit of results they should store, and have to wait for the last four processes in
order to collect the results.
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At the end of this section we want to test the parallel program for stationary "-equilibria
on the same four-player example like in the previous section (see Example6.txt, Appendix
B), for which it is known, that no stationary "-equilibrium exists for " suciently small.
With Vampir we get:
Example7.txt
cpu's total time time eq. search MPI VT API
1 30352.58s 30348.66s <10ms {
4 30706.32s 7676.04s 211.35s 254.02s
8 31569.08s 3947.19s 208.12s 1124.02s
16 33086.32s 2067.40s 191.93s 2556.74s
In comparison to the chart for Example6.txt we have the following:
No stationary "-equilibrium could be found, so all processes have to scan their whole grid
and are nishing their jobs relatively simultaneous.
4.2. Gambit
As mentioned before, Gambit is a library of game theory software. It is Open Source soft-
ware and provides a graphical user interface, a library of C++ source code for representing
games, suitable for use in other applications and a Python API for scripting applications.
A historical overview over the development of Gambit can be found at the web page of
the Gambit project [24] or in the paper [39] written by Turocy, who is one of the principal
developers of Gambit. In this section we give a short overview on the tools which are usable
for the calculation of Nash-equilibria in one-step games. Observe that no "-equilibria are
considered where " > 0.
We start with the computation of a sample Nash-equilibrium. This could be used for
example to get an equilibrium for a quitting game with dominant strategies, where at least
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one player has quit as dominant strategy. I.e. if the program qg dominant detects a
dominant strategy for a given quitting game, the output is the player with the dominant
strategy and the corresponding reduced game, which is a one-step game, if the dominant
strategy for the player is quit. For that reduced game we can use the following command-
line tools from Gambit.
Computation of a sample Nash-equilibrium
Using a global Newton method { gambit-gnm
Gambit provides a method for the computation of Nash equilibria using a global Newton
method, introduced by Srihari Govindan and Robert Wilson ([16]). The algorithm is
a generalization of the Lemke-Howson algorithm to N -person games and based on the
structure theorem of Kohlberg and Mertens ([21]). In [19], the algorithm is briey explained
as follows: \They indicate that one of the implications of the structure theorem of Kohlberg
an Mertens is that, above each generic ray emanating from the game of interest (represented
as a point in a Euclidian space), the graph of the equilibrium correspondence is a one-
dimensional manifold. Moreover, at sucient distance from the relevant game there is a
unique equilibrium. Therefore, starting from a suciently distant game along any generic
ray, one can trace the line segment to the relevant game, tracing the one-dimensional
manifold of equilibria along the way, to nd an equilibrium of the game of interest at
the terminus. Govindan and Wilson propose to trace the manifold using a global Newton
method."
Using iterated polymatrix approximation { gambit-ipa
The algorithm for the computation of Nash-equilibria using iterated polymatrix approxi-
mation is presented in the paper [17] by Govindan and Wilson. It is based on the previous
algorithm, but polymatrix approximations are used to increase the speed of the algo-
rithm.
Using simplicial subdivision { gambit-simpdiv
We cite from [24]: \This program implements the algorithm of van der Laan, Talman,
and van Der Heyden ([41]). The algorithm proceeds by constructing a triangulated grid
over the space of mixed strategy proles, and uses a path-following method to compute
an approximate xed point. This approximate xed point can then be used as a starting
point on a renement of the grid. The program continues this process with ner and ner
grids until locating a mixed strategy prole at which the maximum regret is small."
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Remark 4.2.1. In a test, we used a one-step game corresponding to a quitting game,
which is presented in [14]. The game is given by:
Player 3 c Player 2 Player 3 q Player 2
c q c q
Player 1
c
q
(1; 2; 1)
(1; 3; 0)
(0; 1; 3)
(1; 0; 1)
Player 1
c
q
(3; 0; 1)
(0; 1; 1)
(1; 1; 0)
(0; 0; 0)
The computed Nash-equilibria using the three methods mentioned before are:
 Global Newton method
p = (0; 1:00012e   012; 0:5)
 Iterated polymatrix approximation
no result
 Simplicial subdivision
p = (0; 0; 0)
Computation of all Nash-equilibria with Gambit
Sometimes it may be not enough to know only one Nash-equilibrium. If we are interested in
instant equilibria, for example, we need to know all Nash-equilibria. Gambit uses therefore
a method called \Enumeration of supports".
\Enumeration of supports" { gambit-enumpoly
The method \Enumeration of supports" is described in [39] written by Turocy and im-
plemented in Gambit. It goes back to a computer program published by Dickhaut and
Kaplan ([10]). We explain the main steps of the algorithm in the context of one-step
games corresponding to quitting games.
We need some denitions rst:
Denition 4.2.2. Let  v =
 N = (1; : : : ;N ); (rS )S2P(N ); v be a given one-step game.
 A pure strategy ~pn 2 f0; 1g for player n 2 N is called dominated if:
8p = (p1; : : : ; pN ) 2 f0; 1gN ; pn 6= ~pn : nv (p) > nv
 
(p n ; ~pn)

:
 The set A(p) := a = (a1; : : : ; aN ) 2 f0; 1gN : % p; fn 2 N ; an = 1g > 0	 is called
support set of  v with respect to p, i.e. A(p) contains all action-vectors, which are
played with positive probability under the given prole p.
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 The set A := a 2 A(p) : p is an Nash-equilibrium in  v	 is called the equilibrium-
support set of  v .
 Let Ai , i 2 f1; : : : ; 3Ng be a possible support set for a given one-step game  v . An
action (respectively a pure strategy) a 2 Ani for player n 2 N is called admissible, if
nv
 
(p n ; ~pn)
  nv  (p n ; a) 8 ~pn 2 f0; 1gN ; p 2 Ai
holds. Furthermore the set Ai is admissible, if all sets A
n
i , n 2 N , are admissible.
The algorithm now works as follows:
1. Elimination of dominated strategies.
In the rst step, all dominated strategies are eliminated. This leads to a reduced
game, which has the same Nash-equilibria like the original game.
2. Enumeration of all possible equilibrium-support sets.
We consider a one-step game without dominated strategies and enumerate all possible
support sets. For a one-step game with N players, there exist 3N dierent support
sets. Observe that a support set must contain at least one action for each player. All
support sets, where the players have only one possible action available, correspond to
pure strategies as equilibrium, which is easy to test. The remaining 3N   2N support
sets apart from one dene new games with less players than the given game. This
reduces the computational eort for the analysis.
By another precalculation, one excludes support sets, which contain strategies that
are:
a) \dominated from the inside", i.e. if the support set is not admissible (this case
only occurs, if a player has the actions quit and continue in her support) or
b) \dominated from the outside", that means, a player n 2 N and an action
respectively a pure strategy a 2 Ani , i 2 f1; : : : ; 3Ng, exists, such that a is
dominated by another action ~a 2 f0; 1g n Ani for all p = a 2 Ai (this case only
occurs, if a player as only one action available in her support).
3. Calculation of equilibria for the possible support set and testing the obtained equi-
libria in the context of the given one-step game.
We consider only admissible support sets. Assume that at least one player has both
actions available. Then the support sets dene reduced one-step games4. For these
games we have to determine all totally mixed Nash-equilibria { observe that we
consider 0-equilibria. Therefore one can rewrite the Nash-equilibrium conditions for
p in terms of polynomial equations. This is explained very well by Datta in [8] for
games in general. The resulting polynomial equations are now solvable for example
with PHCpack a software for solving polynomial systems (see the next Section and
[42] or [7]), which is also used by Gambit.
4If no player has at least two actions available we are in the case, where we consider a pure strategy.
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Remark 4.2.3. The computed Nash-equilibria applying gambit-enumpoly to the previous
example (see Remark 4.2.1) are: p = (0; 0; 0) and p = (0; 0; 0:5).
We briey mention some aspects of a parallel implementation of the algorithm.
Parallel Computation
An algorithm for the computation of all Nash-equilibria using polynomial equations and the
enumeration of the support set can easily be implemented in parallel, because each support
set forms an independent problem. Such an algorithm was realized by Widger and Grosu.
The results are stated in [45]. In comparison with the (sequential) algorithm implemented
in Gambit, their algorithm does not contain any check for dominated strategies or for the
admissibility of the support sets. It is to expect that they can improve the performance by
using this precalculations. Furthermore it is recommendable to check rst, if the solution
of the polynomial equations sums up to one, instead of checking the Nash-equilibrium
conditions for the (pure) strategies that are not in the actual support set.
Application of this method in the context of instant equilibria
Determining all Nash-equilibria with help of \Enumeration of the supports" using of poly-
nomial equations may be more ecient than the method used from us in the previous
chapter. But it is somehow problematic in the general case, since this method fails if the
one-step game is not generic, that means, if there exists a strategy prole, where the payo
to at least on player is independent of the strategy played by her.
Example 11. Consider Example 7. For the one-step game  v1 with v1 = (1; 2; 1)
T , the
routine gambit-enumpoly, which should compute all Nash-equilibria for a given one-step
game, has only (0; 0; 0)T and (0; 0; 0:5)T as result. The equilibria (0; 0; )T ,  2 (0; 0:5),
are not listed.
4.3. PHCpack
As mentioned in the previous section, PHCpack is a solver for polynomial systems (see
[42]). It is available on the web page of Jan Verschelde (http://hompages.math.uic.edu/
~jan/. PHCpack uses homotopy continuation to compute numerically approximations to
all isolated complex solutions of a polynomial system.
In the context of quitting games, it is usable for the computation of stationary Nash-
equilibria in totally mixed strategies.
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Calculation of stationary Nash-equilibria using PHCpack
In this section we consider a given quitting game G and want to nd out, whether it has
a stationary Nash-equilibrium in totally mixed strategies or not. Therefore we can use the
approach by Solan and Vieille, stated in [37]: Assume that  = (p; p; : : :) is a stationary
Nash-equilibrium in totally mixed strategies in G , i.e. p 2 (0; 1)N . Then with Lemma
1.4.8 (see p. 40) we have
n() = n
 
( n ; c)

= n
 
( n ;q)

for all players n 2 N . Since
n
 
( n ;q)

= n0
 
(p n ; 1)

and
n
 
( n ; c)

= nn (( n ;c))
 
(p n ; 0)

= n0
 
(p n ; 0)

+ %
 
(p n ; 0);?

n0
 
(p n ; 1)

we get the following system of polynomial equations:
0 = n0
 
(p n ; 0)

+ %
 
(p n ; 0);?

n0
 
(p n ; 1)
  n0  (p n ; 1)
=
X
S2P(Nnfng)
%
 
(p n ; 0); S
 
rnS   rnS[fng

+
X
S2P(Nnfng)
%
 
(p n ; 0);?

%
 
(p n ; 0); S

rnS[fng;
where %
 
(p n ; 0); S

are squarefree monomials and %
 
(p n ; 0);?

%
 
(p n ; 0); S

are not
squarefree monomials (see e.g. [8]).
The resulting system of equations is the input in PHCpack. How the input le has to look
like is explained in the tutorial provided at the webpage by Jan Verschelde. The output of
the so called blackbox solver of PHCpack consits of the approximated isolated solutions of
the system, the order of the variables is the same order in which they appeared in the input
equations. Since the solutions are complex numbers one has to test all of them, in order
to identify those, which are real and element of (0; 1)N . The resulting solutions generate
totally mixed stationary Nash-equilibria in the given quitting game5.
Example 12. Consider the three player example from Example 7 again. In order to detect
all totally mixed stationary Nash-equilibria of this game we have to consider the following
system of polynomial equations:
0 =  p1 + 2p2 + (p2)2   p1(p2)2
0 =  p3 + 2p1 + (p1)2   (p1)2p3
0 =  p2 + 2p3 + (p3)2   p2(p3)2
5For a discussion on the performance of PHCpack see for example [7], observe that Datta only considers
one-step games.
142
4.3. PHCpack
where the rst formula comes from player three, the second one from the second player
and the third from player one. The output from PHC are 27 solutions, we state here the
rst 3:
a : 4.82295559478865E-01 8.76008557781811E-01
b : 2.95326778355902E-01 9.55396302057907E-01
c : -9.94370944777199E-01 1.05954821423568E-01
a : 4.82295559478865E-01 8.76008557781811E-01
b : 2.95326778355902E-01 9.55396302057907E-01
c : 4.05425905382346E-01 -9.14127909673972E-01
a : 4.82295559478865E-01 8.76008557781811E-01
b : 2.95326778355902E-01 9.55396302057907E-01
c : 5.88945039394853E-01 8.08173088250404E-01
a = p1, b = p2 and c = p3. As expected no real solution in (0; 1)3 exists, which conrms
the assertion by Flesch et al. in [14].
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Overview: Frequent calculations
This chapter gives a short overview of the used decompositions, which are not proven yet.
For completeness we will explain respectively deduce them here.
For one-step games
First we consider the function % : [0; 1]N  P(N )  ! [0; 1], where
(p; S ) 7 ! %(p; S ) =
Y
n22S
pn 
Y
m2NnS
(1  pm):
Then X
S2P(Nnfng)
%
 
(p n ; 1); S [ fng = X
S2P(Nnfng)
%
 
(p n ; 0); S

= 1 (A.1)
follows for all n 2 N .
Let n 2 N be a given player. For the probability, that at least one player m 2 N n fng
plays the action quit under the strategy prole p in the one-step game  v , we haveX
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p n ; 1); S [ fng = X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p n ; 0); S

: (A.2)
We used this function mainly for the calculation of the expected payos. Observe for
example the expected payo v from a one-step game  v , v 2 RN , under the strategy
prole p:
v(p) = p
n  v
 
(p n ; 1)

+ (1  pn)  v
 
(p n ; 0)

; (A.3)
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where we can write alternatively
v
 
(p n ; 1)

=
X
S2P(N )
%
 
(p n ; 1); S
  rS
=
X
S2P(Nnfng)
%
 
(p n ; 1); S [ fng  rS[fng
=
X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p n ; 1); S [ fngrS[fng + % (p n ; 1); fngrfng
(A.4)
and
v
 
(p n ; 0)

=
X
S2P(N )
%
 
(p n ; 0); S
  rS + % (p n ; 0);?  v
=
X
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g
%
 
(p n ; 0); S
  rS + % (p n ; 0);?  v ; (A.5)
for all n 2 N .
For nite quitting games
This section considers dierent conditional expected payos in the nite quitting game
GBk =
 
G ;Bk ; vk := (ik+1 1)

, where Bk is the stopping time for the game GBk .
We have:
E}k
 
~rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0
=
1
P}k (Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0)
Z
fBk<ik+1 1; ~Y nBk =0g
~rn( ~YBk ) dP}k
=
1
P}k (Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0)
ik+1 2X
i=ik
Z
fBk=i ; ~Y nBk =0g
~rn( ~Yi) dP}k
=
ik+1 2X
i=ik
P}k (Bk = i ;
~Y ni = 0)
P}k (Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0)
E}k
 
~rn( ~YBk )
Bk = i ; ~Y ni = 0
=
ik+1 2X
i=ik
P}k
 
Bk = i
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 0E}k ~rn( ~YBk )Bk = i ; ~Y nBk = 0
(A.6)
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respectively
E}k
 
~rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1
=
1
P}k (Bk < ik+1   1; ~YBk = 1)
E}k
 
~rn( ~YBk )1fBk<ik+1 1; ~Y nBk =1g

=
1
P}k (Bk < ik+1   1; ~YBk = 1)
ik+1 2X
i=ik
E}k
 
~rn( ~YBk )1fBk=i ; ~Y nBk =1g

=
ik+1 2X
i=ik
P}k (Bk = i ;
~Y nBk
= 1)
P}k (Bk < ik+1   1; ~YBk = 1)
E}k
 
~rn( ~YBk )
Bk = i ; ~Y nBk = 1
=
ik+1 2X
i=ik
P}k
 
Bk = i
Bk < ik+1   1; ~Y nBk = 1E}k ~rn( ~YBk )Bk = i ; ~Y nBk = 1;
(A.7)
and analogously we get
E(} nk ;c)
 
~rn( ~YBk )
Bk < ik+1   1
=
1
P(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1)
Z
fBk<ik+1 1g
~rn( ~YBk ) dP(} nk ;c)
=
1
P(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1)
ik+1 2X
i=ik
Z
fBk=ig
~rn( ~Yi) dP(} nk ;c)
=
1
P(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1)
ik+1 2X
i=ik
P(} nk ;c)
(Bk = i)
P(} nk ;c)
(Bk = i)
Z
fBk=ig
~rn( ~Yi) dP(} nk ;c)
=
ik+1 2X
i=ik
P(} nk ;c)
(Bk = i)
P(} nk ;c)
(Bk < ik+1   1)
E(} nk ;c)
 
~rn( ~YBk )
Bk = i
=
ik+1 2X
i=ik
P(} nk ;c)
 
Bk = i
Bk < ik+1   1E(} nk ;c) ~rn( ~YBk )Bk = i: (A.8)
Besides this,
E}k
 
~rn( ~YBk )
Bk = i ; ~Y nBk = 0
=
1
P}k (Bk = i ;
~Y nBk
= 0)
Z
fBk=i ; ~Y nBk =0g
~rn( ~YBk )dP}k
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holds, and furthermore we get
E}k
 
~rn( ~YBk )
Bk = i ; ~Y nBk = 0 (A.9)
=
Qi 1
j=ik
%(pi ;?) 
P
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g %(pi ; S )  rnSQi 1
j=ik
%(pi ;?) 
P
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g %(pi ; S )
=
P
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g %(pi ; S )  rnSP
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g %(pi ; S )
=
(1  pni )
P
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g %
 
(p ni ; 0); S
  rnS
(1  pni )
P
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g %
 
(p ni ; 0); S

=
P
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g %
 
(p ni ; 0); S
  rnSP
S2P(Nnfng)nf?g %
 
(p ni ; 0); S

=
Qi 1
j=ik
%
 
(p ni ; 0);?
 PS2P(Nnfng)nf?g % (p ni ; 0); S  rnS
i 1Q
j=ik
%
 
(p ni ; 0);?
 PS2P(Nnfng)nf?g % (p ni ; 0); S
= E(} nk ;c)
 
~rn( ~YBk )
Bk = i (A.10)
for all i 2 Bk and n 2 N .
Another useful equation is the following:
E}k
 
~rn( ~Y )  1fBk<ik+1 1g
Bk > 
=
1
P}k (Bk > )
Z
fBk<g
~rn( ~Y )  1fBk<ik+1 1gdP}k
=
P}k (Bk < ik+1   1; Bk < )
P}k (Bk < ik+1   1; Bk < )P}k (Bk > )
Z
fBk<;Bk<ik+1 1g
~rn( ~Y )dP}k
= P}k
 
Bk < ik+1   1jBk > 
  E}k ~rn( ~YBk )j < Bk < ik+1   1: (A.11)
Decomposition lemma
Lemma A.0.1. Let (
^; A^; P^) be a probability space and U : 
^ ! R a random variable
with jU j  K, K 2 R+, thenE^(U )  K  P^(Ac) + sup
!^2A
jU (!^)j
holds for all A 2 A^, where E^ denotes the expected value referring to the probability measure
P^ and Ac := 
^ n A.
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Proof.E^(U ) = E^ U  1A + U  1Ac
 E^ U  1A+ E^ U  1Ac
 E^ jU j  1A+ E^ jU j  1Ac
Since U is bounded by K , one obtainsE^(U )  E^ K  1Ac+ E^  sup
!^2A
jU (!^)j  1A

 K  P^(Ac) + sup
!^2A
jU (!^)j  P^(A)
 K  P^(Ac) + sup
!^2A
jU (!^)j:
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Appendix B.
Instructions and examples for the
software
Input le
Since a quitting game is given by the set of players and a family of payo vectors, one has
to think about, how to submit this information to the program. We decided to do it via
an input le. In order to keep the data small, which should be read, one has to sort the
family of payo vectors sensible. Therefore we encode the quitting coalitions S 2 P(N )
with the bijective function f as follows:
f : P(N )! f0; 1; : : : ; 2N 1g; S 7! f (S ) :=
X
i2S
2i 1:
Because S = ? leads by denition to the payo rS = 0, we can neglect S = ? as input of
the data-le. So the le nally consists of the number of players in the rst row, followed
by the sorted { according to the coding-number { payo vectors.
For example: Consider the following game (cf. [14]):
Player 3 c Player 2 Player 3 q Player 2
c q c q
Player 1
c
q
	
(1; 3; 0)
(0; 1; 3)
(1; 0; 1)
Player 1
c
q
(3; 0; 1)
(0; 1; 1)
(1; 1; 0)
(0; 0; 0)
The data input le looks like:
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3
1, 3, 0
0, 1, 3
1, 0, 1
3, 0, 1
0, 1, 1
1, 1, 0
0, 0, 0
Another advantage of the encoding is, that it is easy to determine the action vector be-
longing to the code-number of a quitting coalition in a program.
Remark. Usually, as written in [11], all input data should be rational and represented by
the numerator and denominator written in binary. We refrain at this moment from this
requirement and allow input data, which is real respectively rational and not represented
by numerator and denominator.
Overview: Implemented programs
We provided the following (sequential) programs for the analysis of quitting games:
Name Function
qg symmetry
Tests, if a given quitting game is symmetric.
Input: Quitting game
Output: (in results.txt)
{ two vectors of payos representing the two families of payos
for a symmetric game
{ one equilibrium for the game
qg dominant
Tests, if the players of the game have dominant strategies.
Input: Quitting game
Output: If dominant strategies exist, the players and the
corresponding strategy as well as the reduced game are
stored in results.txt. A hint is given at the end, whether the
resulting game is a quitting game or a one-step game.
qg pure
Tests, if a quitting game has a pure "-equilibrium.
Input: Quitting game, "
Output: If a pure "-equilibrium exists, the equilibrium is stored in
results.txt, otherwise a hint is given that no pure "-equilibrium
exists.
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qg instant
Searches for instant "-equilibria.
Executable in dierent modi.
Input: Quitting game, ", execution modus (number from 0 to 3)
Case 0-2: additional input: step size as power of two
Case 1: additional input: min-max-value for the players
Case 2: le with "-equilibria for the reduced one-step games
Case 3: le with the min-max values for the players and the
"-equilibria for the reduced one-step games
Output: If found, the rst column-vector of the instant "-equili-
brium, the player who plays quit with certainty, and for the
Cases 0 and 2 the used min-max values and the min-max prole of
the quit player.
qg stationary
Searches for stationary "-equilibra.
Input: Quitting game, ", step size as power of two
Output: If found, the stationary "-equilibrium for the game is
stored in results.txt.
The following parallel programs are available:
Name Function
qg instant
Searches for instant "-equilibria.
Input: Quitting game, step size as power of two, ", maximum
number of results per processor
Output: If found, the instant "-equilibria.
qg stationary
Searches for stationary "-equilibra.
Input: Quitting game, step size as power of two, ", maximum
number of results per processor
Output: If found, the stationary "-equilibrium for the game is
stored in results.txt.
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List of examples
For the sequential programs we examined four examples. We give the input les in the
following:
Example1.txt Example2.txt Example3.txt Example4.txt
3 3 3 3
1; 1; 1  1; 0; 0 3; 1; 1 1; 3; 0
1; 1; 1 0; 1; 0 2; 2; 2 0; 1; 3
0; 0; 3 1; 1; 0 1; 1; 3 1; 0; 1
1; 1; 1 0; 2; 1 1;  1; 0 3; 0; 1
0; 3; 0 2; 1; 1 3; 1; 4 0; 1; 1
3; 0; 0 1; 3;  1 0; 1; 1 1; 1; 0
2; 2; 2 0; 2; 3  1; 1; 1 0; 0; 0
For the parallel programs we took the following examples:
Example5.txt Example6.txt Example7.txt
3 4 3
3; 1; 1 1; 4; 0; 0 0; 0; 2
2; 2; 2 4; 1; 0; 0  2; 0; 1
1; 1; 3 1; 1; 1; 1 1; 2; 1
1; 1; 0 0; 0; 1; 4 0; 1; 1
3; 1; 4 1; 1; 1; 0 1; 2; 3
0; 1; 1 0; 1; 1; 1 2; 1; 0
 1; 1; 1 1; 0; 0; 0  1; 1; 1
12 0; 0; 4; 1 10
0:0001 1; 0; 1; 1 0:001
100 1; 1; 0; 1 100
0; 1; 0; 0
1; 1; 1; 1
0; 0; 0; 1
0; 0; 1; 0
 1; 1; 1; 1
8
0:001
100
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Further reading
We give a short overview about literature which is related to quitting games and might be
interesting for a further reading.
Repeated games with absorbing states
1. Flesch, J., Thuijsman, F. and Vrieze, K.: Recursive repeated games with absorbing
states, Mathematics of Operations Research, 21, pp. 1016 { 1022, 1996
2. Flesch, J., Thuijsman, F. and Vrieze, O.J.: Cyclic Markov Equilibria in a stochastic
game, International Journal of Game Theory, 26, pp. 303 { 314, 1997
3. Solan, E.: Three-Player Absorbing Games, Mathematics of Operations Research, 24,
pp. 669 { 698, 1999
4. Thuijsman, F. and Vrieze, O. J.: On equilibria in stochastic games with absorbing
states, International Journal of Game Theory, 18, pp. 293 { 310, 1989
Quitting games in general
1. Simon, R.S.: A Topological Approach to Quitting Games, Mathematics of Operations
Research, 37, pp. 180 { 195, 2012
2. Simon, R.S.: The structure of non-zero-sum stochastic games, Advances in Applied
Mathematics, 38, pp. 1 { 26, 2007
3. Solan, E.: Subgame-Perfection in Quitting Games with Perfect Information, Mathe-
matics of Operations Research, 30, pp. 51 { 72, 2005
4. Solan, E. and Vieille, N.: Quitting Games - An Example, International Journal of
Game Theory, 31, pp. 365-381, 2003
5. Solan, E. and Vieille, N.: Quitting Games, Mathematics of Operations Research, 26,
pp. 265 { 285, 2001
6. Solan, E. and Vohra, R. V.: Correlated equilibria in quitting games, Mathematics of
Operations Research, 26, pp. 601 { 610, 2001
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Index of notation
a action vector, a = (a1; : : : ; aN )T 2 A 3
A -algebra for a quitting game 6
A -algebra for a one-step game 12
AI -algebra for a nite quitting game 29
A action space 3
m min-max value for player m 2 N 91
mp pure min-max value for player m 2 N 102
c strategy in the quitting game, where the player plays continue with certainty
all the time 34
c strategy in the nite quitting game, where the player plays continue with
certainty all the time 71
c all players play continue with certainty in the stage, i.e. c := 0 2 [0; 1]N 34
v maximum of the absolute value of the payo for a player in the one-step game
 v 14
 expected payo function for the quitting game 8
v expected payo function for the one-step game 12
gI ;v = g expected payo function for the nite quitting game GI ;v 30
 v one-step game corresponding to the quitting game G , with continue payo
v 2 RN and  v = (G ; v) 10
G quitting game, G = (N ; (rS )S2P(N )) 3
GI ;v nite quitting game corresponding to the quitting game (G), with continue
payo v 2 RN , with stages I , GI ;v = (G ; I ; v) 28
Hk random variable, denotes the random history up to time k 2 N 7
~Hk random variable, denotes the random history in the nite quitting game GI ;v
up to time k 2 I 29
I set of stages, I  N 28
N set of players 3
N number of players 3

 sample space of a quitting game 6

 sample space of a one-step game 12

I sample space of a nite quitting game 29
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 (strategy) prole in the quitting game,  = (1; : : : ; N )T 4
n strategy for player n 2 N , n = (pn1 ; pn2 ; : : :) 4
j subgame prole induced by  in the quitting game staring at time j 2 N 5
nj subgame strategy for player n 2 N induced by n in the quitting game staring
at time j 2 N 5
( n ; ~n) alternative strategy prole for player n 2 N in the quitting game,  2 ,
~n 2 n 4
}I := } (strategy) prole for the nite quitting game, } = (}
1; : : : ; }N )T 29
}nI := }
n strategy for player n 2 N for the nite quitting game GI ;v , }nI=fi ;:::;jg =
(pni ; : : : ; p
n
j ) 29
p (strategy) prole for a one-step game 11
pn probability that player n 2 N plays quit in the one-step game 11
pni probability that player n 2 N plays quit at time i 2 N 4
 set of all strategy proles of a quitting game 4
n set of all strategies for player n 2 N 4
(p n ; ~pn) alternative strategy prole for player n 2 N in a one-step game, p 2 [0; 1]N ,
~pn 2 [0; 1] 11
Pp probability measure for the one-step game (with respect to the given prole
p 2 [0; 1]N ) 12
P probability measure for the quitting game (with respect to a given strategy
prole  2 ) 7
q strategy in the quitting game, where the player plays quit with certainty all
the time 34
qi strategy in the quitting game, where the player plays quit at time i 2 N and
continue in all the other stages with certainty 34
qi strategy for the nite quitting game GI ;v , where the player plays quit at time
i 2 I and continue in all the other stages from I with certainty 71
q all players play quit with certainty in the stage, i.e. q := 1 = (1; : : : 1)T 2
[0; 1]N 34
% (probability) function 5
r payo function of a quitting game 3
rmax maximum of the absolute value of the payos a player could get in the quitting
game 19
(rS )S2P(N ) family of payo vectors, rS = (r 1S ; : : : ; r
N
S )
T 2 RN 3
~rv payo function of a one-step game 10
S quitting coalition 3
 stopping time for the quitting game 7
I stopping time for the nite quitting game GI ;v 30
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~t transition law 3
v continue payo vector in a one-step game, v 2 RN 10
Xk random variable, random state of the quitting game at time k 2 N 7
Xk random variable, random state of the one-step game at time k 2 f1; 2g 12
~Xk random variable, random state of the nite quitting game at time k 2 I 29
Y random variable, random action vector taken in the one-step game 12
Yk random variable, random action vector played at time k 2 N, in a quitting
game 7
~Yk random variable, random action vector taken in the nite quitting game at
time k 2 I 29
Y nk n-th component of the random variable Yk , denotes the random action taken
at time k 2 N from player n 2 N 7
Z state space 3
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